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This thesis examines three separate topics related to corporate asset restructurings 
involving mergers and acquisitions and divestitures. Chapter 2 studies whether the 
explosive rise of boutique investment banks is justified by their M&A buyside 
success. Using the U.S. domestic deals during the period 2000 to 2016, short- and 
long-term event study analyses are performed to estimate shareholder wealth effects 
on boutique-led M&As. The results show that acquiring firms represented by 
boutique advisors generate significantly higher abnormal returns than those advised 
by full-service banks in difficult-to-value transactions with greater information 
asymmetry. These deals include private target deals, cross-industry acquisitions, 
and deals involving inexperienced bidders in the target sector. In these deals, 
boutique advisors reduce information asymmetry on the target firm and accrue 
more value creation to acquirers than do full-service banks using their distinctive 
knowledge and expertise in the target industry. This study provides important 
implications for conventional wisdom on the role of financial advisors in M&As.    
Chapter 3 investigates various motives of bank divestiture that are previously 
undocumented based on the neoclassical theory and the resource-based view. 
Contrasting to previous findings, I find that bank divestitures are not motivated by 
regulatory capital requirement but are driven by mergers and bank-specific 
characteristics such as operating inefficiency, size, performance, and financial 
constraints. I also study how banks choose between focusing and diversifying 
strategies using both mergers and divestitures in the perspective of organizational 




banks’ performance and productivity. Banks use focusing strategy when they 
experience increasing performance and loan growth while diversifying strategy is 
pursued when they face financial distress and operating inefficiency. These findings 
have an important implication on short-term equity valuation: diversifying strategy 
induces negative announcement returns due to this endogenous selection by banks 
with declining productivity while firms with focusing strategy receive premium 
valuation due to their ex-ante outperformance. However, in the long-run, the 
abnormal effects dissipate and banks with both strategies perform comparably to 
their benchmarks. These findings provide considerable insights as to the role of 
bank divestiture in dynamic asset restructuring and subsequent performance.    
Chapter 4 examines the role of divestiture as a turnaround strategy for a sample 
of U.S. firms faced with financial distress during the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Despite a widespread belief that divestments in an illiquid market destroy firm 
value with potential fire sale discounts, the evidence shows that divestiture has a 
positive impact on resolution of financial distress and long-term performance 
recovery. Over the 3-year period subsequent to divestiture, firms significantly 
improve their long-term operating performance compared to their non-divesting 
benchmarks. This outperformance appears to be attributed to financing benefits 
linked to an asset liquidation that can be used to relax financial constraints and 
subsidize continued investment in the remaining divisions. On the contrary, 
retrenchment strategies focusing on short-term cash flows and cost-cutting tactics 
through operational and financial restructurings exacerbate financial distress and 
trigger performance decline. This research sheds light on the long-term implications 
of corporate turnaround strategies employed by distressed firms in periods of 
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This thesis explores several topics related to corporate asset restructuring with a 
focus on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and divestitures. Both strategies involve 
restructuring of assets. M&As represent consolidation of entities or assets through 
a form of absorption from one entity to another or combination of two firms into 
one. Divestitures involve sale of divisions and partial assets. While a broad array of 
studies exists in this research area, the topics presented in this thesis are inspired by 
ongoing issues discoursed but have rarely been delved in empirical research. 
Examples of such inquiries include: why do acquirers hire boutique financial 
advisors and what is their economic contribution? how do banks use divestiture to 
reconfigure their asset portfolio and to achieve performance stability over their 
business cycle? what are the strategic and economic implications of divestiture on 
the long-term performance of financially distressed firms during periods of 
economic crisis? Investigations into these questions comprise the next three 
chapters of my thesis. Specifically, Chapter 2 of this thesis aims to empirically 
examine the primary drivers of increasing reputation and involvement of boutique 
financial advisors in large scale and high-profile merger transactions.   
Over the period 2000 to 2016, boutique investment banks have partaken in a 
large volume of M&A activities amounting to aggregated transaction value of 
approximately $2.3 trillion. During this period, their reputation started superseding 
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some of the largest names in the advisory market as well as in the investment 
banking league table. Prior study reports that boutique advisors are mostly limited 
to serving small and middle-market clients or larger and complex deals only in 
collaboration with full-service banks (Song, Wei, and Zhou, 2013). However, 
boutique firms founded by former bulge bracket bankers actually have skills and 
experiences to handle sizable deals on their own and established large-cap client 
portfolio from their prior relationships. Despite their growing importance, limited 
insights have been offered about boutique investment banks. One of the reasons is 
because their increasing reputation is a fairly recent phenomenon and prior to mid-
2000s, the M&A advisory space has been dominated by bulge bracket and other 
full-service financiers. Accordingly, much of the attentions has been naturally given 
to so-called top-tier bulge bracket advisors (Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000; 
Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov, 
Petmezas, and Travlos, 2012). 
Another reason is due to the lack of established database providing 
classification between full-service and boutique financial advisors. Hence, the 
classification was manually performed by cross-checking various sources such as 
S&P Global Market Intelligence, SEC filings, company websites, news media, and 
past/local periodicals at the time of deal announcements. My classification not only 
is more comprehensive than the prior study with 141 vs. 462 boutique advisors, but 
also corrects earlier misclassifications in Song et al. (2013) as the definition of 
“boutique investment bank” has evolved over time.  
Based on this advisor classification data, I measure the quality of boutique 
investment banks in comparison with full-service banks. The value of financial 
advisors is estimated using 3- day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of their 
buyside clients around the acquisition announcement date. I find that acquiring 
firms represented by boutique advisors generate significantly higher returns than 
those advised by full-service banks in transactions which involve greater 
information asymmetry. These economic gains are explicitly observed in 
acquisitions of private targets, cross-industry deals, and acquisitions by firms 
without prior experience in the target industry. These findings imply that boutique 
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advisors are particularly useful for transactions which require high level of industry 
expertise and due diligence skills. 
This abnormal effect holds even after comparing only similar deals between 
the two advisor groups based on propensity score matching (PSM) and after 
controlling for unobservable endogenous selection bias using Heckman’s two-step 
model. Prior studies only consider unobservable bias when comparing performance 
across different advisor groups. However, it is important to control for endogeneity 
derived by observable bias as client portfolios between boutique and full-service 
banks are extremely different. In this study, I compare matching deals based on 
firm and deal characteristics to eliminate observable selection bias. Further, I 
document long-term performance implications estimated using buy-and-hold 
returns and calendar-time portfolio returns. The results indicate that investors who 
purchase the bidder stock portfolio comprised of boutique deals outperform those 
who invest in full-service portfolio. 
This research offers insights as to why boutique intermediaries are becoming 
more important. They smartly capture niche sector to mainstream clients by 
utilizing their sector-specialized skills to uncover information asymmetry residing 
in difficult-to-value firms and generate real synergy gains for their acquirer clients. 
Corporate takeovers normally cost millions to billions of dollars per transaction for 
acquirers. Hence, it could be risky to acquire opaque firms if not assessed properly. 
However, such information asymmetry could turn into greater synergy gains if 
unravelled by the financial advisor, which could give the acquirer bargaining power. 
Thus, in opaque deals, financial intermediation is much more crucial as it requires 
specific target sector knowledge and intensive due diligence to accurately value the 
target firm.  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis attempts to overcome two limitations in divestiture 
literature. While the financial services industry takes the largest proportion of 
divestiture transactions in the U.S., there is little known about divestiture of banks. 
Majority of research disregards the financial industry due to its association with 
intensive regulatory scrutiny and lack of segment data. Hence, divestiture studies 
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have mainly been conducted on listed industrial firms with plant-based data or 
segment-specific financial information. Exclusion of banking firms from the 
corporate divestiture sample, however, incurs data-snooping1 issue (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997), especially considering that a large share of deals occurs in the 
financial sector.  
Another limitation comes from the existing studies’ restricted use of theories 
and sole focus on a type of divestiture. Apparently, mainstream divestiture studies 
in finance rely on a single theory in which divestiture is portrayed as a remedy for 
agency problem residing in diversified firms. Earlier studies find that divestiture of 
unrelated (non-core) assets by diversified firms, which increases corporate focus on 
their primary business significantly improves abnormal returns during the 
announcement period. Due to this strongly positive correlation between focus-
increasing divestiture and firm value, they conclude that focusing strategy 
eliminates diversification discount which is a result of agency issues such as: 
divided managerial attention, inefficient resource allocation across divisions, and 
subsequent underinvestment (overinvestment) in profitable units (unprofitable units) 
(John and Ofek, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1999; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; 
Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 2012).  
To resolve these limitations, this chapter tackles data-snooping problem by 
separately examining divestiture of banks and introduces an alternative perspective 
that counters conventional interpretation of the role divestiture plays in corporate 
diversification. Specifically, I prove inapplicability of the agency theory to bank 
diversification. In analysing the role of divestiture, I incorporate the neoclassical 
theory and the resource-based view. As opposed to the agency theory which 
proposes that diversification is a product of managerial entrenchment and 
undermines firm performance, these theories assume that managers in diversified 
firms are as equally motivated as those in specialized firms to maximize profit. This 
alternative hypothesis views divestiture as a vital means of obtaining funds and 
value-increasing activity. Based on this hypothesis, I find contrasting motivations 
 
1 Data snooping refers to an exclusion of certain observations from the sample after the researcher 
observes the data to find patterns which make the results statistically significant.  
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for bank divestitures to the prior study by Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1991). 
They suggest that bank divestitures are less of strategic decisions but more of forced 
restructurings by regulatory capital requirements. Contrarily, my results show that 
banks implement divestitures rather to fund segments with increasing performance 
and further the growth. Banks also divest to improve operating efficiency and 
resolve financial distress.   
These theories also predict that restructuring decisions between focusing and 
diversification should be perceived as a process of search and match for synergistic 
opportunities over the corporate business cycle: firms focus on their core segment 
when it has sound performance and growth potential, but they diversify their 
revenue stream into a different sector when their current business is in mature stage 
and has no further competitive advantage in its industry. I provide empirical 
evidence to this hypothesis and show that banks use focusing strategy when they 
experience increasing performance and loan growth but use diversifying strategy 
when their operation becomes inefficient and less profitable. These findings 
repudiate previously identified divestiture motives based on the agency theory and 
show that diversification is irrelevant to managerial entrenchment.  
This chapter further shows that diversifying strategy may be costly in the short-
term due to the underlying firm-specific conditions such as ex-ante 
underperformance, which endogenously affect divestiture announcement returns. 
However, banks implementing diversifying strategy perform comparatively to their 
industry benchmarks in the long-term as it is initiated to reverse declining 
performance and improve productivity. Although the neoclassical theory has been 
previously applied to studies investigating alternative motives for corporate 
diversification, it has not been adopted in divestiture research. This chapter 
empirically examines the theory and corroborates that divestiture is an integral part 
of dynamic asset restructuring, which firms jointly undertake along with mergers 
to alter corporate scope and sustain their competitive advantage.  
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis evaluates divestiture as a turnaround strategy along 
with other turnaround strategies that financially distressed firms use during periods 
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of economic crisis. These strategies include asset, managerial, operational, and 
financial restructuring. Majority of firms are found to respond to the economic 
crisis by adopting retrenchment strategies which include operational and financial 
restructuring such as reduction in costs and expenses. However, firms relying on 
short-term efficiency and cash flow may experience a weakened market positioning 
or performance stagnation post-crisis. This is due to the lack of investment and 
sustainable financing sources to survive the prolonged recessionary period (Denis 
and Kruse, 2000; Gulati, Nohria, Wohlgezogen, 2010; Mann and Byun, 2017). 
Thus, this chapter identifies which turnaround strategies are associated with the 
improvement in long-term operating performance and with the recovery from 
financial distress. According to the corporate turnaround literature, a successful 
turnaround can be achieved by implementing strategic reorientation which has 
long-term effects on firm performance with continued growth and profitability 
(Barker and Duhaime, 1997). Strategic reorientation occurs when firms change the 
existing strategy to gain competitive advantage corresponding to their declining 
performance compared to their industry counterparts.     
One of the ways to achieve strategic reorientation is to reconfigure a firm’s 
asset portfolio through divestiture. Divestiture allows firms to dispose unfit assets, 
focus on profitable divisions, and increase investment efficiency on the remaining 
assets. The proceeds from divestiture can also be used to repay debt and lower 
leverage or invest in positive NPV projects (Ahn and Denis, 2004; Hovakimian and 
Titman, 2006; Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan, 2018). As such, this chapter 
demonstrates that divestiture is the most viable strategy that firms can take to both 
relax financial constraints and improve long-term operating performance. Further 
findings show that complementing divestiture with other restructuring strategies is 
associated with greater improvement in performance. However, managerial 
restructuring and other retrenchment strategies alone cannot effectively turnaround 
performance of declining firms.   
While management restructuring entails a radical change in strategy along with 
replacement of the incumbent manager, it is likely to be ineffectual in resolving 
financial distress triggered not by mismanagement, but by a deteriorating economic 
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condition. Moreover, retrenchment as a strategy is not viable to attain long-term 
profitability. For example, operational restructuring includes investment reduction, 
COGS reduction, fixed asset reduction, and layoffs and financial restructuring 
involves dividend cut or omission. These restructuring tactics are all designed to 
cut costs to enhance short-term cash flows, but also deter investment and growth. 
Further, other types of financial restructuring such as debt or equity issue could be 
costly during periods of severe external financing frictions. Debt issue involves 
higher interest payment and increase in leverage while equity is normally issued at 
discount for financially distressed firms. Thus, relying solely on retrenchment 
measures and alternative financing options could deter performance recovery and 
even exacerbate financial distress.  
Despite discernible financing benefits related to divestiture as a turnaround 
strategy, it is less commonly utilized during economic downturn. The literature 
indicates that firms shun asset sales when the market is illiquid because there are 
not enough industry buyers and assets are sold at fire sale price (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992, 2011). Empirical studies investigating the relation between market illiquidity 
from industry shocks and asset liquidation document severe discounts in asset value. 
However, these studies mostly focus on industry-wide distress. Studies based on 
the economic crisis find no such evidence as fire sale discounts upon divestiture 
announcements (Alexandrou and Sudarsanam, 2001; Finlay, Marshall, and 
McColgan, 2018). They rather argue that the financing benefits outweigh any 
potential liquidity discounts that might have been applied to the asset price. 
Consistent with this financing hypothesis, this chapter also shows that divestiture 
announcements neither incur fire sale discounts, nor destroy shareholder value.   
This research is both topical and practical as it tackles corporate strategies that 
can be exercised by firms facing economy-wide distress, especially with the 
ongoing Coronavirus pandemic. First, I find that firms optimizing their asset 
portfolio through divestiture recuperate from financial distress and significantly 
improve their long-term operating performance through continued investment. I 
also show that divestiture is a suitable strategy for distressed firms during the 
economic crisis because fire sale discounts are unobservable; liquidity can be 
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provided by non-industry buyers and the financing benefits offset expected liquidity 
discounts. Most importantly, while turnaround studies examining crisis-related 
restructurings fail to document long-run recovery and profitability due to their focus 
on retrenchment strategies, this research reiterates the importance of choosing 
crisis-driven strategy based on its long-term effects as over-pursuing retrenchment 
strategies can be short-sighted.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 studies boutique financial 
advisors in mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 evaluates the role of divestiture in 
dynamic asset restructuring of bank holding companies. Chapter 4 investigates the 
long-term performance impact of divestiture as a turnaround strategy during the 
financial crisis. Chapter 5 summarizes main findings from each chapter and discuss 
further research ideas.  








Do Boutique Investment Banks 




2.1 Introduction  
 
By serving mid-size to large cap corporations, boutique investment banks have 
become a major driver of the financial advisory market in recent decades. Refinitive 
(2018) reports that the M&A fees earned by boutique investment banks surpassed 
those earned by top five banks in 2012. 2  In some cases boutique advisors’ 
reputation, as manifested in the various league tables, has climbed above bulge 
bracket banks’, with boutique advisors now leading some of the largest M&A 
transactions and commanding an ever-growing share of the total deal value and 
revenue pie.3 The success of boutique advisors can be attributed to a number of 
 
2 See Refinitiv, July 31, 2018, “Mega deals keep the M&A boom afloat” 
3 The league table is available in Thomson One SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database, Yearly 
Advisors Rank by Value. In 2018, four boutique investment banks, Evercore, Centerview Partners, 
Lazard, and PJT Partners preceded the largest banks such as Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citi, 
Credit Suisse, and Barclays from the top 10 US league table. Refinitiv, May 7, 2019, “Boutique 
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factors. Among them is the sector-specific expertise and skillset that I tend to 
observe with boutique advisors. Further, most of the top-tier ones are typically 
founded by experienced former bulge bracket dealmakers with access to established 
client and investor bases which are instrumental in handling large scale 
transactions.4 The very nature and structure of boutique financial advisors also tend 
to be associated with more independent advice and less conflicts of interest (Song, 
Wei, and Zhou, 2013) relative to full-service banks who often arrange deal 
financing and cross-sell multiple financial services for profit (Allen, Jagtiani, 
Peristiani, and Saunders, 2004). The 2008 financial crisis further enhanced the 
demand for boutique M&A advisors as it was associated with negative investor 
perception and stricter regulatory scrutiny toward large banks.5  
Prior to the mid-2000s, the M&A advisory space has been dominated by bulge 
bracket and other full-service financiers. Accordingly, the existing literature is 
naturally devoted to examining the role such top-tier advisors play in the M&A 
market (Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 
2010; Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2012). Despite the 
continuous growth of boutique advisors’ market share, limited insights have been 
offered on the drivers of their success and whether this trend can be justified by 
their M&A deal-making skills and ability to deliver synergistic value. Accordingly, 
this study aims to shed light on the overarching question whether employing a 
boutique financial advisor comes with financial gains for acquiring firms and their 
shareholders.    
I study a sample of U.S. M&As with a buyside financial advisor over the period 
2000 to 2016. Overall, the sample comprises of 1,848 deals linked to boutique 
advisors and 3,162 deals advised by full-service banks. This sample includes a more 
recent period than previous studies, encapsulating the significant growth of 
boutiques in the aftermath of the financial crisis.6 I also employ a comprehensive 
 
M&A Fees” also highlights that in 2018 despite a 3% fall in total completed M&A fees from pre-
financial crisis high in 2007, boutique fees increased by 80%. 
4 See Financial Times, March 16, 2014, “Small proves beautiful at boutique banks” 
5 See Financial Times, April 18, 2019, “Rise of the boutique banks” 
6 This period represents richer sample of boutique deals than mid-1990s which is included in Song 
et al. (2013) and during which boutique banks are known mostly for advising smaller deals and 
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manual classification approach for financial advisors based on various sources to 
tackle potential misclassifications.7 More importantly, unlike Song et al. (2013) 
who examine the impact of boutique financial advisors in M&A public deal premia8, 
I focus on the actual value creation mechanism of boutique intermediaries by 
studying directly their impact on short- and long-run M&A deal performance. This 
approach allows me to capture a broader spectrum of potential gains from the 
combination of firms that might be attributable to the deal-making skills of boutique 
advisors.9 In addition, it allows me to include private deals which take up a larger 
share of M&A transactions in the market and comprise the majority of deals led by 
boutique advisors.   
In general, private deals present challenges for financial advisors with aspects 
of target search, screening, and valuation, among others, partly because of 
information scarcity or asymmetry associated with private firms (Capron and Shen, 
2007; Officer et al, 2009). Therefore, the in-depth sector knowledge and experience 
that can be typically observed with boutique advisors can be more relevant in a 
private deal setting, better placing them in identifying, valuing, and negotiating 
M&A opportunities that deliver synergistic gains.  
Conversely, public deals require additional resources and integrated services 
to handle a broad range of tasks such as regulatory and shareholder approval, 
fairness opinion, and financing for large scale deals which are typically tackled by 
full-service banks. Therefore, arguably acquisitions of private targets may comprise 
a better testing ground to investigate deal outcome differentials among boutique 
and full-service advisors. I gauge short-term gains to acquiring firms through their 
 
represented insignificant proportion of advisory market share. Moreover, several top-tier boutique 
firms such as Centerview Partners, Moelis & Company, and PJT Partners were only founded post-
2006. Lastly, including the post-financial crisis period is important since boutique advisors started 
gaining significant market share since 2007. See Refinitive, May 7, 2019, “Boutique M&A Fees”.  
7 The number of boutique advisors classified in this study is 462 compared to 141 in Song et al. 
(2013). 
8 Song et al. (2013) find that bidders (targets) hiring boutique advisors pay (receive) lower (higher) 
premium than those hiring full-service advisors due to their skills associated with industry 
specialization. 
9 As observed in previous studies, skilled advisors with industry expertise can identify better merger 
opportunities, reduce transaction costs, and generate greater value for their clients (Bowers and 
Miller, 1990; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Song et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2017). 
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cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the merger announcement date. 
The OLS regression analysis shows that deals advised by boutique advisors are 
subject to a 0.8% higher CAR relative to those linked to full-service advisors. The 
corresponding dollar wealth gain differential is economically significant and 
translates to $96 million for the average-sized acquirer in my sample.  
Consistent with my conjecture, I also find that boutique advisors undertake a 
higher share of private deals than do full-service banks and are more successful at 
achieving superior announcement returns for acquirers in this case. In regression 
tests, the corresponding coefficient of boutique advisors for private deals reflects a 
1.4% higher CAR.10 In contrast, the return differential between boutique led and 
full-service led public deals is statistically insignificant. These findings show for 
the first time that employing a boutique financial advisor can yield better results for 
acquirers in private deals and offer a new dimension on the role of financial advisors 
in M&A outcomes.   
As documented by the literature, the OLS approach suffers from unobservable 
bias since advisors are not randomly selected by their clients and certain advisor 
selection criteria that are unaccounted for in my model can be driving the results.11 
To control for unobservable bias, I implement Heckman’s two-step analysis using 
an instrumental variable which captures whether a given financial advisor has 
advised an acquirer in the past five years. Interestingly, the first stage regression 
analysis indicates that boutique advisors are more likely to be retained by their 
previous clients for future acquisitions than are their full-service counterparts. 
Further, I find that boutique advisors are less likely to be chosen by highly levered 
firms and larger bidders.12 Yet, boutiques seem to be the choice of advisors when a 
deal is harder to value and negotiate; such deals include inter-industry M&As and 
 
10 This wealth gain is comparable to $121.4 million for a mean-sized bidder acquiring a private 
target. 
11 The omitted variable bias in financial advisor study is also discussed in Golubov et al. (2012) and 
Song et al. (2013). 
12 Highly levered firms require an advisor who can arrange financing for the acquisition. Large firms 
may prefer an advisor who can provide financing and more integrated advisory services for its scale 
and complexity.  
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deals involving stock offers. 13  The second stage results show no evidence of 
unobservable selection bias, verifying my earlier findings from the OLS analysis.   
Further, I perform a propensity score matching (PSM) where comparable deals 
from each advisor group are matched based on firm and deal characteristics to 
compare their acquisition performance. Previous studies investigating the quality 
of M&A advisors do not account for observable differences in their client portfolios 
and simply compare overall deals among different groups of advisors. Such 
comparison could potentially produce biased outcomes as it does not approximate 
the counterfactual; an alternative outcome had a deal led by a full-service advisor 
instead been advised by a boutique advisor. By applying PSM, I effectively control 
for endogeneity originating from fundamental dissimilarities in observables and 
examine whether boutique dealmakers have superior deal-making skills relative to 
their larger competitors based on similar transaction portfolios. The results indicate 
that the excess return associated with boutique is 1.57% in all deals and 1.47% for 
private deals, corroborating that hiring a boutique advisor typically yields a better 
M&A outcome. Moreover, I find that the documented performance differential 
remains robust when comparing the performance of boutique advisors to that of the 
top 10 full-service (bulge bracket) banks only.  
Additionally, I examine the longer-term impact of boutique advisors on 
shareholder gains by employing buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) and 
calendar-time portfolio return (CTPR) analyses. Results from both measures 
indicate that acquiring firms hiring boutique investment banks as M&A advisors 
generate greater long-term value for their shareholders. Abnormal returns for 12- 
and 24-month post-acquisition windows aggregate to 7.2% and 14.4%, respectively.  
My findings may make one wonder why do boutiques perform better than full-
service banks and why in private acquisitions only? I deduce the reason from 
Capron and Shen (2007) who conclude that acquiring managers make informed 
choices in the acquisition of private targets where information asymmetry is greater. 
 
13 Diversifying deals have higher information asymmetry than those within related industry and, 
thus, require specific knowledge in the target sector. Stock offers are more difficult to negotiate than 
cash deals and are negatively associated with shareholder returns in public deals.  
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For public deals in which all the information about the target firm is known, there 
may be little room to make difference in terms of offer price among capable 
financial advisors. Capron and Shen (2007) introduce two conflicting economic 
theories regarding information asymmetry to the M&A literature. The information 
economics theory (Akerlof, 1970) suggests that information asymmetry obstructs 
bidders from pursuing suitable targets by incurring costs to uncover the intrinsic 
value of the target. On the contrary, the strategic factor market theory (Makadok 
and Barney, 2001) views information asymmetry as an opportunity to obtain private 
information through which bidders can take advantage of the acquisition14. If a 
financial advisor has significant knowledge in the target industry and can identify 
a better target for the acquirer, the concerns suggested by the information 
economics theory can be resolved, and as a result, the bidder can save a great deal 
of search costs. Further, financial advisors take a considerably important role in 
offering proper due diligence and valuation by minimizing information asymmetry, 
thereby providing bidders better bargaining power. Boutique advisors in this regard 
are very resourceful as they not only are strongly sector specialized but are also 
frequently hired for due diligence to provide fairness opinions in public deals. This 
theory has been attested by Song, Wei, and Zhou (2013) who emphasize the skills 
and devotions of boutique advisors. They find that complex deals such as cross 
industry mergers and mergers with competing bids, which require greater due 
diligence, are more likely to involve boutique advisors, and they take longer time 
to complete transactions than do full-service banks to improve deal quality.  
To support my argument on the skills and expertise of boutique advisors, I 
employ two additional proxies of information asymmetry following Graham et al. 
(2017) and perform propensity score matching. The first proxy is cross-industry 
deals in which target firms operate in different industries from acquiring firms. The 
second proxy is bidders without prior acquisition experience in the target industry. 
Similar to my findings in private deals, in both measures, bidders hiring boutique 
advisors outperform those hiring full-service advisors by an average of 1.37%.  
 
14 This theory is supported by Li and Tong (2018) who find positive correlation between bidders’ 
announcement returns and targets’ information asymmetry. 
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This study contributes to the literature in various important ways. First, 
employing a comprehensive manual classification of financial advisors, I provide 
new empirical evidence that boutique advisors create more value for their buyside 
clients than do their full-service counterparts and are more likely to be retained by 
their clients in future transactions. These findings challenge conventional wisdom 
that full-service banks’ advanced capabilities and resources place them better to 
create value in M&A deals and offer a rational justification for the significant rise 
of boutique advisors’ reputation and league table rankings. Second, I offer new 
evidence that boutique financial advisors tend to outperform full-service banks – 
even the top-tier ones – when leading private deals, while they also do not 
underperform even in more high profile, public deals. The fact that boutique 
advisors yield superior M&A deal outcomes in acquisitions of private targets 
complements the role of financial advisors in the success of M&As and has 
important implications for financial advisor choice when valuation uncertainty is 
high. Lastly, my findings yield important economic implications associated with 
antitrust issues within the market for financial intermediation. Previously, the 
advisory space has been dominated by a small number of bulge bracket banks who 
were largely responsible for the financial crisis. This dominance of limited number 
of players can inhibit competition and a free market economy. The emergence of 
boutique firms, therefore, is meaningful in that it can promote healthy competition 
and potentially enhance the overall quality of advisory services.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents literature 
review related to financial advisors in M&A. Section 2.3 analyses market share of 
boutique investment banks. Section 2.4 illustrates data collection and descriptive 
statistics. Section 2.5 reports empirical analysis. Section 2.6 provides additional 
robustness tests, and Section 2.7 concludes the study.  
 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
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It is an intuitive supposition that the quality of service determines advisors’ 
reputation and their future market share. However, earlier studies do not seem to 
corroborate this intuition. The controversy related to advisor reputation and quality 
began with the expensive fee investment bankers used to charge for M&A deal-
making in early 1990s. McLaughlin (1990) cautions that the contingency-based fee 
contracts upon deal completion can undermine value creation by promoting 
conflicts of interest between advisors and clients. Advisors under this contract can 
complete mergers just for the sake of receiving fees, without putting their best 
efforts to create value for the acquirer. Consistent with this conjecture, McLaughlin 
(1992) discovers later that reputable advisors do not necessarily improve deal 
quality considering their clients pay similar deal premia to those of non-top-tier 
clients.   
Rationally, skilled financial advisors should be able to lower the premium by 
reducing information asymmetry on the target firm and increasing negotiation 
power for their acquirer clients. High premium means more of the value creation in 
merger is accrued to the target firm than to the acquiring firm. Thus, his finding on 
merger premia weakens the connection between reputation of advisors and the 
quality of their service. McLaughlin’s theory is further substantiated by Rau 
(2000)’s discovery that the contingent fee structure allows investment banks to 
focus more on completing deals than improving deal quality. He observes that 
reputation of investment banks estimated by their market share is positively 
associated with both contingent fee payments and deal completion rate but is 
negatively related to acquirers’ post-acquisition performance in tender offers.  
Like McLaughlin (1992), a series of similar studies (Servaes and Zenner, 1996; 
Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010; Bao and Edmans, 2011) 
continue to disapprove this intuitive correlation between reputation and quality. 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) show that bidder returns do not change based on advisor 
reputation. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) find that the use of top-tier advisor 
negatively affects shareholder returns for both acquirers and targets. Bao and 
Edmans (2011) assert that investment banks in general have positive contribution 
to deal outcome. However, they identify large variations in average CARs among 
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top-tier investment banks and conclude that this variation induces negative 
association between average bidder returns and advisor market share. They further 
demonstrate that bulge bracket advisors associated with lower average CARs tend 
to take higher proportion of value-destructive deals than small deals with positive 
returns.   
As imaginable by constant divergence of top-tier banks’ reputation from their 
deal quality, empirical efforts have been continuously made to unearth why 
reputable advisors do not improve deal outcome. Eventually, a study finds that 
advisor reputation matters in acquisition performance, but only in public deals 
(Golubov et al., 2012). Golubov et al. report that bidders advised by top-tier banks 
exhibit superior abnormal returns during acquisition announcements. They link the 
outperformance of top-tier deals to the advisors’ ability to identify and accrue 
greater synergies for their clients, justifying the premium advisory fee. Yet, they do 
not clearly elucidate as to why top-tier-banks make no difference in private deals 
and how a firm’s public status justifies the significance of any mergers. In general, 
private targets are traded at discounts due to information asymmetry, thereby 
acquirers can capture more synergies than they do in public deals. Synergies on the 
bidding firm can be magnified, especially when the financial advisor has greater 
expertise in the target industry. For all things considered, private acquisition is an 
important indicator of advisor skill as private targets are harder to discover and 
value than public targets. Moreover, the number of private deals as a proportion of 
overall M&A volume is too high to be taken lightly.  
While earlier studies have consistently failed to link the ongoing market 
dominance by top-tier banks with their advisory quality, Sibilkov and McConnell 
(2014) identify technical issues in measuring reputation and market share of 
investment banks. Specifically, earlier studies use a time-invariant methodology to 
define top-tier banks. For example, Golubov et al. (2012) define top-eight banks 
based on total deal value over the entire sample period as top-tier advisors without 
applying year-on-year change in ranking. This causes imperfect correlation 
between advisors’ prior performance and their market share in following periods. 
Another measurement issue comes from the use of static market share in regression 
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analysis. Sibilkov and McConnell (2014) re-examine Rau (2000) and Bao and 
Edmans (2011)’s model using change in advisory market share instead. Their 
methodology corrects both measurement issues originated from time-invariant 
definition of advisor reputation and market share and succeed in deriving different 
outcomes from previous studies. They find that prior client performance determines 
advisors’ future deal flows as well as their market share and finally corroborates 
the unresolved puzzle for a long-time. 
Apart from advisor quality, questions still remain on how else market share is 
determined and what other fundamental roles do financial advisors play. Bao and 
Edmans (2011) and Sibilkov and McConnell (2014) remind that prior acquisition 
performance is not the only factor considered in hiring decision of a financial 
advisor. Depending on the deal and acquirer characteristics, different types of 
advisors are hired, which is why the advisory market is not dominated by a single 
best advisor. For example, an experienced acquirer with enough capital to purchase 
a target may hire an independent advisor specifically for a target recommendation 
and valuation advice, whereas an inexperienced bidder without funding would hire 
a full-service advisor who can provide multiple pertinent services as well as capital. 
For this reason, recent studies started changing their focus from the quality of top-
tier banks more toward the choice of financial advisor.  
The most researched topic is the relation between deal complexity defined by 
information asymmetry and industry expertise. The primary role of buy-side 
advisor is to reduce information asymmetry residing between a buyer and a seller 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996). Servaes and Zenner find that the probability of hiring 
an advisor increases when the target operates businesses across diverse industries. 
Diversified firms have greater information asymmetry on divisional cash flows 
when they have operations outside the bidder’s industry, hence, M&A advisors’ 
expertise on the target industry is essential. Based on the most active fifty advisors 
by transaction value, Chang et al. (2016) document that the probability of hiring 
advisors increases with their expertise in the merger counterparty’s industry. 
Song et al. (2013) study the choice between boutique and full-service financial 
advisor. They explain full-service banks mainly advise larger firms and firms with 
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which they have prior lending relationship. On the other hand, boutique investment 
banks advise smaller but more complex deals such as cross-industry acquisitions, 
competing bids, and stock deals due to their sector specialized nature and help 
bidders pay lower premium.  
Graham et al. (2017) compare transactions led by industry specialists with 
those of non-specialist advisors and find that acquirers hiring specialists in the 
target industry receive higher announcement valuation. This value creation is 
enabled by the specialized advisors’ ability to negotiate better price for their bidder 
clients by resolving information asymmetry on the target firm. Graham et al. adds 
that due to the significance of sector knowledge in deal-making, more value is 
created by small/medium-sized specialist advisors than by bulge bracket banks.  
As observed in these studies, the literature on the choice of M&A advisor 
presents more persistent findings corresponding to the conventional role of 
financial advisor: advisors can identify better merger opportunities and reduce 
transaction costs using their expertise (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996). I take those insights into measuring what kind of role boutique 
advisors play in the corporate takeover market outside the traditional measure of 
advisor-tier system and how they create value for their buyside clients.    
 
 
2.3 Boutique Financial Advisors’ Market Share 
 
In this section, I examine how the market share of boutique advisors has evolved 
over time. Figure 2. 1 shows the change in market share of boutique vs full-service 
advisors by the number of deals, while Figure 2. 2 provides the same trend based 
on deal value.15 Both figures show that boutiques’ market share has discernibly 
increased over time, especially post the 2008 financial crisis.  
The perceived trend in advisory market share is complex and multi-faceted that 
various attributes must be considered from different angles. I suggest largely three 
 
15 The trendline in this figure is generated based on moving average to present a pattern more clearly 
by smoothing out fluctuations.  
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factors to explain the change in advisory market share in M&A: regulation, 
economy, and competition.     
First, the role of regulation. The late 1990s were marked by a wave of mega 
M&A deals consummated by full-service banks and especially bulge brackets. This 
trend was underpinned by Section 20 Subsidiaries, enacted in 1997, which 
effectively allowed commercial banks increase their investment banking activity by 
directly acquiring investment banks, further blurring the line of separation between 
commercial and investment banks.16 Further, in 1999, the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) propagated more merger activity by full-
service and bulge bracket banks, up to 2007, prior to the financial crisis.17 During 
this period, large banks benefitted from large deals due to their financing capacity 
and capabilities. Boutique investment banks’ M&A market share began to steadily 
increase since 2007, fuelled, among other things, by regulatory hurdles for full-
service banks as well as negative investor perceptions towards large banks in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Accordingly, The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) enacted 
in 2010 forced full-service banks to revert to a more traditional business model by 
separating their commercial banking role from investment banking operations 
(Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2014). The regulatory framework was more lenient 
toward independent investment banks, which allowed them to reinvent and 
repurpose themselves. 
Second, in the most recent merger wave, multi-billion mega deals became less 
prevalent relative to the waves of the 90s and 00s, with smaller business 
combinations thriving, providing a fruitful building block for boutique advisors to 
grow their market share. In addition, the financing capabilities of full-service banks, 
 
16  Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) estimate the effect of Section 20 subsidiaries on the 
performance of commercial banks and report enhanced operating cash flows due to investment 
banking activities. Bhargava and Fraser (1998) measure abnormal returns of large commercial banks 
around the Federal Reserve’s conferral of expanded underwriting powers and find negative 
shareholder wealth effects as well as increase in idiosyncratic risk.  
17 Crawford (2011) analyzes the impact of the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act on enlarged investment 
banking role within commercial banks and how this played a role in the cause of financial crisis. 
Cyree (2000) documents that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (which granted powers to large 
commercial banks by allowing them to increase their investment banking activities) widened the 
segregation between large commercial banks and small regional banks. 
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one of their key competitive advantages, can become less important with low 
interest rates, growing corporate cash reserves, and stock-for-stock more widely 
accepted and utilised as a financing method for acquisitions.18  
The distinct qualities and skills that boutique banks bring to the market as well 
as the independent nature of their advice are also vital drivers for the boost to their 
market share. Due to their independence, conflicts of interest are less of a problem 
with boutiques, which are typically founded by former reputable bulge bracket 
bankers, with expertise and established business relationships in specific sectors 
(e.g. technology, retail, finance, and healthcare), or niche markets (e.g. small to 
medium size mergers, business valuation, fairness opinion) where their boutiques 
then specialise.   
 
 
2.4 Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
2.4.1 Sample Criteria  
 
M&A transaction data is collected from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database based on the following criteria. The sample 
includes acquisitions announced between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2016. 
Acquirers and targets are US domestic firms. Acquirers are listed firms while 
targets are public, private, or subsidiary companies. I exclude repurchases, 
recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers, acquisitions of remaining interest, 
minority stake purchases, and intra-corporate restructurings. Acquirers own less 
than 10% of the target firm’s shares before the deal announcement and seek to own 
more than 50% post-completion. Both completed and withdrawn deals with a 
transaction value of at least $1 million are included. I also require that acquirers 
have non-missing data on their buyside financial advisor(s). Acquirers are listed on 
 
18 See Deloitte, July 31, 2018, “Battle for dominance in the M&A advisory business Bulge-brackets 
vs. the boutiques” 
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NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with share codes 10 and 11, and have data on CRSP 
and Compustat. Imposing the above sample criteria results in a sample of 5,010 
M&A deals. I further exclude 934 deals where the financial advisors of the 
acquiring firm include both boutique and full-service banks from all regression 
analyses, since allocating such deals to both sub-sets could produce biased results, 
especially because there is no information on the role each advisor plays in the 
M&A process.   
  
2.4.2 Advisor Classification 
 
Since there is no commercially available, curated database distinguishing 
between full-service and boutique advisors, and given the inherent complexities in 
defining a boutique investment bank, I follow a manual classification approach to 
classify boutique advisors and adopt a dual classification plan to improve accuracy. 
Primarily, I search for whether an individual investment bank is explicitly described 
as “boutique” or “full-service” through company websites, S&P Global Market 
Intelligence from Bloomberg’s private company information section, news media, 
SEC filings, and past/local periodicals around the time of deal announcements. 
Secondly, I identify parameters such as an investment bank’s  focus and expertise 
on M&A advisory service, regional focus, industry specialisation, and the asset 
value of their corporate clients within these sources to ensure that they retain 
characteristics of typical boutique advisors. 19  Moreover, I apply the advanced 
definition of “boutique investment bank” as advisory-service-only institutions is 
too strict for today’s standard and could potentially eliminate an actual boutique 
firm from its category. Despite the fact that some boutique advisors also offer 
additional services such as wealth management, trading, investment, and research, 
this should not automatically disqualify them from being classified as boutique as 
 
19 Typically, boutique investment banks serve small to middle-market firms with a mean asset value 
of $250 to $500 million, although there are boutiques that also serve large cap clients. They are 
independent advisory firms focusing on corporate advisory such as mergers and acquisitions, 
divestiture, valuation, and restructuring. Most importantly, they focus on certain regions and are 
mostly specialized in a few industries.  
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long as corporate financial advisory is their core business and these products are 
largely independent. On the contrary, a firm providing both commercial and 
corporate advisory services, where M&A advisory is just part of their investment 
banking businesses, would be classified as a full-service bank. Collectively, this 
classification method allowed me to accurately identify larger number of boutique 
advisors and correct earlier misclassifications in Song et al. (2013). 20   
I provide below some excerpts for Bigelow LLC, which is classified as a 
boutique advisor based on this dual classification plan.  
 
“Bigelow LLC is an independently owned mergers & acquisitions advisory 
boutique focused on entrepreneur Owner-Managers. (Bigelow Website)”21  
 
“The Bigelow Company LLC is an investment banking firm that provides financial 
advisory services to middle-market entrepreneurial companies in North America. 
It focuses on transactions between $25 million to $300 million. The firm provides 
restructuring, recapitalization, mergers and acquisition, divestiture, management 
consulting, debt and equity financing, and valuation advisory services. It focuses 
on aerospace, manufacturing, automotive, building materials, business services, 
commercial printing, computer hardware, distribution, education, electronics, 
environmental, industrial tools, metals, materials, publishing, specialty food, 
software, and telecommunications industries. (S&P Global Market Intelligence)”22 
 
The first source describes Bigelow as an M&A advisory boutique. The second 
source highlights characteristics of a typical boutique advisor and specifically the 
 
20 For reference, Song et al. (2013) have a sample of 141 boutique advisors and 152 full-service 
advisors. Of this sample, they misclassified 24 boutique advisors as full-service firms. I corrected 
for such misclassifications in my study. For robustness, when I define 339 deals belonging to the 24 
advisors as full-service deals following Song et al.’s classification and estimate the regression model 
(OLS and PSM), the results remain qualitatively similar, and acquirers hiring boutique advisors 
significantly outperform those hiring full-service advisors in acquisition of all and private target 
deals.  
21 See “https:// bigelowllc.com.” 
22 See “Company Overview of The Bigelow Company LLC” provided by S&P Global Market 
Intelligence.  
CHAPTER 2.  BOUTIQUE INVESTMENT BANKS IN M&A 
 24 
average size of its corporate clients, types of services provided, and specific sectors 
of expertise. Following this comprehensive classification approach, I identify 462 
boutique advisors and 154 full-service banks between 2000 and 2016.23 However, 
since I exclude 934 mixed advisor deals from the regression analysis, the total 
number of advisors remaining include 443 boutique advisors and 147 full-service 
banks.  
 
2.4.3 Descriptive Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2. 1 exhibits summary statistics of (1) all advisor sample and of (2) boutique 
and (3) full-service advisor subsamples, respectively. I generate control variables 
which affect acquirer returns as well as the choice of financial advisor based on 
bidder and deal characteristics. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A.   
First, I discuss bidder characteristics. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
demonstrate strong size effects on acquirer announcement returns, documenting 
better returns for smaller acquirers. Bidder size is also one of the key determinants 
of advisor choice in Song et al. (2013). Accordingly, I control for bidder size in my 
regression analysis. The overall mean (median) bidder size in my sample is 
$12,004.4 million ($1,478.7 million). However, consistent with Song et al., 
boutique investment banks advise on average much smaller companies ($6,480.8 
million) than do full-service banks ($15,241.0 million).  
The book-to-market ratio is an important indicator of a firm’s equity value and 
growth prospects. Growth firms, in general, have a low book-to-market ratio. 
Higher market value of growth stocks reflects their expected outperformance in the 
 
23 The list of advisor classification can be provided upon request. I note that Song et al. (2013) 
classify advisors using news sources and the Dow Jones Factiva database while they apply a stricter 
classification where boutique advisors need to be specialized in certain industries and provide M&A 
advisory services only, rather than other services such as sales, trading, underwriting, research, and 
lending. However, more recently, boutique investment banks started offering services beyond 
corporate advisory, with their divisions acting independently from each other. (See Thomson 
Reuters, December 14, 2016, “As good as it gets? Boutique banks look to grow beyond M&A”) I 
thank Lei Zhou for providing the list of financial advisor classification for comparison purposes.  
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future, but it also indicates overvaluation. In mergers, bidders of growth firms 
receive negative market reaction around deal announcements as they frequently use 
overvalued stocks as a method of payment (Martin, 1996; Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998). Conversely, value firms with a high book-to-market ratio are associated with 
greater announcement returns since their equity is undervalued (Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1989). My sample shows that boutique investment banks advise more 
number of value firms than do full-service banks. The mean (median) book-to-
market ratio of boutique clients is 0.551(0.501) while that of full-service clients is 
0.463 (0.386).    
Run-up is an estimation of pre-announcement returns potentially driven by the 
leakage of information on the forthcoming merger and is often used as a measure 
of insider trading (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). Acquirers’ pre-announcement 
stock price run-up is known to be negatively associated with bidder announcement 
returns (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007) as inside-traders may capture part of the 
gains before the market is informed about the deal. My mean (median) bidder run-
up is -0.014 (-0.000) and is comparable between boutique and full-service deals.  
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) denote that high price volatility 
yields lower announcement returns for acquirers, especially those with stock 
transactions, as the fluctuating stock price weakens their negotiation power. Given 
the difficulty of valuation, bidders’ stock price volatility can also inform about the 
advisor’s skill. Overall, my sample displays mean (median) bidder stock price 
volatility of 0.027 (0.021), which is statistically indifferent between boutique and 
full-service clients.  
Conventionally, as a measure of financial distress, leverage has negative 
implications on acquirer returns (George and Hwang, 2010). However, empirical 
studies dominantly find that highly levered firms are associated with positive 
announcement returns; while firms with excess cash are more likely to pursue a 
merger to build an empire, highly levered firms would undertake an acquisition 
only when merger synergies are greater than the risk of financial distress (see e.g. 
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991). Meanwhile, leverage is also closely related to 
advisor choice decision because it indicates acquirers’ funding capacity. Higly 
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levered firms are more likely to hire full-service firms, whereas those with lower 
leverage may not require their financial advisor to additionally arrange capital. 
Consistent with my conjecture, my sample shows that full-service clients are more 
levered than boutique clients. The mean (median) leverage ratio of full-service 
clients is 0.226 (0.197) and that of boutique clients is 0.157 (0.109). 
Similar to leverage, liquidity of acquirer is related to acquisition funding 
capacity24. Liquid acquirers are less likely to necessitate the level of funding that 
full-service banks are able to offer, meaning boutique clients are more likely to be 
liquid than full-service clients. My sample statistics confirm this postulation and 
show that the mean (median) liquidity ratio of boutique clients is 1.274 (0.599) 
while that of full-service clients is 0.956 (0.436). 
The next cluster of variables describe deal characteristics. Deal value, which 
represents target size, is negatively associated with announcement returns; the 
larger the target, the more the destruction of acquirer shareholder value due to the 
lengthy and costly process of post-acquisition integration (Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
My sample statistics show that bidders are more likely to hire a full-service bank as 
deal size gets larger. The mean (median) deal value of boutique advisors is $724.5 
(95.1) million while that of full-service advisors is $2,126.4 (430.4) million.  
The target-bidder relative size has been known to be positively related to 
bidder returns, especially for successful mergers (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 
1983), but can have a negative effect on bidder announcement returns in public 
deals (Fuller et al., 2002). The mean (median) relative size is 0.436 (0.180) and is 
similar between boutique deals and full-service deals.  
A firm’s public or private status in association with the method of payment has 
significant impact on bidder announcement returns. Officer, Poulsen, and 
Stegemoller (2009) imply that stock consideration is better for private-target deals 
where information asymmetry is greater. By offering stocks, bidders can avoid 
overpayment and retain valuable target shareholders (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, 
 
24 Liquidity is also studied in the context of managerial hubris in M&A literature. Bidders with large 
cash reserves may pursue value-destroying acquisitions (Harford, 1999) as they are more susceptible 
to managerial hubris. This is further substantiated by the association of cash-rich bidders with more 
diversifying deals and less competing bids.  
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and Powell, 2012). As mentioned in the analysis of the book-to-market ratio, stock 
financing is also preferred by growth firms because the exchange ratio is favourable 
to bidders when they use their inflated price to purchase the target. Contrarily, 
returns in public deals are positively associated with cash offer, but are negatively 
related to stock offer (Chang, 1998). Martin (1996) also suggests that bidders with 
large cash reserves or a block-holding in the target firm prefer to use cash 
transaction. Accordingly, I include both the target firm’s public status and the 
payment method in my analysis.  
Public deals and private deals comprise 39.9% and 60.1% of my sample, 
respectively. As expected, boutique investment banks focus more on private deals 
than do full-service banks. The mean rate of public deals that boutique (full-service) 
advisors take is 37.8% (41.1%) while that of private deals is 62.2% (58.9%). As for 
the method of payment, all cash deals, all stock deals, and mix payment deals 
comprise 31.4%, 18.2%, and 50.3% of my sample, respectively. Song et al. (2013) 
highlight the skills of boutique advisors based on their frequent involvement in 
stock deals because these are harder to negotiate than cash deals and tend to 
negatively affect deal outcomes in public deals. Consistent with their finding, my 
sample indicates that boutique advisors take a larger proportion of stock deals than 
full-service banks do. The mean proportion of all stock deals that boutique (full-
service) advisors take is 20.7% (16.8%) while that combined with mixed payments 
involving stock is 73.9% (65.4%). 
Prior studies have found conflicting evidence on the announcement returns of 
diversifying mergers. Proposed motives for cross-industry mergers vary from 
managerial hubris to lower risk of default, which can be achieved through 
diversified revenue streams (Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan, 1992). For my study, 
diversifying deals are useful events in determining whether advisor expertise is 
beneficial to bidders, since acquiring an unrelated company requires critical 
knowledge in the target sector. In my sample, 33.9% are diversifying deals, and 
full-service firms advise slightly higher proportion of diversifying mergers than 
boutique banks do.    
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Most hostile takeovers occur within related industries (Bhagat, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1990). Firms engaging in hostile deals typically pursue cost efficiencies 
and seek to increase market power but are highly susceptible to overpayment due 
to target firms’ resistance (Bhagat et al., 1990). Thus, hostile deals have higher 
failure rates than friendly deals (Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi, 2016) and tend to 
have a negative effect on CARs. The sample has only 1.6% of hostile deals, advised 
more often by full-service banks.     
Under a general perception that skilled acquirers takeover poorly managed 
targets, successful tender offers increase shareholder returns of both bidding and 
target firms (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Jarrell and Poulsen; 1989; Lang, Walkling, 
and Stulz, 1989). Tender offers represent 5.6% of my sample, a relatively larger 
proportion of which are advised by full-service firms.  
In the last column of Table 2. 1, I display mean-difference tests (T-test) for 
each variable between the boutique and full-service subsamples. Except for run-up, 
volatility, relative size, and premium, all variables exhibit significant difference in 
means. This indicates that boutique and full-service intermediaries advise clients of 
seemingly different profiles. I account for the potential effects of these differences 
on advisor selection by employing matching techniques in my empirical analysis.   
 
 
2.5 Empirical Analysis 
 
2.5.1 OLS Regression for Bidder CARs 
 
Most studies estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as a proxy for advisor 
quality 25  and find top-tier advisors are associated with greater acquirer CARs 
(Bowers and Miller, 1990; Kale et al., 2003; Walter et al., 2008; and Golubov et al., 
2012). Yet, boutique advisors’ contribution on merger wealth gains has not been 
documented. Accordingly, I investigate the wealth effect of boutique advisors on 
 
25 See Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2019) for a review of M&A event studies. 
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acquirer performance by 3-day bidder CARs around the announcement date in 
multivariate OLS regression analysis. The key independent variable in the model is 
boutique, which takes the value of 1 for boutique deals and 0 for full-service deals. 
I also control for acquiring firm and deal characteristics. Additionally, I control for 
year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. For industry fixed effects, I use Fama 
and French’s 12 industry classification method26. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and bidder clustering as in Golubov et al. (2012). All control 
variables are winsorized at 1%.  
Table 2. 2 displays the OLS regression results. In specification (1) 27, I find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for the boutique variable. 
Specifically, acquirers employing boutique investment banks outperform those 
employing full-service banks by 0.8% (at the 5% level). This excess return 
translates as an upside of $96 million for the average acquirer28. This preliminary 
analysis suggests that the contribution of boutique advisors to shareholder value is 
superior to that of full-service banks.   
However, the choice between boutique and full-service advisors may have 
different performance implications for deals with public and private targets. Target 
public status affects various deal aspects, and advisors with the appropriate skillset 
could prove valuable to acquirer shareholders. For instance, private deals are 
subject to higher information asymmetry between acquirer and target firms (Officer 
et al., 2009), mainly due to limitations on publicly available information for the 
target’s operations, finances, and prospects. Advisors with the ability to mitigate 
information asymmetry costs by superior knowledge in, e.g., target identification, 
industry specialisation, and business environment, could contribute to wealth 
creation for acquirer shareholders.29 Boutique advisors are frequently specialised in 
 
26  Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1997) "Industry Cost of Equity," Journal of Financial 
Economics 43. For industry classification, I use target firms’ SIC code.  
27 I have a smaller number of observations than in the sample statistics because I exclude deals that 
are advised by both boutique and full-service banks (934 observations) to produce clean results. 
28 The excess return is computed as the average market value of bidders ($12 billion) in my sample 
times excess CAR (0.8%) of the boutique coefficient in specification (1).  
29  The skillsets mentioned stem from boutique investment banks’ regional focus and industry 
specialization. Some boutiques such as Bigelow LLC focuses on advising private firms only within 
certain sectors as highlighted in advisor classification while most firms are regional boutiques. 
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business and geographical segments, therefore, they are better positioned to 
mitigate information asymmetry for acquirer shareholders, especially for private 
deals. On the contrary, public deals may require a wider service offering beyond 
traditional corporate advisory such as regulatory and shareholder approval, or 
financing arrangements. Hence, I perform the analysis separately for public and 
private deals as in models (2) and (3), respectively, to further investigate the context 
in which deals boutique advisors create significant value.30  
The results suggest that boutique and full-service advisors have 
indistinguishable contribution to public deal performance since the boutique 
coefficient is statistically insignificant in model (2). However, boutique advisors 
generate significantly greater returns (at the 1% level) in private deals with an 
average of 1.4% higher CARs than do full-service banks, as it is displayed in model 
(3). The implied shareholder wealth creation associated with boutique advisors in 
private deals is equivalent to $121.4 million in excess of full-service deals.31 This 
performance differential is economically significant, especially after considering 
private deals are smaller than public deals on average. Boutique banks appear to 
have unique abilities in mitigating information asymmetry, which is major concern 
in private deals. These findings partially contradict the inferences of Golubov et al. 
(2012) who attribute the superior performance of top-tier advisors in public deals 
to resource allocation discrepancies, since public deals have greater impact on their 
reputational capital. My results do not support this reasoning. In my study, boutique 
advisors achieve similar performance in public deals and superior performance in 
private deals against full-service advisors. In untabulated analysis, I find that the 
performance differential persists after accounting for advisor classification in the 
top 5, 8, or 10 bulge bracket banks. My analysis so far indicates that involvement 
of boutique advisors in acquisitions result in superior performance for acquirer 
shareholders. 
 
30 In case of Golubov et al. (2012), public and private deals are separately evaluated to prove top-
tier advisors’ disproportionate focus on and outperformance in public deals.  
31 The mean dollar gain in private acquisitions is estimated as the average market value of bidders 
($8,671.23 million) acquiring private targets multiplied by excess CAR (1.4%) which is the boutique 
coefficient in specification (3).  
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Consistent with the prior literature, size effect is strong and has a negative 
effect on bidder CARs, but only in public deals. 32  Other variables negatively 
affecting bidder returns include the book-to-market ratio, public deals, all stock 
deals, and diversifying deals. Conversely, run-up and leverage are significantly and 
positively associated with bidder CARs, implying no impact of insider trading 
leading to the merger announcements, as well as a positive influence of creditor 
monitoring on corporate takeover activity.  
 
2.5.2 Sample Selection Bias and Causal Inference 
 
The OLS regression analysis suggests that boutique advisors contribute positively 
to acquirer shareholder performance. However, this methodology may produce 
precarious inferences. As earlier studies have shown, the analysis using the OLS 
estimator can suffer from sample selection bias (Roy, 1951 and Heckman, 1979). 
Explicitly, the boutique coefficient estimated in Table 2.2 could misrepresent the 
impact of boutique advisors on acquisition performance if the sample used in the 
analysis is non-random. Furthermore, the analysis may suffer from causal inference 
(Heckman, 1989), which refers to my inability to observe the deal outcome had a 
firm hired a full-service advisor instead. On an additional note, Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggest that direct comparisons between two treatment groups may 
be misleading in nonrandomized experiments as the distribution of characteristics 
may differ systematically between treatment and control groups.    
I conduct additional analysis in order to test whether my inferences change 
after accounting for the aforementioned issues. Tucker (2010) recommends two 
methodologies related to my issues. First, she suggests Heckman’s Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) for selection bias caused by unobservable factors, i.e., omitted variable 
bias. Second, she recommends Propensity Score Matching (PSM) for the treatment 
of selection bias that can be explained by observable factors. In both methods, I 
first estimate the advisor selection model and then, compare deal performance by 
 
32 Bidder size is the log of bidder market value four weeks prior to the announcement. 
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generating mean difference in excess returns between boutique deals and full-
service deals. Nevertheless, the two methodologies follow different procedures. 
The IMR process entails the estimation of lambda, an omitted variable in the 
selection process, that is included in the second stage regression. In the PSM 
process, I match deals from the treatment group, i.e., boutique deals, with deals 
from the control group, i.e., full-service deals, based on the propensity score 
calculated during the first-stage regression. Then, I run the second-stage regressions 
and produce a performance comparison using only matched observations. Both 
techniques tackle issues arising from selection bias and can augment my analysis.  
I incorporate both techniques to my analysis because sample selection can be 
driven by both observable and unobservable bias. First, I conduct the IMR analysis 
in order to ensure that my results are not driven by the omitted variable bias that 
can simultaneously affect both deal performance and the decision to hire a boutique 
advisor, as it has been suggested by previous studies (see e.g., Kale, Kini, and Ryan, 
2003; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, and Yao; 2016). Subsequently, I run the PSM analysis 
in order to ensure that the result in the main regressions is not driven by group 
differences in acquirer and deal characteristics between boutique and full-service 
deals. A definitive, supportive outcome in both analyses will ensure that my results 
hold even after accounting for selection bias. I discuss the results on IMR and PSM 
in the next two sections of the paper. 
 
2.5.3 Advisor Choice and Heckman’s Two-Step Regression 
 
To test whether there is an omitted variable bias, I perform Heckman’s two-step 
regression analysis following Golubov et al. (2012). The first stage model is 
estimated using a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 
1 if the advisor is a boutique firm and 0 otherwise. In this selection stage, I use the 
same set of control variables as in my OLS estimation, excluding the tender offers 
variable which does not affect the advisor choice. Additionally, I include the prior 
advisor variable as an instrument, which indicates whether the investment bank has 
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advised the acquirer in the past five years. This variable should influence advisor 
selection, but not the outcome of the announcement returns.  
 
𝑃𝑟(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  1)
= 𝛷[𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡], (1)
 
 
The results of the probit regression analyses are reported in Table 2. 3. The 
prior advisor coefficient is significantly and positively correlated with the choice of 
boutique advisor across all model specifications. Thus, boutique financial advisors 
appear more likely to be retained by acquirers in their future deals than full-service 
banks do. This is an intriguing result since it implies that acquirers are in general 
more satisfied with the advisory quality of boutique banks. This might also suggest 
that independence of financial advisory from conflicts of interest is an important 
factor in advisor switching decisions. For instance, studies document that full-
service banks who provide both lending and corporate advisory services are prone 
to conflict of interest, which prompts acquirers to switch their financial advisors 
(Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders, 2004).    
The probability of selecting boutique advisors increases further with stock 
offers in the public subsample model, and diversifying deals. Song et al. (2013) 
suggest that these deal types require higher advisor skills as both are related to 
greater information asymmetry costs. For instance, stock deals involving public 
targets are known to entail added complexity during negotiations and are also linked 
to negative announcement returns due to fears of overpayment (Chang, 1998). 
Hence, the positive effects of all-stock and diversifying deals on boutique selection 
suggest that the latter may have knowledge and expertise that could be valuable in 
deals with higher information opacity. 
On the contrary, bidder size, relative size, and leverage are negatively related 
to the choice of boutique advisors. Boutique investment banks are less likely to be 
hired when the size of the acquirer or target increases and when financing burden 
can be a focal issue in designing deal consideration. These findings are, in general, 
consistent with Song et al. (2013)’s transaction scale and advisor skill hypotheses. 
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They argue that firms prefer full-service banks as the scale of a transaction becomes 
larger, but acquirers are more likely to hire boutique advisors as deal complexity 
increases.  
In the second stage OLS regression, I include the inverse mills ratio (IMR) 
obtained from the probit model to examine whether unobservable factor bias drives 
deal outcomes.  
 
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛾 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (2) 
 
If my results were affected by omitted variable bias, the IMR coefficient would 
be statistically significant. However, IMR coefficients are insignificant across all 
model specifications, implying there are no unobservable characteristics associated 
with both the choice of boutique advisors and bidder CARs. Thus, I reiterate initial 
findings from the main OLS analysis about the positive contribution of boutique 
advisors to deal outcomes.  
 
2.5.4 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
 
The summary statistics exhibit material differences on acquirer and deal 
characteristics between the boutique and full-service groups. In order to account for 
inter-group heterogeneity when comparing the performance, I repeat my main 
analysis after matching boutique deals with similar full-service deals. I follow the 
Propensity Score Matching method considering its wide scope and flexible 
inclusion of matching factors.  
Step 1 Obtain propensity scores (the probability of receiving treatment33) using 
a logit regression estimation with a set of 𝑥  covariates (bidder and deal 
characteristics) that influence the choice of advisor.  
 
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑑 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑑|𝑥), (3) 
 
33 The probability of receiving treatment in my model is the probability of a boutique advisor to be 
selected by an acquirer. 
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where 𝑝(𝑥) is a propensity score, 𝑑 (dependent variable) is the boutique dummy, 
and 𝑥 is a set of control variables which determine the advisor choice. 
Step 2 Match deals based on a similar propensity score between the treated 
(boutique advisors) and control group (full-service advisors), using different 
matching methods - Nearest Neighbour Matching (one-to-one and 5 nearest) and 
Gaussian Kernel Matching – to validate consistency of the results throughout 
different matching methods. 
Step 3 Measure the average treatment effects by comparing the deal outcome 




 ATT = E(Δ|d = 1) = E(𝑌(1)|d = 1) − E(𝑌(0)|d = 1), (4) 
 
Throughout the estimation, I apply common support restrictions which 
perform matching only based on the common range of propensity scores since a 
range outside the common support will not provide very good matches.  
This treatment methodology allows unbiased use of the selected sample and 
estimation of the outcome at the population level. Table 2. 4 presents the PSM 
results. Panel A is a logit regression model on the choice of boutique over full-
service banks. Panel B summarizes the treatment effects on bidder CARs. In the 
analysis for the aggregate sample, acquirers using boutique advisors are associated 
with significantly higher returns (at the 1% level). Moreover, the excess returns in 
the PSM analysis are even greater than in the original analysis when I compared all 
deals without matching, meaning there is a downward bias in the OLS model, which 
underestimates boutiques’ economic contribution. According to one-to-one nearest 
neighbour matching, acquirers experience an average of 2% higher CAR when 
hiring boutiques over full-service banks. In addition, similar to my findings from 
the OLS analysis, bidder CARs do not differ in public deals, but in private 
 
34 𝑌𝑖(1) is boutique CARs. 𝑌𝑖(0) is counterfactual which is unobservable because it has not happened 
and should be estimated using the outcome of matched full-service banks (full-service CARs).  
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acquisitions, boutique advisors improve shareholder returns by an average of 
1.47%.35 
 
2.5.5 Long-term Abnormal Returns 
 
The analysis on acquirer announcement CARs points to superior performance for 
deals involving boutique advisors. However, announcement CARs reflect investor 
expectations on deal performance at the time of public disclosure, while the deal’s 
actual impact on firm performance may take years to materialise. In order to 
identify the long-term implications of advisor selection, I look into acquirer long-
run performance. I employ two methodologies in estimating long-run returns: buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and calendar-time portfolio regression (CTPR).  
In estimating BHAR, the literature documents three approaches that are 
commonly employed for a benchmark: i) reference portfolio approach (Kothari and 
Warner, 1997), ii) the three-factor asset pricing model (Fama and French, 1993), 
and iii) the control firm approach (Barber and Lyon, 1997). The use of reference 
portfolios, such as CRSP equal- or value-weighted market index, results in test 
statistics that are misspecified due to new listing bias36, portfolio rebalancing bias37, 
and skewness bias 38 . Considering the three-factor model which includes four 
parameters (risk-free rate as well as market, size, and book-to-market factors) 
requires at least five observations, it is subject to a survivor bias. It also relies on a 
strong assumption that the three factors are stable for the estimated long-term period. 
I use the control firm approach following Barber and Lyon (1997) since it corrects 
for these biases residing in other approaches and yields well-specified test statistics. 
In this approach, returns of an acquiring firm are compounded over an estimation 
period and then are adjusted by compounded returns of a matching benchmark 
 
35 This is based on the average of returns from all three matching methods. 
36 While event firms have a long period of returns followed by the event date, the benchmark index 
often includes newly listed firms with stock prices available sometime after the event month.  
37 Market indices are frequently rebalanced by including or excluding different stocks, but sample 
firms are not rebalanced. 
38 Long-run abnormal returns are subject to positive skewness.  
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portfolio formed over the same period. The benchmarks are Fama-French’s 25 
equal-weighted size and book-to-market portfolios:39   
 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏[1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1





where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is monthly returns of a sample firm i compounded over the 12- and 24-
month period beginning from the announcement date. 40 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡 is returns of 
a benchmark portfolio corresponding to the same size/book-to-market group as the 
sample firm i. Table 2. 5 shows the regression results generated using 12- and 24-
month BHARs as dependent variables. The boutique dummy is positively and 
significantly related to both BHAR configurations, indicating firms hiring boutique 
advisors experience higher gains than those hiring full-service banks with excess 
returns of 4.0% over 12 months and 7.8% over 24 months. In subsequent analysis 
of public and private acquisitions, I observe findings similar to the announcement 
CAR analysis. Boutique advisors make no difference in shareholder value in public 
deals, but in private deals, they significantly increase acquirer returns by 7.4% over 
12 months and 16.1% over 24 months. Overall, the BHAR method confirms my 
previous findings regarding the contribution of boutique advisors to acquirer deal 
performance. 
The BHAR methodology provides useful insight on firm performance over and 
above the performance of an appropriate benchmark. Nevertheless, the BHAR 
measure is subject to cross-sectional correlation. In order to account for cross-
sectional correlation in the event-firm returns, I also use the calendar time portfolio 
regression (CTPR) approach following Mitchell and Stafford (2000). For each 
month, the sample firms participating in the event of deal-making enter the monthly 
portfolio and remain for 12 or 24 months. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly with 
firms entering the event portfolio when a deal is announced and with other firms 
 
39 The use of value-weighted portfolios produces qualitatively similar results.  
40 The results are consistent when the returns are compounded beginning from the deal completion 
date.  
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exiting the portfolio when they reach the end of the 12- or 24-month periods. The 
monthly portfolio returns are regressed against Fama-French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997) factors as in the equation below:  
 
 𝑅𝑝(𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒),𝑡 − 𝑅𝑝(𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒),𝑡
=  𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝,𝑡 . 
(6) 
 
where 𝑅𝑝(𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒),𝑡 −  𝑅𝑝(𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒),𝑡 is a zero-investment portfolio estimated by 
the monthly boutique portfolio returns in excess of the full-service portfolio returns, 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the market excess return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the difference between small and 
large stock portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the difference between high and low book-to-market 
equity stock portfolios, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 is the difference between winners and losers stock 
portfolios. The intercept, 𝛼𝑝  estimates boutique portfolio’s monthly abnormal 
return. I conduct the analysis for both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted 
(VW) portfolios.  
Table 2. 6 presents the results from the time-series OLS regression analysis 
based on equation (6). In the model using all deals and 12-month duration, the 
boutique portfolio exhibits positive and statistically significant alpha for the VW 
configuration. The superior boutique performance is also economically significant 
as it amounts to 0.6% per month or 7.4% in annualised terms. Consistent with the 
BHAR analysis, the boutique portfolio significantly outperforms the full-service 
portfolio for private deals in both EW and VW configurations by 0.7% and 1.0% 
per month, respectively, or 8.7% and 12.7% in annualised terms, respectively. The 
boutique deals seem to underperform full-service deals only in the public deals, EW 
configuration by 0.5% per month or 6.2% in annualised terms.    
The results are qualitatively similar for the 24-month portfolio durations. 
Boutique deals significantly increase in value in both EW and VW measures with 
excess returns of 0.3% and 0.6% per month or 7.5% and 15.4% in biannual terms, 
respectively. During this period, there is no difference in public deal performance 
between boutique and full-service portfolios. In private acquisitions, EW measure 
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indicates that boutique portfolio yields excess returns of 0.6% per month or 15.4% 
in biannual terms.  
Overall, both event study methods of BHAR and CTPR indicate that boutique 
deals outperform full-service deals in the long-term in “all” and “private” deal 
subsample. The combination of our findings in the CAR and long-run returns 
analyses points towards a unique benefit in hiring boutique advisors, especially in 
deals with high informational asymmetry, such as private deals. Thus, the policy 
implications for acquirer management are clear: hiring boutique advisors can lead 
to superior returns for shareholders, especially if the target’s public status requires 
the expertise of niche-focused, specialised advisors.   
 
 
2.6 Additional Robustness Checks 
 
2.6.1  Information asymmetry and boutique client returns 
 
So far, I have shown that boutique advisors generate superior wealth gains for 
bidding firms’ shareholders in private deals, where financial advisors face more 
challenges in valuing a target firm than in public deals. Officer et al. (2009) 
emphasize that private deals have substantially greater information asymmetry than 
do public deals, thus, entail considerable valuation uncertainty. Capron and Shen 
(2007) argue that the lack of information on private targets increases search costs 
and the risk of misvaluation. However, information asymmetry in private deals can 
work in favour of acquirers with the potential to generate higher returns if they are 
already familiar with the target firm’s industry. This is supported by acquirers’ 
choice of private targets based on familiar industries or closer geographic 
proximities (Capron and Shen, 2007). Aspiring acquirers may find attractive targets 
in vastly different regions or industries; hence they may seek the assistance of 
specialised boutique banks. Boutique advisors frequently focus on specific regions, 
industries, and private deals. Their unique insight in opaque market niches can be 
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well coveted by acquirers who may not have adequate insight into the target 
company’s region, industry, or operations.  
In my study, I argue that the outperformance of boutique advisors in private 
acquisitions is associated with their ability to mitigate the effects of information 
asymmetry by applying their sector-specific expertise and regional focus. To assess 
this argument, I consider a partial segmentation of my sample in order to focus on 
deals with high information asymmetry following Graham et al. (2017). I consider 
two deal types. The first deal type is cross-industry vs same-industry deals, 
classified using the acquirer and target firms’ 3-digit SIC code. The second deal 
type is generated based on whether the acquirer has acquisition experience in the 
target’s industry in the last three years before the deal announcement41. I expect the 
case of cross-industry deals and deals where the acquirer has no recent experience 
in the target’s industry to increase information asymmetry, rendering the valuation 
of the target company more difficult. My expectation is that the choice of boutique 
acquirers will be more valuable to bidder investors when information asymmetry is 
higher. 
In order to test my hypothesis, I perform Propensity Score Matching analysis, 
where I match boutique with full-service advisors similar to Table 4. In Table 2. 7, 
I show the PSM results of the advisor selection model of cross-industry and same-
industry deals. In Panel A where I exhibit the probability model of hiring a boutique 
advisor, following Graham et al. (2017), I include the industry peers variable which 
measures average use of boutique advisors by industry peers42. The use of boutique 
advisor by the bidder’s industry peers significantly and positively affects the 
probability that the bidder is likely to hire a boutique advisor in cross-industry deals 
(at the 1% level). As for the performance of bidders hiring boutique advisors, Panel 
B indicates that bidders in cross-industry deals experience up to an average of 1.6% 
higher returns than bidders hiring full-service advisors. In contrast, the 
 
41 3-digit SIC code of the current target firm is used to measure the number of deals in the target 
industry. If an acquirer’s prior experience is zero, it is considered without prior experience whereas 
greater than zero is classified as with prior experience. 
42 Industry peers is computed as the number of boutique advisors hired by a bidder's industry peers 
(based on the same 3-digit SIC code) in the year prior to the announcement date over the total 
number of advisors employed by the same group of peers during the same period. 
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announcement CARs are similar between boutique and full-service deals in same-
industry acquisitions. This indicates that boutique advisors offer a unique advantage 
to bidders in acquisitions of targets with higher information asymmetry. 
The same conclusion is reiterated when considering deals with or without prior 
bidder experience in the target industry. Table 2. 8 shows that industry peers 
significantly influence the bidder’s decision to hire a boutique advisor when it lacks 
prior acquisition experience in the target industry (at the 5% level). The results on 
deal outcome in Panel B are similar to cross-industry deals and confirm that bidders 
with lack of target-sector experience significantly outperform the full-service 
matched peers by up to 1.6% on average when they hire boutique advisors. Overall, 
the results imply that bidders pursuing deals with higher information asymmetry 
can benefit by hiring boutique advisors. 
 
2.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis on CARs 
 
Sibilkov and McConnell (2014) uses Fama-French value-weighted portfolios 
instead of market model to calculate CARs during the announcement period. To see 
whether the use of different benchmark model changes my results, I also employ 
the Fama-French model and Fama-French Momentum model to produce 
announcement returns. My results remain qualitatively the same with these 
variations.  
 
2.6.3 Matching Quality Using Balance Diagnostics 
  
The quality of matching can be assessed by comparing the similarity of baseline 
covariates between treated and untreated subjects: when there are no differences 
between the treatment and control group after matching on propensity score, the 
matching is considered well-balanced. Therefore, in untabulated analysis, I check 
the distance in marginal distributions of the x covariates by comparing the 
standardised bias (SB) before and after matching as suggested by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). While empirical studies typically suggest that the bias be less than 
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3% or 5% after matching, my sample displays below 3% for all covariates. The 
mean bias for all groups is also less than 5% after matching. However, this does not 
uphold the success of matching. Hence, I employ additional approaches to evaluate 
the matching quality. The t-test is similar to SB testing and informs on whether 
there are significant mean differences between the treated and untreated group for 
each covariate. The matched advisor groups in my sample show no significant 
differences in covariates after matching. Additionally, an approach by Sianesi 
(2004) shows drastically low pseudo R-squared for the matched sample, indicating 
no systematic differences in covariates between treatment and control group. 
Finally, the F-test on the joint significance of all covariates is rejected before 
matching, but it is not rejected after matching. Thus, I conclude that certain level of 
balancing between the treated and untreated group is achieved via the matching 
process. I visually present the matching quality in a box chart and density graph 
exhibited in Figure 2. 3.   
 
2.6.4 Entropy Balancing 
  
Entropy balancing is an alternative method to PSM to preprocess data and achieve 
balancing from the control group prior to estimating the impact of the treatment on 
the outcome based on the standard regression analysis (Hainmueller, 2012; 
Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). While PSM can be limited in jointly balancing out all 
covariates included in the matching process, entropy balancing overcomes these 
issues by adjusting weights that satisfy constraints from a large set of covariates 
and improving the overall covariate balance. In untabulated analysis, I implement 
the entropy balancing method and derive results that are similar to those from PSM. 
Acquirers hiring boutique advisors are associated with significantly higher returns 
in all deals (at the 5% level) and in private deals (at the 1% level) with an average 
of 1.1 and 1.7 % CAR, respectively.   
 
 




With the increasing demand in industry specialization for strategic mergers and 
diversified sources of funding, corporate clients have turned their eyes to highly 
specialized advisory boutiques for M&As. This study investigates the source of 
their increasing market share and reputation and provides new empirical evidence 
on the value of boutique investment banks.    
Based on the analysis of 3-day bidder announcement returns, I find that 
boutique advisors’ growing reputation is attributable to the superior quality of their 
services with economically significant value creation for acquirer shareholders. In 
particular, boutique advisors generate higher CARs relative to full-service advisors 
in all deals and private deals. Moreover, boutique advisors are more likely to be 
rehired by their clients for future acquisitions and chosen for complex deals such as 
diversifying mergers and deals involving stock offers. Lastly, boutique advisors 
retain strongly qualified skillsets and expertise in advising deals involving high 
level of information uncertainty; namely, private deals.  
My findings are robust with a series of subsequent tests I provide in this paper. 
I corroborate our results by controlling for two different types of sample selection 
bias, observable and unobservable, using propensity score matching as well as 
Heckman’s IMR model. I confirm that the results are not affected by unobservable 
or observable bias in which certain characteristics associated with the acquirer and 
the deal affect both the choice of advisor and deal outcome. I also consider the long-
term effects of boutique advisors on acquirer shareholder wealth and find that 
investors receive higher returns in the long-run when they invest in a portfolio of 
boutique deals than when they invest in a full-service portfolio.   
Bowers and Miller (1990) argue that highly reputable bankers identify better 
deals and create value for their clients. My findings on the quality of boutique 
advisors reflect the conventional role of financial advisor highlighted by Bowers 
and Miller and add diverse insights to the financial intermediary literature.  
 








The role of divestiture in dynamic 
asset restructuring: Evidence from 
bank holding companies  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Corporate divestiture as part of asset restructuring has proven to help non-financial 
firms improve performance and resolve financial distress according to the prior 
research, but little is known about divestiture of banks. The lack of academic 
research in bank divestitures is largely because i) the industry is highly regulated as 
the risks associated with banking organizations are different from and much greater 
than those of non-banking firms43; hence, most divestitures are assumed to be 
forced under regulatory pressure, and ii) there is no segment data available for 
banks to evaluate divested units.  
 
43 The risks uniquely associated with banks include credit risk from payment defaults by borrowers, 
market risk from large security holdings, liquidity risk from sudden deposit withdrawals, and 
systemic risk due to their interconnectedness with other financial institutions as well as the economy.  
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An exclusion of banking firms from the sample of corporate divestitures, 
however, incurs two major concerns. Firstly, as Barber and Lyon (1997) elucidates, 
it is subject to data-snooping44. Barber and Lyon (1997) highlight that an earlier 
study by Fama and French (1992) which measure the relation between stock returns 
and firm size/book-to-market ratio has faced criticisms by financial economists as 
they left out sizable observations belonging to financial firms from their estimation, 
rendering a speculation on whether the anomalies in returns are more likely to be a 
result of massive data-snooping by researchers. To resolve this speculation, Barber 
and Lyon (1997) separately examine the robustness of the relation using the holdout 
sample of financial firms in their study. Similarly, it is concerning that practically 
all studies on divestiture exclude financial firms without providing any 
justifications or explaining the potential impact of such an exclusion on the results, 
even though the proportion of bank divestitures are unignorably larger than those 
in any other individual sectors. Accordingly, this study not only attempts to 
acknowledge potential data-snooping in prior studies, but also fill the research gap 
by separately evaluating the motives and role of bank divestiture which are 
previously undocumented.   
Moreover, bank divestitures are ideal for studying managerial motives on 
restructuring decisions based on different theories beyond the agency theory. It is 
not unknown that banks are highly diversified, and preponderance of research 
regard divestitures as a remedy for diversification discount and the agency problem 
(John and Ofek, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1999; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; 
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Lamont and Polk, 2002; Dittmar and 
Shivdasani, 2003; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 2012). However, the agency theory has 
a limited application for banks because the banking industry is highly regulated 
with the strict antitrust law that diversification is much less likely to be a result of 
managerial entrenchment. For non-financial firms, it would be hard to distinguish 
managerial motive behind a restructuring decision, especially for large industrial 
firms in highly concentrated industries such as the oil and telecommunications 
 
44 Data snooping refers to an exclusion of certain observations from the sample after the researcher 
observes the data to find patterns which make the results statistically significant.  
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industry (Yermack, 1996; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Kumar and 
Rabinovitch, 2013). Thus, this study uses the neoclassical theory which have been 
studied by a growing body of literature repudiating the existing interpretation of 
corporate diversification (Matsusaka, 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; 
Campa and Kedia, 2002; Gomes and Livdan, 2004) and the resource-based view 
which has been widely employed by studies on corporate asset reallocation 
including divestiture ((Penrose, 1959; Chang, 1996; Capron, Mitchell, and 
Swaminathan, 2001; Levinthal and Wu, 2010; Kaul, 2012; Vidal and Mitchell, 
2015). 45  These two theories provide similar views regarding the role of asset 
restructurings and suggest that both focus and diversification involving mergers or 
divestitures should be perceived as resource-increasing and value-maximizing 
strategies that firms pursue to free resources and fund a growing or a new business 
opportunity.  
In this study, I separately evaluate the motives and role of divestiture in bank 
holding companies as this allows me to control for unobservable industry-specific 
factors such as regulation and unique risks associated with banks, which could 
affect restructuring choices and returns (Delong, 2001). Also, focusing only on 
banks can lead to less spurious results coming from inter-industry differences. For 
instance, Lang and Stulz (1994) ascertain that diversification decisions are highly 
affected by the industry characteristics and firms in industries with slow growth are 
more likely to diversify. They also argue that diversified firms have lower Tobin’s 
q46 than do focused firms, but it fluctuates across industries rather than within an 
industry. As a holdout sample, bank divestitures can provide exemplary information 
on its own for testing several theories explored and underexplored in divestitures 
of non-financial firms. 
I begin by examining the impact of bank-specific characteristics on divestiture 
decisions and of different types of restructuring strategies on the performance of 
banks. Specifically, I re-evaluate the hypothesis suggested by Slovin, Sushka, and 
 
45  These studies expound that the agency theory substantiate neither the managerial decisions 
between focus and diversification, nor the subsequent outcomes. 
46 Tobin’s q is used to measure diversification discount.  
CHAPTER 3.  DIVESTITURE OF BANKS 
 47 
Poloncheck (1991). They posit that banks are obligated to divest due to its 
regulatory capital requirement which confines managerial flexibility and 
investment. Thus, they argue that divestiture announcements by banks convey 
unfavourable information regarding their capital position and call this the economic 
cost of bank regulation. To assess this argument, I examine the relation between the 
regulatory risk-based capital ratio of banks and their decision to divest in the fixed-
effect probability model. Unlike their argument, I find that bank divestitures are not 
motivated by regulatory capital needs, and banks’ mean (median) capital ratio prior 
to divestitures is much higher than the required risk-based capital ratio. According 
to my divestiture decision model, bank divestitures are rather strongly motivated 
by ex-ante productivity such as size of the bank, financial distress, and operating 
inefficiency similar to divestitures of nonfinancial firms.  
More importantly, I estimate the resource-based view which suggests that 
firms with increasing performance divest assets to fund their growing business 
(Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 2001; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015). Consistent 
with studies based on this theory, I find that banks with positive performance gap 
(increasing performance) are more likely to undertake divestitures. An additional 
driver of bank divestiture includes mergers and acquisitions. Several studies have 
documented that merger is a primary determinant of divestiture and roughly 20 to 
50% of acquired assets are eventually divested (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Kaplan 
and Weisbach, 1992; Fluck and Lynch, 1999). Furthermore, large bank mergers are 
rarely approved without ensuing divestitures as required by the antitrust law47. In 
my sample, 68.2% of bank divestitures are accompanied by acquisitions. 
As mergers are significant part of banks’ restructuring strategies concomitantly 
implemented with divestitures, I estimate how banks use both means of asset 
restructurings to change their corporate scope. Changes in business scope are 
defined as follows. Banks which acquire related business to their primary industry 
and divest non-core unit are defined to have implemented focusing strategy; but 
those which acquire unrelated business and divest non-core or core unit are 
 
47 Section of Antitrust Law, ABA. (2006). Bank mergers and acquisitions handbook. Chicago, IL. 
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considered to have taken diversifying strategy.48 In order to determine which firm-
specific characteristics affect the choice between focusing and diversifying 
decisions, I generate hypothesis proposed by studies using the neoclassical theory 
and the resource-based view (Chang, 1996; Matsusaka, 2001). These studies imply 
that firms alternate between focusing (scope-decreasing) and diversifying (scope-
increasing) strategies over their business cycle to explore synergistic opportunities 
that could help maintain their performance and growth. More specifically, firms in 
the stage of increasing performance employ focusing strategy to specialize in their 
profitable segment. However, once they exhaust all the synergistic opportunities 
within their core segment, firms diversify into another industry in search for a new 
revenue stream.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that positive performance gap, 
increasing loan growth, and higher earnings prospect are positively associated with 
the choice of focusing strategy but are negatively associated with diversifying 
strategy. For instance, banks with increasing loan growth are more likely to focus 
on their core business while those with decreasing loan growth are more likely to 
diversify. Additionally, operating inefficiency and financial distress are major 
reasons why banks implement diversifying strategy. Lastly, as the level of 
diversification increases within the banking firm, it is more likely to undertake 
focusing strategy and is less likely to diversify. These findings indicate that banks 
in their profitable stage of business cycle tend to focus on the existing segments, 
but they continue to search for a new business opportunity when current operations 
become inefficient and less profitable. My findings are inconsistent with the agency 
theory which ascribe diversification discount to managerial entrenchment or empire 
building since diversification is used only to sustain organizational productivity.    
These restructuring choices banks make to change their corporate scope 
convey important implications about their equity performance subsequent to 
focusing or diversification. According to studies involving the neoclassical theory 
 
48 Divesting the core unit is called legacy divestiture and is known to be associated with negative 
announcement returns as it signals underperformance and lack of growth opportunities of the 
divesting firm’s primary business.  
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(Matsusaka, 2001; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Gomes and Livdan, 2004), even if 
managers diversify to improve the firm’s declining productivity, diversification can 
incur discount. This is because of endogenous selection, whereby firms with 
declining performance diversify while those with increasing performance choose to 
focus. Hence, the ex-ante underperformance (outperformance) of diversifying 
(focusing) firms transforms into equity discount (premium) when the strategy is 
implemented (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Gomes and 
Livdan, 2004; Villalonga, 2004) 49. Consistent with previous empirical evidence on 
endogenous selection and the neoclassical theory, I find that focusing strategy by 
diversified banks induces positive stock market reaction with an average of 2.2% 
increase in CAR around divestiture announcements. On the contrary, diversifying 
strategy involving legacy divestiture (divestiture of core asset) negatively affects 
the announcement returns with an average of 1.4% reduction in value.  
Though banks with diversifying strategy get panelised in the short-term and 
experience discount, I expect that their performance would recover in the long-term. 
My further intuition is that firms are already aware of discounts (price correction) 
upon the announcement of such deals. They simply sacrifice short-term returns for 
the long-term gains to restore their declining performance. If the neoclassical theory 
holds, diversifying strategy undertaken to improve productivity of the firm should 
alleviate the discount in the long-term. For the long-term equity performance, I 
estimate 12- to 36-month post-divestiture stock returns using buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns and calendar-time portfolio regressions. Both measures show that 
the performance of banks with focusing and diversifying strategy is not 
significantly different from that of their benchmarks. These findings affirm that 
diversifying (focusing) strategy normalizes the performance of banks and 
eliminates discount (premium) in the long-run.   
 
49 In theoretical perspective related to the neoclassical theory, firms choose to specialize in their 
existing business only when they already have a good match. Otherwise, they have to keep exploring 
a new business until they find the most compatible match for their organizational capabilities. 
Therefore, announcement returns are more likely to be a reflection of investor reaction to the 
corporate strategies containing implications about the match and less likely to be just diversification 
discount. 
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This paper provides new evidence on divestiture of banks. Contrasting to the 
previous supposition by Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1991), I show that the 
regulatory capital requirement is not the main determinant of bank divestitures, and 
divestitures on average have positive impact on equity returns in both the short- and 
long-term. Additionally, this study conjoins the neoclassical theory and the 
resource-based view to predict how banks make scope-changing decisions through 
acquisitions and divestitures and how they perform subsequently. These theories 
are employed to overcome limited scopes suggested by prior studies in divestiture; 
most studies presume that diversification is related to managerial entrenchment or 
inefficient resource allocation and misconstrue focus-increasing divestiture as a 
means of eliminating the agency problem.   
Inconsistent with these arguments, I show that managerial motives suggested 
by the agency theory does not explain banks’ decision to focus or diversify. Instead, 
these decisions depend on ex-ante productivity and performance of banks. Banks 
are more likely to diversify (focus) when their performance and loan growth decline 
(increase) and experience operating inefficiency and financial constraints. I further 
prove that regardless of the managerial motive, announcement returns increase with 
focusing strategy but decrease with diversifying strategy. However, short-term 
stock performance is merely based on what the strategic direction is informing 
about the bank’s ex-ante performance which is endogenously related to the 
selection of a particular strategy. In the long-run, there is no evidence that banks 
with diversifying strategy underperform their industry benchmarks, and both 
focusing and diversifying banks perform comparatively.  
Feldman and McGrath (2016) note that divestitures comprise about one-third 
of overall deal-making value annually, and divestiture transactions accounted for 
over $3.9 trillion worldwide between 2010 and 2018 (Divestment Performance 
Monitor)50. Over the same period, an analysis of the Thomson One’s US domestic 
 
50 “Majority of companies lose value from divestitures, research shows.” Willis Towers Watson and 
Cass Business School. Accessed May 27, 2020. https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-
US/News/2019/02/majority-of-companies-lose-value-from-divestitures-research-shows. 
Additionally, PWC reports that annual deal value of total divestitures accounts for over $350 to $800 
billions based on the Thomson Reuters data. Refer to “Deciding on a divestiture? Here’s how to 
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divestiture transactions data indicates that approximately 37 to 50% of divestitures 
were undertaken by financial services firms. Despite their frequent involvement in 
divestment activities and economic significance of these deals, divestiture of banks 
has not received proper attention in academic literature. Empirical contribution of 
this research is notable given that the findings and theoretical arguments in this 
study have not been examined previously in divestiture studies and can add diverse 
perspectives to broaden the existing knowledge in this research area.   
Following sections of the paper is organized as section 3.2 literature review, 
section 3.3 Hypothesis, section 3.4 data and sample collection, section 3.5 
methodology, section 3.6 empirical results, and section 3.7 conclusion. 
  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Divestitures comprise the largest part of corporate asset restructuring activities and 
is commonly implemented along with M&As. However, due to its frivolous 
transaction scale as compared to mergers, it has gained less empirical 
considerations. Nevertheless, there is one angle that has been predominantly 
explored in divestiture-related studies, which is the focusing strategy or namely, 
divestiture of unrelated (non-core) assets. First and foremost, John and Ofek (1995) 
discern that asset sales targeted at reducing corporate scope improve operating 
performance and shareholder value. They support this finding through the focus 
hypothesis in which firms seek to raise capital by disposing an unrelated asset and 
invest in their core business. The effect of this strategy is cash flow enhancement 
on the divestor’s remaining assets and productive use of the disposed asset by a 
more suitable acquirer.  
The literature’s fascination with focus-driven divestitures was instigated by the 
notion of diversification discount, whereby diversified firms are traded at lower 
value than standalone companies specialized in one sector. For instance, Berger and 
 
protect an asset’s value.” Mike Niland. Accessed May 27, 2020. 
https://usblogs.pwc.com/deals/deciding-on-a-divestiture-heres-how-to-protect-an-assets-value/. 
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Ofek (1995) find that diversification lowers firm value on average by 13 to 15% 
than when a firm is single-segmented. Because it causes discounts in firm value and 
shareholder returns, researchers often link diversification with the agency theory. 
The theory suggests that diversification is a tool for managers to increase their 
compensation and entrench their position within the firm by expanding into areas 
related to their personal skills or interests 51  rather than to the firm’s core 
competencies (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Scharfstein and Stein, 2002).  
While the literature in 90s is filled with the ongoing demonstration on the 
value-destructive nature of diversification, the discovery on scope-decreasing 
divestiture spurs another series of studies reenforcing the agency view. As reducing 
corporate scope through divestiture of non-core asset is discovered to have positive 
effects on firm value, studies started concluding that divestiture is a remedy for 
diversification discount and uniformly presented the following narratives: 
diversification leads to discount in firm value because pursuing diversification 
conflicts with shareholders’ interest; but scope-decreasing divestitures moderate 
discount and induce positive revaluation, which justifies the focusing strategy in 
resolving the agency problem in diversified firms. Similar narratives have been 
exhaustively recycled in the literature of corporate and asset control (Lang and Stulz, 
1994; John and Ofek, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1999; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; 
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Lamont and Polk, 2002; Dittmar and 
Shivdasani, 2003; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 2012).    
Among various forms of agency problems, most frequently raised issue prone 
to diversified firms in the literature is inefficient allocation of free cash flows among 
divisions, which leads to overinvestment in unprofitable divisions and 
underinvestment in profitable business (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Berger and Ofek, 
1995). Scharfstein and Stein (2002) refer to this inefficient internal capital 
allocation in which profitable divisions subsidize unprofitable ones as corporate 
 
51  The expansion as part of managerial entrenchment happens through takeovers of unrelated 
business using free cash flow of the firm (Jensen, 1986). Subsequent studies report that diversifying 
mergers are value-destroying (Servaes, 1996; Megginson, Morgan, and Nail, 2004).  
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socialism. In divestiture studies, proponents of the agency theory prove how 
focusing strategy eliminates diversification discounts by improving divisional 
capital allocation and reinstates shareholder value and long-term performance (John 
and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003).  
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) bolster that diversified firms trade at a discount 
because managers misallocate investments to an underperforming unit over a more 
valuable unit. Consequently, those which divest the underperforming non-core unit 
experience significant reduction in discount, leading to positive announcement 
returns and substantial increase in efficacy of post-divestiture segment investment. 
Although they do not find the evidence on cross-subsidization of cash flows, Daley, 
Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) also document that increasing corporate focus via 
cross-industry spinoffs have significantly positive effects on announcement returns 
and operating performance of the parent firm after spinoff. They find that this is 
attributable to the focusing strategy which allows divided managerial attention to 
be invested in where their skillset lies. Similarly, Desai and Jain (1999) show that 
focus-increasing spinoffs are associated with improvement in both long-term 
abnormal stock returns and operating performance while non-focus-increasing 
spinoffs are not.  
Studies incorporating mergers and acquisitions report similar results. 
Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2004) find positive association between focus-
increasing mergers and long-term performance, but negative relation for 
diversifying mergers. Bennett and Feldman (2017) suggest that firms acquire a 
related business and concurrently spinoff non-core assets to constantly generate 
synergies and assemble divided managerial attentions to their primary division.  
As characterized by numerous examples, although the focusing and agency 
theories have been the underpinning of divestiture research, some studies allude 
monotonously value-destructive nature of managerial behaviour within diversified 
firms seem inadequate (Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Feldman and McGrath, 2016). 
More eloquent rationalization should be that managers in diversified firms could be 
as equally motivated as single-industry firms to maximize firm value. After all, the 
agency theory does not explain most of the critical aspects of corporate decisions 
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such as: why and how diversified firms and conglomerates exist if diversification 
destroys value; how firms manage risk without diversifying their business portfolio 
and survive an industry shock; how firms in a mature stage of their lifecycle find 
growth opportunities without increasing business scope to another industry. 
Moreover, diversification has its own advantages as much as specializations. For 
example, diversification eliminates redundancies across segments, hence, reduce 
fixed costs, which essentially allows conglomerates to operate more efficiently; it 
also allows mature firms with slowing growth in their industry to discover a new 
business avenue and utilize their capabilities (Gomes and Livdan, 2004). 
Consequently, many studies started questioning managerial motives on 
diversification discount defined by the agency theory in prior studies and 
investigating alternative motives. Two plausible theories counter the agency view 
and provide sound rationale on diversification decision: the neoclassical theory of 
profit maximization and the resource-based view of capital allocation.   
The neoclassical economics theory provides basis for determining firms’ 
production and allocation decisions. In its essence, firms are assumed to pursue 
profit maximization, a goal that influences every process of corporate decision-
making including resource allocation and restructuring choice between focus and 
diversification (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002, 2007; Gomes and Livdan, 2004; 
Yang, 2008; Arikan and Stulz, 2016).  
Earlier I mentioned that the agency theory postulate that diversified firms 
inefficiently allocate resources across divisions and profitable segments subsidize 
unprofitable ones. Controverting evidence is presented based on the neoclassical 
theory of profit maximization. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that resources 
within diversified firms (e.g. conglomerates) are allocated depending on the 
productivity of each segment and industry demand. Specifically, larger capital is 
invested into a more productive segment and a segment which operates in an 
industry with higher demand. Their findings indicate efficient allocation of 
resources across diverse segments, with larger segments being more productive 
than smaller segments and the largest segment being the most productive. In the 
study of diversifying acquisitions, Doukas and Kan (2008) also find that internal 
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capital resources are transferred from less profitable segments to more profitable 
segments subsequent to diversification.   
In examining diversification decisions, studies under the neoclassical theory 
commonly use a dynamic model which accounts for endogenous self-selection 
between the characteristics of firms and the decision to diversify (Campa and Kedia, 
2002; Chevalier, 2004; Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Villalonga, 2004). Campa and 
Kedia (2002) and Gomes and Livdan (2004) argue that the decision to diversify is 
not random but is endogenously determined depending on ex-ante differences in 
firm-specific characteristics such as size and productivity. These characteristics 
explain not only the choice of diversification, but also the ex-post performance and 
valuation of diversified firms.  
The dynamic model proves that diversification decisions are optimally made. 
Gomes and Livdan (2004) find that diversification is driven by productivity 
differentials and decreasing returns to scale. Firms remain focused when 
productivity is high, but they diversify when productivity becomes too lower for 
the scale. Campa and Kedia (2002) document that firms only diversify when the 
benefits outweigh the costs of diversification. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) 
show that the optimal level of diversification depends on the firm’s comparative 
advantage. For example, a firm with industry-specific skills can incur higher 
opportunity costs from diversifying, which makes it more productive to remain 
focused. However, firms with declining returns in the existing segments but with 
skills that can be extended to different industries explore diversification option as 
they see profit opportunities. Diversification threshold can also be extended as 
outside opportunities rise. Doukas and Kan (2008) study decisions between related 
and diversifying acquisitions and find that firms acquire related business when their 
core segment is in a high growth industry and generates superior cash flows. 
However, firms diversify when their core segment is in a low growth industry and 
its cash flows and growth prospects are lower than those of non-core assets.     
Regardless of the optimality of diversification decisions explained by the 
dynamic model, these studies unanimously corroborate that diversification discount 
exists. However, they note that the source of discount is not attributable to 
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diversification itself, but to the underlying characteristics that are endogenously 
related to the diversification decision. In congruence with this endogenous selection 
explanation, Campa and Kedia (2002) share an example where an underperforming 
firm in its industry decides to diversify. In this case, not accounting for the impact 
of the ex-ante performance on diversification decision will falsely ascribe the 
discount to the diversifying activity. Similarly, Matsusaka (2001) argues that when 
firms exhaust a good match for their capabilities – valuable and productive skills 
which could be applied to certain types of businesses –, their performance may 
dwindle, and this performance decline is what drives firms to diversify, not the 
other way around. Based on plant-level observations52, Schoar (2002) observes a 
significant productivity premium for plants in diversified firms compared to those 
in standalone companies. However, total productivity diminishes as the managerial 
attention shifts from incumbent plants to newly acquired plants 53 . Gomes and 
Livdan (2004) also report that firms increasing their scope are less productive than 
focused firms (non-diversifying firms)54 prior to diversifying. This endogenous 
self-selection between productivity and diversification decision leads to the lower 
valuation of diversified firms.    
While these studies indicate that diversification discount endogenously occurs 
due to diversifying firms’ ex-ante performance or productivity, other research 
present additional sources of discount. Schoar (2002) cite that diversification 
discount in market value is more likely to be a result of wage difference which 
accounts for approximately 30% of the discount since conglomerates pay higher 
wages than standalone firms. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) reevaluate 
diversification discounts in mergers presented in Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
identify that the source of value reduction is from the acquisition of already 
discounted targets. 
 
52  They use the plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database instead of the 
COMPUSTAT segment data reasoning that they are systematically biased toward resulting in 
diversification discount.  
53 The increase in productivity of newly acquired plants is deducted by the decline of productivity 
in incumbent plants. 
54 They discover that specialized firms are more efficient and more productive. 
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Further suggested source of discount include measuring issues in estimating 
the valuation effect. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) point out that there are 
systematic differences between divisions of diversified firms and standalone firms. 
Thus, using standalone firms as a benchmark in measuring diversification discount 
can be misleading. Explicitly, Villalonga (2004) describes that since segments 
within diversified firms are larger than standalone firms in the same industry, it is 
inadequate to assign the q ratio obtained from a standalone firm to a segment in 
multi-divisional firms. Campa and Kedia (2002) also observe systematic 
differences between diversified and single-segment firms in their underlying 
characteristics and discover that the characteristics driving firms to diversify also 
causes discounts in firm value. After controlling for endogenous selection bias 
through different methods, they discover that the average discount not only 
diminishes, but also adjusts to premium.     
Overall, irrespective of perceivable discounts associated with diversifying 
strategy, recent studies using a dynamic model assent that the managerial motive of 
diversification is consistent with profit maximization. 
Similar to the neoclassical theory, studies exploring the resource-based view 
also perceive that firms make profit-maximizing decisions and diversification is 
part of such decisions. The resource-based theory suggests that a firm’s competitive 
advantage comes primarily from its unique resources and capabilities that are hard 
to replicate (Barney, 1991). While firms’ growth can be attained by manipulating 
and expanding resources, the limited scope of firms (lack of diversification) stems 
from scarce resources and managerial capabilities (Penrose, 1959). In the study of 
diversification decision, Levinthal and Wu (2010) assert that firms with lower 
capabilities remain focused while those with more capabilities diversify when their 
current industry becomes mature. They perceive that diversification discount is a 
result of the dispersion in capabilities across increased number of divisions. They 
further indicate that firms in general focus more on total profit rather than profit 
margin or q ratio which are used to measure diversification discount. Hence, firms 
remaining focused generate greater profit margins but become less profitable than 
their diversifying competitors in terms of total profit growth.  
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The resource-based view has been frequently applied to divestiture studies 
unlike the neoclassical theory. Studies espousing the resource-based theory in asset 
transactions find that firms with increasing performance adopt divestitures to free 
resources and support their growing business (Chang, 1996; Matsusaka, 2001; 
Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 2001; Kaul, 2012; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015). 
These firms continuously reconfigure their resources through divestitures and other 
means of asset restructurings even when they are already generating good 
performance without financial distress to sustain competitive advantage. Vidal and 
Mitchell (2015) find that firms with increasing performance undertake partial 
divestitures to free resources that can be invested for future growth. Kaul (2012) 
notes that new knowledges and skillsets obtained through technological innovation 
prompt firms to change their scope by redeploying limited resources from 
incumbent businesses that are marginally profitable to the newly acquired segment. 
Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan (2001) investigate how firms reconfigure 
corporate resources and find that firms divest immaterial assets post-acquisition to 
eliminate redundancy and achieve scale efficiency.  
A stream of literature with the resource-based view enunciate that divestitures 
are not merely a remedy for ill-perceived diversification but are more of a resource 
increasing and value-maximising instrument. In this paper, departure from the 
agency and focusing theories which have been predominantly and repeatedly 
examined in corporate divestiture studies, I incorporate the dynamic value-
maximizing approach of the neoclassical theory and resource-based view into 





There is little known about divestiture of banks as the financial industry is normally 
excluded in divestiture studies due to heavy regulation. Slovin, Sushka, and 
Poloncheck (1991) portray such limitations of bank divestitures imposed by the 
financial regulation in their study and suggest that banks are forced to divest under 
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regulatory capital requirement. They then argue that since divestitures are mandated 
when banks have insufficient capital, divestiture announcements carry negative 
information about the divesting bank’s financial position. Another reason for lack 
of bank divestiture studies is that a large proportion of bank divestitures are 
mandatorily required upon takeover activities55 (Burke, 1997; Baer and Redcay, 
2000; Pilloff, 2002), thus, divestitures are not individually studied. However, it is 
hard to believe that all bank divestitures are implemented involuntarily as banks 
comprise one of the largest conglomerates which often use divestitures as part of 
portfolio reconfiguration similar to other listed non-financial firms. As a matter of 
fact, banks undertake divestitures more frequently than any other sectors. Yet, the 
existing studies provide weak documentation on divestiture of banks. In this study, 
I investigate whether bank divestitures are driven solely by regulatory capital 
requirement and merger plans as previously reported or can also be explained by 
additional motives applicable to divestitures of non-financial firms.  
In developing hypotheses on additional divestiture motives, I consider a 
theoretical approach backed by empirical evidence as discussed in the literature 
review. As I mentioned earlier, divestiture studies, in general, have been limited to 
measuring the effectiveness of focusing strategy on removing the agency problem 
in diversified firms. However, according to recent studies conducted based upon 
the neoclassical theory and the resource-based view, focusing strategy is irrelevant 
to the agency problem, but rather is mainly implemented by firms with increasing 
performance and growth potential in their current industry. They also discover that 
the corporate decision between focus and diversification depends on underlying 
firm-specific characteristics which cannot be explained by the agency theory. While 
these theories have been actively researched leading to important discoveries on 
corporate diversification behaviour, I recognize that both theories have been 
underutilized in divestiture studies. Therefore, I first begin by identifying a set of 
managerial motives of bank divestitures based on these theories.  
 
55 Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) document that 44% of acquisitions from 1971 to 1989 were followed 
by some form of divestiture. Baer and Redcay (2000) note that a number of mergers are challenged 
by FTC (Federal Trade Commission) and DOJ (Department of Justice) and divestitures are often 
demanded by antitrust agencies as a merger remedy. As such, I test the following hypothesis. 
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The neoclassical theory concerns efficient allocation of limited resources to 
maximize profit, and corporate divestitures are primarily implemented to have 
specific assets operated by those who can operate them most efficiently (Hite et al., 
1987; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that 
the probability of asset sales is related to ex-ante efficiency of buyers and sellers 
and that divestiture transactions tend to improve the allocation of resources, utility, 
and wealth of the parties involved56. In this context, asset reallocation through 
divestiture is consistent with a simple neoclassical model of profit maximization. 
Yang (2008) also argue that the change in productivity measured by the efficiency 
ratio affects firms’ decision to buy or sell assets: firms with rising productivity 
expand their scale while those with falling productivity downsize. As divestitures 
enable efficient allocation of corporate assets in the market, I deduce that operating 
inefficiency is likely to drive divestitures by banks that aim to achieve efficiency 
gains.  
In the process of scrutinizing recurrent divestiture motives for non-financial 
firms in prior research, I find that asset sales are also followed by financial distress 
(Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Brown, James, and 
Mooradian, 1994; John and Ofek, 1995). When firms are in financial distress with 
declining performance and high leverage, they may experience difficulty in 
borrowing and raising funds to invest in their ongoing operation. Divestitures are 
particularly useful for firms that are incapable of raising funds externally and are 
implemented to relax credit constraints (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) and repay debts 
(Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995). Considering banks are highly leveraged due to 
the nature of their business making debt a cheaper source of financing, divestiture 
can be a natural strategic choice for banks to take when they are financially 
constrained.  
Interestingly, divestitures are also known to be undertaken by firms with 
increasing performance. According to studies based on the resource-based view, 
divestitures free limited resources through asset liquidation and invest the capital 
 
56 Unlike mergers and acquisitions, both acquirers and targets experience positive announcement 
returns in divestitures.  
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raised to foster firms’ growing performance (Vidal and Mitchell, 2015; Bennett and 
Feldman, 2017). Matsusaka (2001) also indicate when firms have a good business 
match for their capabilities, it is reflected in their increasing performance and 
growth. These firms then undertake divestitures of unrelated business to help 
support investment in their thriving segments and magnify profitability. Vidal and 
Mitchell (2015) argue that firms incessantly reconfigure their resources through 
divestitures to maintain profitability. They explain that managers perform 
divestitures either to sidestep declining performance against competitors or to 
propel positive performance for a longer period by removing superfluous operations 
inhibiting growth. Frequent involvement in divestitures by banks may be part of 
their efforts to reconfigure their asset portfolio and sustain more profitable branches 
and segments.  
The literature denotes that banks have become larger and highly diversified 
(Winton, 1999; Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders, 2006; Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 
2010; Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong, 2016), and approximately 94% of the banks in 
my sample operate in more than one sector besides traditional banking. Bank size 
can be an important determinant for divestiture decision in both a voluntary and a 
regulatory standpoint. In a regulatory perspective, bank size is linked to systematic 
risk, for which banks are regulated by size threshold, minimum capital requirement, 
limitation on risky activities, and stress tests. Such restrictions may require banks 
to divest their assets as their overall scale becomes larger. Banks can also 
voluntarily divest to achieve scale efficiency. While bank divestitures are often 
followed by acquisitions, Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan (2001) argue that 
post-acquisition divestiture is part of portfolio reconfiguration through which firms 
absorb and integrate only necessary portion of the target’s assets. They show that 
as the business similarity between acquirer and target increases, redundant assets 
are more likely to be divested. Divestitures in this sense help acquiring firms 
achieve scale efficiency.  
Based on those conceivable motives of divestiture discussed above, I propose 
the following hypothesis that has not been evaluated in previous studies on bank 
divestiture.  
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Hypothesis 1 Bank divestitures are driven not only by regulatory capital 
requirement and mergers, but also by ex-ante productivity and performance such as 
operating inefficiency, financial distress, size, and positive/negative performance 
gap.  
 
Firms constantly change corporate scope throughout their business cycle57 to 
reconfigure their business portfolio, which is typically done via asset restructuring 
using mergers and divestitures. While many empirical studies in finance simply 
view focusing and diversifying strategies as alternative choices firms make and 
measure their usefulness based on resultant performance, I focus on the fact that 
those activities are repeated sequentially in most firms including banks. For 
instance, Berger and Ofek (1999) argue that many diversified firms experiencing 
value destruction end up refocusing by disciplinary events or external pressure. 
However, using the same sample, Hyland and Diltz (2002) find that 82 percent of 
the firms which participated in the refocusing program re-diversified afterwards. 
Further, in his theoretical approach on firms’ sequential entry and exit into a 
business, Chang (1996) postulates that the accumulation of new entries in the past 
should have negative impact on diversification in the next period. 
Considering more than half of bank divestitures are accompanied by mergers 
and given the fact that banks are becoming more diversified, incorporating the 
business cycle is particularly important to understand what motivates banks to 
increase or decrease their business scope. Accordingly, I review studies built on the 
neoclassical theory and the resource-based view which construe scope-changing 
decisions as natural responses of firms facing limited growth opportunities within 
their retained segments over the course of different business cycles.     
Studies espousing the resource-based view document that firms’ behaviour 
involving consistent change in business scope resembles the sequence of 
organizational search and selection and can be explained by profit-maximizing 
 
57 The business cycle refers to the sequence of ups (profitable) and downs (unprofitable).  
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motives. This interpretation is inspired by the earlier literature on organizational 
search (Rumelt, 1974; Levinthal and March, 1981; Chang, 1996): firms primarily 
explore an existing knowledge base and maximize profit opportunities within the 
industry by focusing on their core business, which can be accomplished by 
acquiring related businesses and/or divesting unrelated assets; however, once they 
have depleted all the synergistic resources, firms enter a new industry (diversify) 
through an acquisition of unrelated asset. They may also exit from their existing 
business simultaneously using divestiture. 
Studies based on the neoclassical theory share similar insights. Matsusaka 
(2001) explains how firms repeat focus and diversification to search and match 
better businesses for their organizational capabilities: firms with good match based 
on increasing performance specialize in their primary sector by either divesting 
unrelated assets or expand its scale further to increase market share and maximize 
profit; but firms with poor match approximated by decreasing performance 
diversify to find a better match that can generate profits. Firms continue to search 
until they find a good match for their organizational capabilities, and at the end of 
the cycle, when they finally do, they refocus and divest subordinate matches. Even 
with the absence of acknowledgement in organizational search, studies using the 
neoclassical theory to analyze shift in business scope still observe similar corporate 
decision-making process and show that firms diversify when their productivity and 
profitability fall (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Gomes 
and Livdan, 2004).   
Those studies unanimously predict that firms use focusing strategy when they 
experience increasing performance; on the contrary, firms use diversifying strategy 
when they experience performance decline. Based on this theoretical argument 
provided by prior studies, I propose the corresponding hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Profitable banks are more likely to use focusing (scope-decreasing) 
strategy while poorly performing banks are more likely to use diversifying (scope-
increasing) strategy. 
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A seemingly manifested presumption that may be misguiding in studies relying 
solely on the agency theory is that diversification is a heredity of agency problem 
which destroys value, and divestitures are regarded as a damage control mechanism. 
For this assumption to work, firstly, one has to prove firms increase their scope to 
irrelevant industries even if they already have a growing and profitable business to 
focus on. As mentioned earlier, however, restructuring decisions are sequentially 
made based on firms’ ability to generate profits with given resources and 
knowledge at each stage. Further, studies articulating asset restructuring strategies 
do not find a direct connection between the agency problem and discount in 
diversifying deals. Mulherin and Boone (2000) demonstrate that scope increasing 
acquisitions are as synergistic as other restructuring strategies, and wealth effects 
obtained from scope-increasing deals are inconsistent with the agency theory.  
Nevertheless, there is consensus in literature that firms which use the focusing 
strategy yield higher returns than ones that use the diversifying strategy (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; John and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Gomes and 
Livdan, 2004). Matsusaka (2001) stresses that even if diversification strategy is 
value-maximizing, firms using the strategy may trade at discount as compared to 
specialized firms due to efficiency costs from multi-sector operations and imperfect 
match. On the other hand, firms announcing the focusing strategy are traded at 
premium due to increase in efficiency and managerial attention on the remaining 
business. He also hints that when the core operation is marginal, yet is not a lost 
cause, it is better to keep it than to liquidate. Feldman (2014) substantiates this 
argument and finds that legacy divestitures (divestitures of a firm’s original 
business) are costly due to the unit’s historical interdependency with remaining 
units and cause weaker post-divestiture operating performance compared to that of 
competitors.  
Similar results have been presented in studies of bank merger. Delong (2001) 
distinguishes bank mergers between focus and diversification according to activity 
and geographic similarity and compares announcement returns. The results show 
that diversifying mergers neither create, nor destroy value while focusing mergers 
increase shareholder value. Laeven and Levine (2007) argue that financial 
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conglomerates experience discounts in market valuation in relative terms to their 
diversification intensity. The reason is as follows. I mentioned earlier in Hypothesis 
2 that firms are more likely to use focusing strategy by acquiring related assets and 
divesting unrelated assets when they have increasing performance, whereas 
diversifying strategy is more likely to be undertaken by firms with declining 
performance. This endogenous selection of underlying firm characteristics 
determining both the choice between focus and diversification and ensuing 
performance will be reflected in valuation upon divestiture announcement. 
Accordingly, I propose the following hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis 3 Divestiture announcements by banks induce positive investor 
reactions when involving focusing strategy but negative responses when 
accompanied by diversifying strategy.  
 
Focusing strategy is also known to improve long-term performance. Desai and 
Jain (1999) find that focus-increasing spinoffs are associated with significantly 
greater long-term abnormal returns than non-focus-increasing spinoffs. Similarly, 
Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2004) estimate long-run stock performance for 
focus-increasing mergers and discover significantly higher returns. While it is fairly 
evident that focusing strategy increases both short-term and long-term performance 
according to the prior literature, the long-term effect of diversifying strategy 
requires further considerations. Hence, I gauge different ways banks create value 
through focusing and diversifying strategy.    
Benefits of focusing strategy in the literature were mostly built around the 
agency theory. Focusing strategy is presumed to resolve agency problems residing 
in diversified firms such as misallocation of corporate resources, overinvestment, 
and divided managerial attention. (John and Ofek, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1999; 
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Lamont and 
Polk, 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 2012). 
However, proposed agency problems have been contested in the grounds of 
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inappropriate benchmarks58, different sources of discount unrelated to diversifying 
activities59, and endogenous selection bias in measuring diversification discount 
(Chevalier, 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Campa and Kedia, 
2002; Gomes and Livdan, 2004; Villalonga, 2004). Outside the agency theory, 
value creation in corporate focus comes from increase in market power and 
economies of scale (Delong, 2001; Laeven and Levine, 2007).  
Value creation in bank diversification is generated from the economies of 
information and economies of scope. Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser (2010) 
acknowledge that banks have extensive information on their customers through 
long-term contractual relationships and can use it to achieve economies of 
information. For example, banks often cross-sell different financial services such 
as securities underwriting or insurance to firms with which they have prior lending 
relations. Further, economies of scope can be realized by diversifying revenue 
streams into non-interest activities60 besides traditional loan making (Baele, Jonghe, 
and Vennet, 2007). Diversification can also help bank holding companies create 
efficient internal capital markets and lower the cost of capital when external 
financing is costly 61  (Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Delong, 2001; Matsusaka and 
Nanda, 2002). Most importantly, banks play an essential role in facilitating the flow 
of credit in the economy. For this reason, regulatory agreements such as Basel III 
emphasize the need for countercyclical capital buffer for banks to remain solvent 
and help the real economy during recession. Diversifying revenue sources allows 
 
58 Studies associating diversification with the agency theory compare the performance of each 
segment in diversified firms with that of standalone firms that are systematically different. In my 
opinion, more appropriate benchmark would be other diversified firms which have similar firm 
characteristics, especially in terms of performance and size, and are from the same industry but do 
not diversify.  
59 Examples of different sources of discount include additional costs incurred by higher wages in 
diversified firms (conglomerates) than those in specialized firms and acquisition of underperforming 
targets.  
60 Banks increase non-interest income by diversifying into areas such as mutual funds, insurance, 
trading, brokerage, investment banking, and wealth management which are accelerated by 
technological innovation and deregulation. 
61 In the presence of information asymmetry between divisions and headquarters as well as between 
headquarters and outside investors, external financing could be costly and capital could be 
inefficiently allocated across divisions. Internal capital markets allow headquarters to efficiently 
allocate investment funds to the most profitable divisions and reduce reliance on expensive external 
capital.  
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banks to not only increase capital buffer through which they can navigate 
unexpected capital shocks and lower the risk of default, but also alleviate total 
earnings volatility (Shim, 2013).     
These benefits provide solid reasons why banks alternately implement 
focusing and diversifying strategies. Firms announcing diversifying deals may 
experience discount in value due to their ex-ante performance. However, if 
managers alternate these strategies to dedicate their organization’s capability to the 
best match as proclaimed by the neoclassical theory, this may mean that 
diversifying firms deliberately sacrifice short-term returns to make a long-term 
investment commitment to the new segment. This way firms can ensure longevity 
and growth even during the periods of underperformance in their business cycle. If 
focus and diversification are a sequence of value-maximizing decisions, regardless 
of short-term market performance influenced by endogenous selection, banks 
should exhibit competitive performance in the long-run.  
This conjecture is supported by findings on diversifying bank merger. Baele, 
Jonghe, and Vennet (2007) demonstrate that banks diversifying into non-interest 
income activities improve long-term market returns and lower idiosyncratic risk. 
The source of performance increase comes from economies of scope via cost 
savings and consolidated revenue enhancement. Likewise, Elsas, Hackethal, and 
Holzhäuser (2010) find that bank diversification increases both profitability and 
market valuation. As such, I measure the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4 In the long-run, diversification discount dissipates, and banks with 
diversifying strategy uphold comparable performance to that of their benchmarks.  
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I obtain divestiture transactions data from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions 
database. Divestors are public U.S. banks which announce divestitures between 
1980 and 2019. Table 3. 1 presents the distribution of divestitures completed each 
year. The table indicates that the financial services sector comprises significant 
portion of divestiture activities and banks partake an important role in this. For the 
analyses of banks’ divestiture decision, I download the list of public U.S. banks 
with the accounting data from the Compustat bank fundamentals annual database. 
I merge the transactions data with the accounting data to create firm-year 
observations in which each bank has one yearly observation. Panel A in Table 3. 2 
reports summary statistics of the merged unbalanced panel data (number of banks 
included in the sample fluctuate each year). This sample has 27,179 firm-year 
observations in total and is used to analyse divestiture decision of banks. In Panel 
B, I present the summary statistics of divestor and non-divestor sample. The 
divestor sample has 1,149 firm-year observations and the non-divestor sample has 
26,030 firm-year observations. Panel C exhibits summary statistics of the cross-
sectional data with all divestiture transactions which have the accounting data 
available from the Compustat for the event study analyses. This sample contains 
1,603 observations of divestiture events. The market value of equity data is obtained 
from CRSP. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
3.4.2 Summary Statistics 
 
I compare the divestor and non-divestor characteristics in Panel B of Table 3. 2 and 
report the results of t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the 
mean and median difference, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1%. In general, divestors are significantly larger than non-divestors when 
comparing the size variable measured by the book value of total assets in US 
$ million. While the mean (median) size of divestors is $71.9 ($7.7) billion, that of 
non-divestors is only $22.8 ($1.1) billion.  
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Divestors are less efficient than non-divestors prior to divestitures as the mean 
(median) operating inefficiency of divestors, which is 3.4% (3.1%), is significantly 
higher than that of non-divestors, which is 2.9% (2.7%).  
Consistent with the prior findings on divestitures of non-financial firms 
(Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002), divestors are less liquid prior to 
divestitures. The mean (median) liquidity ratio for divesting banks is 25.4% (24.5%) 
and that of non-divesting banks is 26.6% (25.3%). This means that financial distress 
motivates some banks to divest.  
The mean (median) leverage ratio computed as common equity over the book 
value of total assets is significantly lower for divestors, 8.0% (7.9%) than that of 
non-divestors, 9.2% (8.7%).  
The capital ratio is measured by the bank’s Tier-1 capital (core capital) as a 
proportion of total risk-weighted assets. This ratio is an important indicator of banks’ 
financial soundness because Tier-1 capital is comprised of highly liquid assets that 
can be readily liquidated in the event of financial distress and it ensures that banks 
can absorb losses. Prior to divestitures, divesting banks have significantly less mean 
(median) core capital, 10.5% (10.4%) than do non-divesting banks, 12.0% (11.5%). 
However, divestors on average reserve much higher capital ratio than the minimum 
statutory requirement of 4%, which implies risks associated with the regulatory 
capital requirement may not be the primary motive of bank divestitures. This 
assumption will be tested in the divestiture decision model later.  
The default risk ratio is measured as the proportion of nonperforming assets 
over total assets. The mean (median) default risk of divestors is 1.3% (0.6%) prior 
to divestitures and that of non-divestors is 1.2% (0.6%). Significantly higher default 
risk of divestors suggests that financially distressed banks are motivated to divest.  
The market-to-book ratio of divestors is significantly higher than that of non-
divestors. The mean (median) market-to-book ratio of divestors is 1.4 (1.3) and that 
of non-divestors is 1.3 (1.2). This means banks take an advantage of high market 
valuation in raising capital by liquidating assets.  
The loan growth rate indicates an average percentage growth in bank loans 
over the past three years. Divestors, 43.5% (30.3%) on average have significantly 
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lower mean (median) growth rate than do non-divestors, 45.5% (32.6%). However, 
putting the statistical differences aside, divestors still exhibit healthy growth rates 
similar to non-divestors.  
Iemploy different measures of profitability – return on asset (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), and net interest margin (NIM) – and on average, divestors are slightly 
less profitable before undertaking divestiture according to mean differences. 
Medians are statistically indifferent. 
Divestitures are often accompanied by acquisitions (Kaplan and Weisbach, 
1992; Burke, 1997; Baer and Redcay, 2000; Pilloff, 2002) whether it is to remove 
unfit assets post-acquisition or to boost market share and growth of a business 
segment within a firm. My sample statistics acknowledge that on average the 
probability that a bank is likely to pursue an acquisition is significantly higher for 
divestors (68.2%) than for non-divestors (24.7%).  
The statistics show that banks are on average less efficient, are financially 
more distressed, and have lower growth rate and less core capital prior to 
divestitures. Moreover, divesting banks are much larger than non-divesting banks, 
and majority of divestitures are followed or preceded by acquisition. 
I present characteristics associated with bank divestiture transactions in Panel 
C of Table 3. 2. The mean (median) market value of divesting banks is $35.7 (3.4) 
billion. The mean (median) Tobin’s Q which represents over or undervaluation is 
1.1 (1.0). The mean (median) total assets of divesting banks which is used to 
measure bank size is $282.3 (24.7) billion. The mean (median) deal value of the 
divested units is $261.4 (56.3) million. The mean (median) relative size of the 
divested units is 14.7% (2.7%) of the divesting banks’ market value of equity. Most 
divested units are subsidiaries (97.9%), and only few are public (1.1%) or private 
(0.3%). 69.9% of the transactions involve divestitures of unrelated (non-core) unit 
while 30.1% of the divested units are divestors’ core unit. 56.8% of divestitures are 
accompanied by related mergers in which divestors acquire a business related to 
their core industry. 40.2% of acquisitions that are performed by divestors are 
unrelated mergers. 45.5% of the divested units are from the same state as their 
buyers. The mean (median) divestiture experience by banks in the past 3 years is 
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88.9% (69.3%). With a small number of observations available on the method of 
payment, I generate percentage of payment made by cash for which the mean cash 
payment is 93.6%. The mean (median) stock price runup before divestiture 





3.5.1 Divestiture Decision Model and Variable Construction 
 
There are limited number of empirical studies examining the role of divestiture in 
banks, and divestiture research typically excludes financial firms from the sample. 
A few studies which evaluate bank divestitures accentuate that banks are highly 
regulated and that divestitures are a proviso to mergers. To find out whether 
divestiture is an important restructuring event for banking organizations, I test what 
motivates banks to divest using a fixed-effects linear probability model as in the 
equation (1). I do not use conventional binary model such as the probit or logit 
model because those are subject to inconsistency and incidental parameters problem 
which occur in panel data (Kiefer and Wolfowitz, 1956; Heckman, 1987; Lancaster, 




+ 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,(𝑡−4,𝑡−1) 𝑜𝑟 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,(𝑡−4,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,(𝑡−3,𝑡−1) + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,(𝑡−3,𝑡+1)





62 I additionally estimate a conditional fixed-effects logistic model and the results are similar to those 
in the fixed-effects linear probability model.  
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where the dependent variable, Divest, is a dummy equal to one if a bank divests in 
a given year, and zero otherwise. The definition of explanatory variables is 
available in Appendix B. As addressed in the hypothesis section, I include variables 
which measure divestiture motives based on the neoclassical theory and resource-
based view. These theories suggest that financially distressed firms are more likely 
to liquidate assets to raise capital and relax credit constraints. I create indicators of 
financial distress following Simpson and Gleason (1999): 
 
i. the size of the bank measured by the natural log of total assets; 
ii. financial leverage measured by the ratio of the book value of equity over 
the book value of total assets;  
iii. the default risk measured by the proportion of nonperforming assets over 
total assets; and 
iv. the equity market risk measured by the market value of equity over the book 
value of equity. 
 
Additionally, I include the liquidity and capital ratio to examine the hypothesis 
suggested by Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1991). They argue that bank 
divestitures are more likely to be motivated by the regulatory capital obligation. 
Estimating the correlation between those variables and the likelihood of bank 
divestiture will confirm whether their hypothesis is true.  
The resource-based view suggests that firms with increasing performance 
undertake divestitures to free resources and invest in growing business. To test this 
hypothesis, I generate Historical aspiration gap following Vidal and Mitchell 
(2015), which measures the average performance of a bank for the last three years 
using ROA. The formula is as follows: 
 
 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 −




From the Historical aspiration gap, two control variables are created: 
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i. Positive performance gap takes the value of the Historical aspiration gap 
when it is positive and takes the value of zero when it is negative. This 
variable indicates increasing performance.  
ii. Negative performance gap takes the absolute value of the Historical 
aspiration gap when it is negative and takes the value of zero when it is 
positive. This variable indicates decreasing performance.  
 
3.5.2 Dynamic Restructuring Strategies 
 
Divestitures in amalgamation with acquisitions are more of dynamic restructurings 
which involve expansion of scale and scope. For instance, a firm acquiring a related 
business to its primary industry with subsequent divestiture of a non-core unit 
intends to increase focus (by decreasing its business scope) and scale on its core 
operation. Conversely, a firm acquiring an unrelated business and divesting its core 
or other non-core unit can shift or expand its scope into a different industry. Based 
on scale and scope dimensions related to the implementation of multiple forms of 























Figure 1 Illustration of dynamic restructuring strategies 
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1. Focusing strategy involves divesting non-core unit and/or acquiring related 
business. This strategy strengthens firms’ existing position in their primary 
market and restore managerial attentions.  
2. Diversifying strategy 1 involves an acquisition of unrelated business and 
divestiture of non-core unit. This strategy allows firms to enter a new business 
and simultaneously monetize unfit resources.   
3. Diversifying strategy 2 involves an acquisition of unrelated business and 
divestiture of core unit (legacy divestiture). Firms can shift their business scope 
into a different segment through this strategy.  
 
I use those strategies to estimate both divestiture decision and performance models.  
 
3.5.3 Corporate Restructuring Strategy and CARs 
 
The literature relying on the agency theory favours focusing strategy, and the use 
of focusing strategy within divestiture literature has been limited to explaining a 
reduction in diversification discount in multi-sector firms. It is because empirical 
evidence reveals that focusing strategy improves equity returns and long-term 
profitability. Further, investors positively react to announcements of focus-
increasing divestiture. However, these studies overlook the fact that focusing 
strategy is one of the restructuring strategies sequentially undertaken by managers 
to sustain continuous growth and profitability along with diversifying strategy. 
Under the neoclassical theory, diversification is as value-maximizing as focusing 
strategy, but less is known about announcement returns of bank divestitures 
involving diversifying strategy. I examine the effect of different types of 
restructuring strategies on the announcement returns using the 3-way interaction 
variables in the following cross-sectional OLS regression model:  
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 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽13 − 𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(3) 
 
where the dependent variable is 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around 
the divestiture announcement date. All control variables are defined in Appendix B. 
The 3-way interaction variable has three different combinations depending on the 
restructuring strategy: 
 
1. Focusing Strategy: 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
2. Diversifying Strategy 1: 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
3. Diversifying Strategy 2: 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
 
3.5.4 Post-divestiture Stock Return Performance  
 
3.5.4.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
 
In addition to short-term performance, I estimate long-term post-divestiture equity 
performance. Precisely, I examine buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
following Barber and Lyon (1997) in which the performance of event firms is 
compared to that of benchmark firms matched by size and book-to-market ratio. 
The BHAR is computed over the 12, 24, and 36 calendar months beginning the 
month following the divestiture completion date. The post-divestiture BHAR of 
bank i is calculated as follows: 
 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏[1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1
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where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is compounded returns of a sample firm i, and 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡  is Fama-
French’s 25 benchmark portfolio returns which fall into the same size/book-to-
market decile as the sample firm. To find benchmark firms, first, I construct the 
size (market value of equity) and BM (book-to-market ratio) variable for banks in 
my sample. The size variable is the price on the last trading date of the month 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the divestiture 
completion month. The BM variable is computed as the book value of equity63 from 
the Compustat bank fundamentals annual data at the fiscal year end prior to the 
divestiture effective date over the market value of equity.  
Next, I create size and BM breakpoints based on which each sample firm is 
assigned to its corresponding 25 size and book-to-market benchmark portfolios. 
Size breakpoints are determined by all NYSE stocks sorted into quintiles according 
to their market equity at the end of June in year t64. When assigning breakpoints for 
the sample firm, I use the firm’s market equity from the prior month before the 
divestiture announcement month. BM breakpoints are computed at the end of each 
June using NYSE stocks sorted into quintiles using book equity at the fiscal year 
ending in year t-1 and market equity at the end of December in year t-1. Once all 
the sample firms are assigned with size and BM breakpoints, I obtain benchmark 
returns for each firm by matching its breakpoints with those in Fama-French 25 size 
and book-to-market portfolios. In deriving the BHARs for each sample firm, if a 
stock is missing returns before the end of the cumulation window, I replace the 
return with the delisting return and its benchmark return for the rest of the remaining 
period. The benchmark portfolios are not rebalanced to generate true buy-and-hold 
returns so that it eliminates the rebalancing issue inherent in reference portfolios 
such as CRSP value-weighted index which is rebalanced every month. I estimate 
both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) mean BHARs, in which the 
value weights are generated as: the sample firm’s market value of equity at the 
 
63 Book value is calculated as the book value of common equity plus deferred taxes minus preferred 
stock values – redemption value, liquidation value, and par value in this order. If book equity is less 
than zero, I eliminate it.  
64 Calculation of size and BM quintiles are available at “U.S. “Research Breakpoints Data.” Kenneth 
R. French. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Breakpoints.  
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divestiture completion date divided by the CRSP value-weighted market index on 
the same date (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). 
Prior findings on this long-term stock performance test statistics (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), however, acknowledge that the 
distribution of event firm BHARs is highly positively skewed which makes the 
average BHAR different from zero. To resolve this bias, I further calculate 
bootstrapped p-values following Mitchell and Stafford (2000). The procedure is as 
follows. For each sample firm which enters the divestiture event, I randomly select 
a firm which falls into the same size and book-to-market quintiles as the sample 
firm at the time of the event from the Compustat bank fundamentals annual file. 
This selection process yields a pseudo-sample with the same number of 
observations, size/book-to-market distribution, and calendar time frequency as the 
original sample. I generate 1,000 pseudo-samples by repeating this procedure. Next, 
I calculate BHAR for the pseudo-sample by adjusting with Fama-French 25 
benchmark portfolios and produce an empirical distribution of mean BHARs across 
1,000 pseudo-samples. The bootstrapped p-value is then calculated as the fraction 
of the mean pseudo-sample BHARs that are larger in magnitude, but of the same 
sign, than the mean BHAR from the original event sample. 
 
3.5.4.2 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression 
 
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) highlight a limitation in using BHAR, 
which assumes independence, for statistical inference as BHARs of individual 
event firm are positively correlated with the industry-wide movements. 
Consequently, an alternative approach is implemented to measure the long-term 
stock performance. Advocated by Fama (1998), calendar-time portfolio regression 
approach captures any cross-correlation effects on the individual firm returns by 
allowing time-series variation. To perform the calendar-time portfolio regression, I 
first construct EW and VW portfolios with the returns of all banks which enters the 
event within the previous 12, 24, and 36 months. The value weights are the sample 
firm’s market value of equity at the divestiture completion date. Portfolios are 
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rebalanced every month by including banks which enter the event in that month and 
excluding banks which reach the end of their holding period. The portfolio excess 
returns are calculated by deducting risk-free rate within the same month and then 
are regressed against Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors as in the 
following equation: 
 
 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝,𝑡 . (5) 
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the market excess return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the difference between small 
and large stock portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the difference between high and low book-to-
market equity stock portfolios, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷  is the difference between winners and 
losers stock portfolios. The intercept, 𝛼𝑝  estimates average monthly abnormal 
returns of the event portfolios.  
 
 
3.6 Empirical Results 
 
3.6.1 Determinants of Bank Divestiture 
 
Divestitures of banks are practically unexplored terrain in the literature as compared 
to divestitures of non-financial firms. Given lack of research, I begin by revisiting 
the theories that have been a foundation of divestiture studies. Divestiture is a 
crucial means of reallocating resources in an efficient market perspective. When a 
firm has a marginal business, which makes the entire operation less efficient and 
less profitable, it is better to be transferred to another company which could better 
utilize the asset. This transaction can be synergistic for both parties, but especially, 
for the sellers in any theoretical standpoints. For financially distressed firms, the 
proceeds from asset liquidation relax credit constraints, which corresponds to the 
financing theory. Under the neoclassical theory, divestiture helps divesting firms 
optimize resource allocation by removing marginal or redundant assets and enhance 
operational efficiency of their remaining business. According to the resource-based 
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view, additional cash flow generated by divestiture can be used to fuel the growing 
business.  
In this study, I reflect these theories in assessing various motives of bank 
divestiture proposed in Hypothesis 1. Selected potential motives of bank divestiture 
contain bank-specific characteristics. I test the correlation between these 
characteristics and the decision to divest using a fixed-effect probability model65. 
The results are reported in Table 3. 3. All the variables are defined in Appendix B.  
Following Simpson and Gleason (1999) as discussed in the methodology, I 
generate four indicators of financial distress associated with banking firms: size, 
leverage, default risk, and market-to-book ratio. I display the results in model (1) 
and (2)66. The bank size and default risk have significantly positive impact on bank 
divestiture. Large banks entail higher systemic and idiosyncratic risks overall and 
default risk obstructs banks’ ability to raise capital exacerbating financial 
constraints. Thus, these findings support the financing hypothesis and highlight that 
financially distressed banks are more likely to undertake divestiture. On the 
contrary, the market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with the divestiture 
decision, signifying that banks are less likely to divest as expected earnings power 
become lower. Leverage, another indicator of financial distress, is insignificantly 
associated with divestiture decision.  
Consistent with the efficiency hypothesis based on the neoclassical theory, 
banks are more likely to divest to improve operational efficiency. The operating 
inefficiency ratio, which is measured by a bank’s total operating expenses over the 
book value of total assets, significantly increase the likelihood of bank divestiture. 
The key independent variable in model (3) is positive performance gap 67 
which measures whether a positive performance trend stimulates banks to divest. 
The result shows that positive performance gap significantly and positively affects 
 
65 Refer to equation (1) in the methodology section. 
66 In model (1), I exclude some of the variables shown in model (2) because the Compustat bank 
fundamentals annual database does not provide some financial information necessary to generate 
the operating inefficiency, leverage, and default risk ratio before 1993. When I include those 
variables, the model loses all observations before 1993, hence, I estimate the model both with and 
without those ratios. 
67 Refer to equation (2) in the methodology section for the variable construction. 
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banks’ decision to divest. Consistent with the resource-based view, this finding 
corroborates that divestitures are instigated by firms with increasing performance 
to fuel the growing trend. On the other hand, negative performance gap in model 
(4) is not significantly related to divestiture decision.  
The negative association between loan growth and probability of divestiture 
indicate that banks with increasing loan growth have less incentive to reduce their 
business scale.  
Banks actively engage in divestitures to deploy a redundant or debilitated unit 
following an acquisition. For example, Credit Suisse merged with Winterthur Swiss 
Insurance Company in 1997 and in the following year, they sold Winterthur’s 
reinsurance operations68. Likewise, banks conform to the strict code of federal 
regulation for divestiture procedures with any planned mergers69. As a result, there 
is high correlation between acquisitions and divestitures as shown in the regression 
results.  
Lastly, my finding does not support the hypothesis proposed by Slovin, Sushka, 
and Poloncheck (1991). They suggest that banks are obligated to divest due to the 
regulatory capital requirement, but model (2) shows that the capital ratio has no 
significant influence on divestiture decision. The liquidity ratio also has 
insignificant impact on bank divestiture. 
Overall findings on additional motives of bank divestiture are consistent with 
the Hypothesis 1 and support the neoclassical theory and the resource-based view. 
Further, my finding refutes the argument suggested by Slovin, Sushka, and 




68  “Acquisitions and divestitures.” Credit-Suisse. Accessed May 29, 2020. https://www.credit-
suisse.com/about-us/en/investor-relations/corporate-and-share-information/corporate-
information/acquisitions-divestitures.html. 
69 From “Title 12-Banks and Banking,” by Code of Federal Regulations, January 1, 2010, Pt. 220-
299. 
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3.6.2 Change in Corporate Scope through Mergers and Divestitures 
 
As mergers have been proven to be an integral part of restructuring strategies jointly 
exercised with divestitures, I look into what motivates banks to involve acquisitions 
to change corporate scope. Chang (1996) describes that firms expand and contract 
corporate scope in the process of search and selection to modify current 
organizational routines and upgrade their knowledge base. He indicates that while 
both highly and poorly performing firms engage in search and selection, poorly 
performing firms have more incentive to do so to resolve the discrepancy in their 
performance gap. This perception of organizational search has been transpired in 
studies investigating change in corporate scope in conjunction with the neoclassical 
theory and the resource-based view.  
Studies inspired by the resource-based view suggest that poorly performing 
firms are more likely to pursue diversifying strategy since the underperformance 
signals exhausted synergistic opportunities in their current segments. On the 
contrary, firms with increasing performance are more likely to specialize in their 
growing business (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Chang, 1996; Vidal and 
Mitchell, 2015).   
Corresponding to the neoclassical theory, Matsusaka (2001) specifies search 
and selection as a sequential process of finding a good match70 and explains how 
the status of match motivates a particular restructuring strategy. He suggests that 
firms with a good match use focusing strategy to amplify the profitability of the 
ongoing business while those with a marginal or a bad match use diversifying 
strategy to discover a better match for their organizational capabilities.  
Based on these theories, I estimate what motivates banks to change their scope. 
As highlighted in Hypothesis 2, my conjecture is that highly performing banks 
(banks with a good match) are more likely to use the focusing (scope-decreasing) 
strategy while poorly performing banks (banks with a poor match) are more likely 
to use the diversifying (scope-increasing) strategy. I evaluate this hypothesis using 
 
70 A type of business defined as a good match for the firm’s capabilities (unique knowledge and 
skillset) can produce synergies, but a bad match lowers profitability and causes performance decline. 
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the fixed effect probability model. The dependent variable is the choice between 
scope-decreasing and scope-increasing strategy. The key independent variable is 
positive performance gap, which indicates a good match, and negative performance 
gap, which indicates a bad match. Additionally, I include ex-ante firm 
characteristics representing financial distress and profitability as control variables 
and estimate their relation to scope-changing decisions.  
Table 3. 4 exhibits the regression results. Consistent with the Hypothesis 2, 
banks with positive performance gap are more likely to undertake the focusing 
strategy and are less likely to employ the diversifying strategy. Banks with negative 
performance gap exhibit exactly opposite relations with the strategic decisions, 
however, the results are statistically insignificant. Positive correlation between the 
market-to-book ratio and focusing strategy indicates that banks with higher 
earnings potential are motivated to specialize in their core business. Conversely, 
those with lower expected earnings are more likely to diversify. Moreover, banks 
with an increasing loan growth rate have higher probability to implement the 
focusing strategy to continue the growth trend, but those with declining loan growth 
are more likely to search for a better match by diversifying into a new industry. 71 
My findings are consistent with profit-maximizing motives explained by the 
neoclassical theory and the resource-based view in that highly performing banks, 
due to a synergistic match, are more likely to specialize in the existing segments 
and are less likely to pursue diversification. The fact that positive performance gap 
as well as loan growth and earnings potential are negatively associated with the 
diversifying strategy also provides a critical implication against the agency theory. 
Studies advocating the agency theory argue that excess cash flows tend to trigger 
value-destroying takeovers such as diversifying mergers to entrench managerial 
power and build an empire (Jensen, 1986; Mann and Sicherman, 1991; Chen, Chen, 
and Wei, 2011). Lang et al. (1995) also note that free cash flows generated by 
selling assets can lead to agency problem when it is retained by the firm. My results 
 
71 The results are similar when focusing and diversifying strategy are defined using an alternative 
period in which a bank acquires an asset in a given year and divest a segment over the five-year 
period (-3, +1).  
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denounce these concerns arising from the agency costs of free cash flow as 
diversifying deals occur when firms experience weak performance. In the next 
section, in relation to these theories, I contemplate how different strategic choices 
affect banks’ divestiture announcement returns.  
 
3.6.3 Cross-sectional Analysis of Bank Mergers and Divestitures 
 
In this section, I break down strategies further into (1) divestiture of a non-core unit, 
(2) focusing strategy, (3) diversifying strategy 1, and (4) diversifying strategy 272 
and examine the cross-sectional data comprised of all divestiture transactions 
occurred between 1980 and 2019 73  instead of the firm-level data. I estimate 
logistics regression analyses to measure the relation between bank-specific 
characteristics and the choice of scope-changing strategy. Table 3. 5 presents the 
results. All control variables are defined in Appendix B.  
Similar to my findings from the panel regression analyses, banks are more 
likely to specialize when their loan growth rate increases. However, as their 
operations become more inefficient along with declining loan growth, banks are 
more likely to diversify their revenue streams and divest dysfunctional units. 
Regarding diversifying strategies involving two different types of divestitures 
between divestiture of core and non-core unit, I observe interesting variation in 
strategic choice depending on banks’ financial status. Previously, in the panel 
regression analyses, leverage and regulatory capital requirement were insignificant 
determinant of bank divestiture. However, model (3) shows that banks with lower 
leverage and higher risk capital are more likely to undertake diversifying 
acquisition along with divestiture of non-core asset (diversifying strategy 1). 
Conversely, financially distressed banks - with higher leverage, lower risk capital, 
and higher default risk – are more likely to shift their scope by taking a legacy 
divestiture (divestiture of core asset). Those findings are consistent with Matsusaka 
 
72 Refer to 3.5.2. Dynamic Restructuring Strategies in the methodology section for the definition of 
each strategy.  
73 Refer to Panel C in Table 3. 2 for the summary statistics of divestiture transactions data obtained 
from the SDC. 
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(2001)’s prediction, whereby firms with a good match continue to focus on their 
current segments while firms with a poor match diversify into a new industry; and 
firms with the worst match shift their business scope by disposing their core assets.  
For determinants of scope-changing strategies, I add a new variable, 
diversification level74, which is a categorical variable measured by the number of 
different first 2-digit SIC codes within a bank. In exploration of the neoclassical 
theory, Matsusaka (2001) cognizes that firms diversify to find a better match when 
they have a decreasing performance and growth prospect. Intuitively, however, as 
the level of diversification increases, firms which have already explored other 
sectors and applied their capabilities could have realized which operations to focus. 
Chang (1996) supports this intuition and imply that the accumulation of new entries 
in the previous period is negatively associated with the probability of diversification 
in the next period. Consistent with this intuition, I find that the level of 
diversification in banks is positively (negatively) associated with focusing 
(diversifying) strategy as shown in model (2) and (3). 
 
3.6.4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) surrounding Bank Divestiture 
Announcements 
 
To this point, I have focused on what drives bank divestitures. In this section, I 
estimate how investors react to banks’ restructuring choices using cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around divestiture announcements. Table 3. 6 reports 
announcement returns of (1) all divestitures, (2) divestitures of non-core unit, (3) 
divestitures as part of the focusing strategy, (4) divestitures as part of the 
diversifying strategy 1, and (5) divestitures as part of the diversifying strategy 2, 
based on different event windows. Panel A includes all banks in the sample and 
Panel B only includes diversified banks with operations in more than one industry. 
 
74 Diversification level is generated following Jenner, Powell, and Zhang (2019) and is added to the 
cross-sectional analyses because SIC codes for entire sectors a bank is operating in are only available 
for firms participated in divestiture events from SDC. 
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Fundamentally, there are almost no differences in the number of observations as 
well as the resultant CARs between the two samples.  
When comparing CARs throughout different event windows for all and non-
core divestitures as in model (1) and (2), respectively, announcements of bank 
divestiture induce on average significantly positive stock market reaction. Based on 
the 3-day CARs, banks’ divestiture announcement increases shareholder returns by 
0.4% in all deals and 0.6% in divestitures of non-core unit. My findings on 
shareholder wealth gains upon bank divestiture announcements contradict those of 
Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1991), which report no gains. They argue that the 
lack of announcement gains is because bank divestitures, unlike those of non-
financial firms, convey unfavourable information regarding a bank’s capital 
position and attribute such results to the economic cost of regulation.   
Contrarily, restructuring strategies involving both acquisitions and divestitures 
portray varying impacts on shareholder returns contingent on alternative event 
windows. Over the 3- and 5-day windows, banks with focusing strategy and 
diversifying strategy 1 do not experience any abnormal returns, whereas those with 
diversifying strategy 2 which involves legacy divestiture experience significantly 
negative returns. However, during a longer event window estimated over 11 days, 
two of the former strategies are associated with negative CARs while the 
diversifying strategy insignificantly influences returns. Univariate estimations do 
not yield persistent results and there is no significant difference in announcement 
returns between focusing and diversifying strategies. Consequently, I estimate the 
impact of these strategies on announcement returns in multivariate cross-sectional 
OLS model.   
To precisely estimate the impact of each strategy on CARs, I create three-way 
interaction variables as in equation (3) in the methodology section. In this analysis, 
I focus on diversified banks since divestiture of non-core unit with focusing strategy 
can only be implemented by a firm operating in more than one industry. Thus, I 
impose the same condition for banks implementing different strategies as well. 
These variables are used to test Hypothesis 3 which is deduced based on the 
neoclassical theory.  
CHAPTER 3.  DIVESTITURE OF BANKS 
 86 
Studies using this theory find that firms with increasing performance are more 
likely to specialize in their core business, whereas those with declining productivity 
are more incline to diversify. Estimated focusing premium and diversification 
discount around divestiture announcements are, therefore, caused by this 
endogenous selection bias; in which the valuation of assets is the reflection of 
divesting firms’ ex-ante performance. Furthermore, Matsusaka (2001) states that 
even with a value-maximizing motive, firms implementing diversifying strategy 
could underperform specialized firms because of the efficiency cost and implicitly 
suboptimal match. He also adds that legacy divestiture can result in significant 
value reduction due to the core asset’s historical interdependency with the rest of 
the businesses (Feldman, 2014).  
The results are reported in Table 3. 7. Consistent with the Hypothesis 3, 
divestiture of core unit is negatively associated with the announcement returns with 
an average of 0.5% reduction in shareholder value. I also find that focusing strategy 
in model (2) (interaction between non-core divestiture and related merger with 
diversified bank) significantly increases announcement returns by an average of 2.2% 
while diversifying strategy in model (4) (interaction between core divestiture and 
unrelated merger with diversified bank) which involves legacy divestiture 
significantly and negatively affects stock returns with an average of 1.4% reduction 
in value. However, diversifying strategy with divestiture of non-core asset and 
unrelated merger in model (3) has an insignificant impact on valuation. Substituting 
the event window with 11-day CARs does not change the results. 
Additionally, in untabulated analysis, I interact these variables with the relative 
size variable since larger divestments can have stronger impact on the returns while 
small deals may have no influence. I document strong size effect as the results show 
not only that the relative size is significantly and positively associated with CAR, 
but also that diversifying strategy involving divestiture of non-core asset increase 
returns of banks. Further, neither legacy divestiture, nor diversifying mergers with 
divestiture of core asset are linked to discount in firm value after controlling relative 
size.  
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3.6.5 Long-term Performance 
 
Short-term returns echo revaluation of a firm based on its prospective performance 
with the strategy it is devising. To identify equity performance of an investment in 
divesting banks for a longer holding period though, I estimate Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR). Table 3. 8 exhibits 12-, 24-, and 36-month BHARs 
along with standard and bootstrapped p-value following Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000). Panel A, B, C, and D display bank BHARs on all divestitures, divestitures 
with focusing strategy, diversifying strategy 1, and diversifying strategy 2, 
respectively. BHARs are presented in percentages. Overall, there is some evidence 
that bank divestitures outperform their industry benchmarks within 36 months by 
6.7% for equal-weighted (EW) reutrns and 3.4% for value-weighted (VW) returns. 
Banks with focusing strategy are on average associated with positive returns, 
however, bootstrapped p-values are statistically insignificant. Banks with 
diversifying strategy 1 underperform based only on VW returns, but the p-values 
are inconsistent between standard and bootstrapped. The long-term performance of 
banks with diversifying strategy 2 do not significantly differ from that of their 
benchmarks.  
Overall, the BHAR estimation exhibits inconsistent results making it difficult 
to conclude that banks with divestitures or other restructuring strategies perform 
differently from their benchmarks in the long-run. More importantly, the results 
indicate that any diversification discount banks experience during the 
announcement period dissipates in the long-term. This implies that banks which 
previously have experienced underperformance and financial distress eventually 
achieve comparable performance through revenue diversification. Likewise, 
premiums related to focusing strategy also neutralize in the long-term.  
I additionally perform calendar-time regression analyses of portfolios formed 
on banks with divestitures to account for any cross-correlation present in BHARs. 
Table 3. 9 reports the time-series regression results. Returns are presented in 
percentages. I estimate 12 to 36 months returns, and the alpha represents the excess 
returns of the monthly portfolio. Both EW and VW returns display statistically 
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insignificant mean abnormal returns implying compatible performance of divestors 
with that of their benchmarks over the long-run. I also separately measure calendar-
time portfolios formed on banks with focusing and diversifying strategies. However, 
I only report the results from all divestiture activities because I do not have enough 
observations to measure some of the portfolio returns, and for those that are 
available, alpha was statistically indifferent 75 . Based on the results from both 
BHAR and CTPR methods, I confirm that the Hypothesis 4 is true and conclude 
that divestitures help banks remain competitive by matching their performance to 





In this study, I investigate motives of divesting banks and their performance. Due 
to the nature of bank divestitures often accompanied by contemporaneous mergers, 
I also consider banks which undertake acquisitions along with divestitures. I define 
strategies involving both transactions as focusing and diversifying strategy 
depending on the change in corporate scope these transactions effectuate. I then 
study strategic directions divesting banks frequently take as well as implications 
these strategies have on their divestiture performance.  
In designing estimation models and translating the results, I apply the 
neoclassical theory and the resource-based view which take value-maximizing view 
of managerial motive in scope-changing decisions. My view on the managerial 
motive deviates from the agency theory which limits the role of divestiture to 
eliminating agency problems in diversified firms and alleviating diversification 
discount. As the agency view conveys questionable assumptions that have been 
empirically contested, I empirically examine motives and performance of bank 
divestiture based on the other theories mentioned above.  
 
75 I do not have enough observations for the 12-month portfolio from diversifying strategy 1 and for 
all the portfolios from diversifying strategy 2. Besides, returns from the focusing and diversifying 
strategy are not significantly different.  
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I begin by analysing previously undocumented divestiture motives based on 
bank-specific characteristics such as operating inefficiency, financial distress, and 
profitability. Similar to divestitures of non-financial firms, banks are motivated to 
divest when experiencing financial pressure and operating inefficacy. Furthermore, 
consistent with the resource-based view, banks with positive performance gap are 
highly likely to use divestitures to reconfigure their resources and boost their 
growing business. 
To confirm the inapplicability of the agency theory on diversification discount, 
I additionally analyse the relation between the level of diversification of a bank and 
its choice of restructuring strategies. As opposed to the agency view on 
diversification, I find that the more the bank is diversified, the more it is likely to 
undertake focusing strategy and the less it is likely to diversify. I also find that banks 
with increasing performance and loan growth rate tend to focus on their growing 
business rather than diversifying. However, those with operating inefficiency and 
financial distress are inclined to diversify their revenue streams to a different 
industry.  
My findings in general do not support the agency theory in which large and 
diversified firms with additional cash flows tend to use further diversification to 
build an empire and strengthen managerial control over the firm. I get more 
persistent results from the neoclassical theory and the resource-based view, in 
which banks with a good match (e.g., positive performance gap and increasing loan 
growth) specialize in the existing sector, but those with a poor match (e.g., financial 
distress and operating inefficiency) diversify to find a better match.  
In measuring divestiture performance of banks, I first gauge the overall bank 
divestiture performance using CARs with multiple windows. Divestiture 
announcements overall induce positive investor reactions, so does divestiture of 
non-core unit. As for those involving acquisitions to change corporate scope, 
focusing strategy improves CARs, whereas the diversifying strategy has a negative 
impact on CARs.  
In the long-run, there is weak evidence that divestitures overall help investors 
gain significantly within 36 months according to buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
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(BHARs). However, both BHAR and calendar-time regression results confirm that 
irrespective of the strategy between focusing and diversification, long-term equity 
performance of banks does not differ from their benchmarks. Therefore, I conclude 
that divesting banks or banks with different strategies on average remain 
competitive with their industry peers in the long-term.   
My findings contribute to the divestiture literature by providing new evidence 
regarding banks’ divestiture motives and performance. From the theoretical 
perspective, I add to the literature of neoclassical theory and the resource-based 
view by providing empirical evidence on the value-maximizing managerial motive 












The Role of Divestiture during 
Periods of Economic Crisis 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Corporate turnaround strategies during periods of economic crisis not only 
determine survivor of a distressed firm, but also define its market positioning post-
crisis. The utmost lesson learned from the 2008 global financial crisis is that firms 
facing distress during the economic downturn should adopt strategies which allow 
financial flexibility76 for a prolonged period of recession beyond sidestepping a risk 
of default. In the midst of Coronavirus pandemic, top managers are tasked to make 
strategic decisions that can help overcome unprecedented financial distress. 
Astonishingly, to the best of my knowledge, no study has researched on an effective 
long-term turnaround strategy for firms facing financial difficulty ignited by the 
economic crisis. Most studies examining crisis-related restructurings focus on 
retrenchment77 strategies with no evidence of long-run recovery and profitability. 
 
76 Financial flexibility is a term referring to the capability of a firm to react to an unanticipated event 
or to invest in a valuable project when it becomes available (Denis, 2011).  
77 Retrenchment refers to the reduction of costs or spending in response to economic difficulty. 
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More strikingly, I discover that the lack of research on effective turnaround 
strategies for economy-wide distress is attributable to the theoretical gap in 
empirical studies that do not demarcate the nature of those strategies.  
According to the prior literature, there are two types of turnaround strategies 
that are executed by distressed firms: strategic reorientation78 and retrenchment 
(Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Barker and Duhaime, 1997) and four types of relevant 
restructurings carried out to support those strategies: asset, managerial, operational, 
and financial restructuring (Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Koh et al., 2015). Asset and 
managerial restructuring are designed to pursue strategic reorientation which, by its 
nature, has long-lasting effects on firm performance. Precisely, asset restructuring 
involves major reconfiguration of a firm’s portfolio through divestitures or 
acquisitions of a business unit 79  (Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001). Managerial 
restructuring is typically pursued to attain a radical change in incumbent 
management practices by the top managers80. Consequently, these two restructuring 
measures are inevitably progressive and foster the ensuing firm’s strategic 
repositioning for several years to follow.     
On the other hand, operational81 and financial restructuring82 are retrenchment 
strategies devised to increase short-term efficiency and cash flow. Conventionally, 
firms immediately react to economic distress by enacting retrenchment measures 
by cutting costs and reserving cash (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Andrade and 
Kaplan, 1998; Zhou, Li, and Sveinar, 2011)83. Less acknowledged is that those 
 
78  Strategic reorientation occurs when firms change the existing strategy to gain competitive 
advantage corresponding to their declining market position and to enable continuing growth and 
profitability.  
79 Asset restructuring is achieved through the change in asset composition by purchasing a business 
unit to enter a new industry, expand or reduce the scale of existing business, or exit from an operating 
industry. The primary mechanism of asset restructuring includes mergers and acquisitions and 
divestitures.  
80 As managerial restructuring entails radical change in strategies used by incumbent managers, it 
involves top management turnovers.  
81 Operational restructuring includes investment reduction, COGS reduction, fixed asset reduction, 
and layoffs. 
82  Financial restructuring includes dividend cut or omission intended to preserve cash. It also 
includes debt or equity issue for raising capital to meet debt obligations and support continued 
operation. 
83 My sample statistics present supporting evidence to such claims. During the fiscal year of 2007/08 
financial crisis, only 8.8% of the sample firms undertake divestments and 9.9% take management 
CHAPTER 4.  DIVESTITURE DURING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 93 
measures are for firms with a strong strategic positioning in their industry expecting 
timely cyclical upturns (O’Neill, 1986). Economic crisis, however, is a highly 
volatile exogenous shock which requires firms to quickly adapt to shifting external 
environment to avoid elongated performance stagnation. This means sticking to 
contraction measures for a lengthy recessionary period is detrimental to firms’ 
growth as those impede investments. Empirical evidence shows that those who 
withheld cash and focused on cost-cutting tactics underperformed firms with 
persistent investment after the 2008 financial crisis (Gulati, Nohria, Wohlgezogen, 
2010; Mann and Byun, 2017). 
Theoretical insights provided by the turnaround strategy literature indicate that 
investment potential determines distressed firms’ long-run growth and profitability. 
Further intuition on declining economy posits that successful turnaround requires a 
strategy which allows firms to secure financing without having to increase leverage 
and sacrifice investment opportunities for valuable projects. The literature on asset 
restructuring nominates a strategy which exactly fulfil such purposes based on the 
financing hypothesis; financially constrained firms and firms with declining 
performance divest underperforming assets to resolve distress and support 
continued investment in the remaining divisions (Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; 
Ahn and Denis, 2004; Denis and Shome, 2005; Kalay, Singhal, and Tashjian, 2007). 
Further, a recent study by Finlay et al. (2018) suggests that divestiture is a useful 
strategy to be undertaken by financially distressed firms during economy-wide 
distress. They find that divestiture announcements during the economic crises are 
positively associated with returns of distressed firms due to its financing benefits 
which outweigh potential discounts in asset values under fire sale conditions.84 
Despite its financing benefits, it has been argued that divestiture is on average 
insufficiently exercised relative to shareholders’ optimum due to the agency costs 
of managerial discretion. However, external pressure such as financial constraint or 
recessionary condition forces firms to undertake divestiture to resolve distress 
 
turnover. Majority of firms use retrenchment strategies such as investment reduction (57.6%), fixed 
asset reduction (24.7%), layoffs (17.7%), and debt issue (28.9%). 
84 Fire sale indicates selling assets at severe discounts. Fire sale conditions are defined by the 
increase in distressed firms, external market instability, and shortage of natural buyers. 
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(Wruck, 1990; Boot, 1992; Alexandrou and Sudarsanam, 2001). My conjecture is 
that economic crises provide firms with a unique opportunity to defeat managerial 
discretion and review their strategic and structural inefficiencies, pressuring them 
into reconfiguring their asset portfolio. External financing frictions triggered by 
depression can also encourage managers to dispose unfit assets and, instead, invest 
their attention and capital in more competent assets. Therefore, under the financing 
hypothesis, divestiture seems to be a vital strategy to be undertaken by financially 
distressed firms during the crises as it allows firms to liquidate underperforming 
assets to generate funds and invest in more profitable segments.  
To corroborate these conjectures based on the financing hypothesis, I examine 
the impact of divestitures on firms’ long-term operating performance in comparison 
with that of other restructuring strategies during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Specifically, I assess whether financially distressed firms engaging in divestitures 
resolve distress condition and sustain more competitive performance in the post-
crisis market as opposed to non-divestors who rely on other restructuring measures 
such as cost reduction and debt or equity issue85.  
Long-term operating performance is estimated based on the matched firm 
adjusted median OIBD (the ratio of operating income before depreciation plus 
interest income over the book value of total assets) and ROA (the ratio of net 
income over the book value of total assets) over the 3-year period subsequent to 
divestiture86 as well as multivariate quantile (median) regression analysis. In both 
measures, I find that divesting firms significantly outperform non-divesting 
counterparts. The improvement in performance is much greater when divestiture is 
undertaken by financially distressed firms than by non-distressed firms with an 
average of 3.6 to 12.4% excess ROA. Furthermore, the joint analyses of multiple 
strategies show that conjoining divestitures with other restructurings create 
synergies and have positive effects on the operating performance. In particular, the 
combination between divestiture and managerial restructuring generates the highest 
 
85 Cost reduction measures hamper investments, and alternative financing measures such as debt 
and equity issue can be very costly and entail the risk of increasing leverage and default.  
86 I refer to Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Prezas and Simonyan (2015) for this methodology. 
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returns. On the contrary, firms undertaking managerial restructuring without 
divestiture do not improve their operating performance and those with retrenchment 
strategies trigger long-term performance decline.  
I further analyze the effectiveness of these turnaround strategies on the 
recovery of firms from financial distress using the change in Z-score87 (Altman, 
1968). The results show that operational restructuring exacerbates distress 
condition and financial restructuring does not have significant impact on resolving 
distress. Conversely, divesting firms exhibit a strong resilience from distress with 
40.1 to 59.9% increase in Z-score over the 3 years after the restructuring. 
These findings are consistent with the financing hypothesis and imply that 
divestiture not only resolve financial distress, but also enable performance 
turnaround through investment in retained segments. For robustness, I compare the 
leverage and segment investment ratio of divesting firms with those of non-
divesting firms. The results show that one year prior to divestiture, divesting firms 
have higher leverage than both non-divestors and firms with financial restructuring. 
Their leverage ratio, however, decreases by 0.6% post-divestiture whereas that of 
non-divestors, especially those which undertake financial restructuring, 
significantly increases by 5.6%. This implies that retrenchment strategy is not 
effective at resolving financial distress, but divestiture helps firms raise capital 
without escalating leverage. Likewise, the analysis on the segment investment 
ratio88 confirms that divesting firms maintain investment ratio that is comparable 
to the pre-divestiture level. Conversely, non-divesting firms and firms which 
implement operational restructuring significantly diminish investment.  
These findings confirm that strategic reorientation through asset restructuring 
takes a critical role in fuelling growth for firms under economic distress while 
management turnover or retrenchment alone cannot facilitate a sustainable 
turnaround. My findings affirm Barker and Duhaime (1997)’s theory that a 
 
87 Z-score measures the probability of default and is estimated based on four key financial ratios that 
represent a firm’s financial health and profitability.  
88 Investment ratio is computed as capital expenditures divided by sales. Divesting firms’ segment 
investment ratio was generated using retained segments only following Dittmar and Shivdasani 
(2003) to eliminate the influence of divested unit on the firm’s overall investment policy in case it 
was capital-intensive. 
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successful turnaround depends on a firm’s ability to modify its strategy, structure, 
and ideology rather than on short-term efficiency enhancements or cost-cutting 
tactics. They highlight that retrenchment is not the straight solution to turnaround, 
and it could further the decline if used poorly. My results are also similar to those 
of Denis and Kruse (2000) who find cost reductions ineffectual for turnaround and 
attribute most improvements in operating performance to asset restructuring.    
Despite its clear financing advantages, however, divestiture is less frequently 
implemented during the crises. The most plausible reason for such inactivity can be 
found in the fire sale literature. Prior studies suggest that illiquid market condition 
during the economic downturn can potentially catalyse fire sales and discounts in 
asset values (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 2011). While this has been proven true for 
industry-wide distress, no evidence has been documented regarding the influence 
of economic instability on distressed asset sales89. Hence, whether divestitures are 
indeed subject to fire sale discounts during the financial crisis and whether the 
reduction in asset value undercuts their financing benefits require further 
examination.  
I explore the possibility of fire sale discounts by measuring whether divestiture 
announcements result in shareholder value destruction using 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the divestiture announcement date. For both 
distressed and non-distressed firms, no sign of fire sale discounts is observed as 
distressed firms’ announcement returns are significantly positive. Moreover, 
according to the OLS regression and Heckman’s two-stage analysis90, the returns 
between distressed and non-distressed firms are indifferent. My findings provide 
strong support for the financing hypothesis91 since divestiture announcements by 
distressed firms do not induce fire sale discounts and the financing benefit 
overwrites potential discounts from suboptimal asset sales to non-industry buyers. 
 
89 Finlay, Marshall, and McColgan (2018) find inconsistent evidence to the fire sale theory during 
two different periods of economic crisis.  
90 I use Heckman’s endogeneity correction model to control for the selection bias in divestiture 
decision. 
91 Any potential discounts from asset sales are compensated by the external financing benefits 
enabled by non-industry buyers who pay higher price than do industry buyers who are negatively 
affected by the economic distress.  
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My findings are also consistent with Finlay et al. (2018) who argue that non-
industry buyers unaffected by the economic condition pay higher price that exceeds 
the expected cost of financial distress from the economy-wide distress. Consistent 
with their argument, my statistics show that 63% of assets during this period are 
divested to non-industry acquirers unlike in the growing economy 92 , and 
unconstrained sellers have higher propensity to do so93.  
This study contributes to the corporate turnaround literature by providing the 
first empirical evidence as to the role and effectiveness of asset restructurings 
implemented during a recession. I construe that firms initiating strategic 
reorientation and optimize their asset portfolio through divestiture corresponding to 
the changing market dynamics gain competitive advantage against their industry 
counterparts. Such an intuition is buttressed by the improvement in long-term 
operating performance of firms with divestiture strategy.   
This research also adds to the turnaround literature by considering the effect 
of economic crisis on distressed asset sales. So far, studies on divestiture as a 
turnaround strategy were performed on the firm-level distress in which market 
illiquidity was not a determinant of the asset value; especially, divestitures have 
been undermined in crisis-related turnaround studies because of the pervasive 
notion of liquidity discounts. Thus, distressed asset sales lacked theoretical 
implications and empirical validations as a suitable turnaround strategy in 
depressed economy. The evidence provided in this study suggests that the fire sale 
theory is inapplicable to asset sales in periods of economic crisis. Positive stock 
returns upon divestiture announcements imply that enough liquidity is provided by 
unconstrained non-industry buyers and assets are rather fairly priced.   
Lastly, this research reiterates that firms need to base their choice of crisis-
driven strategy upon its long-term effects as over-pursuing retrenchment strategies 
can be short-sighted. I believe that evaluating effective long-term turnaround 
 
92 In the growing economy, more assets are divested to industry buyers than to non-industry buyers. 
93 Unconstrained buyers have less incentive to sell assets to non-industry buyers if the fire sale theory 
were true and if non-industry buyers require massive discounts on divested assets. The fact that non-
distressed firms sold more assets to non-industry buyers than did distressed firms during the crisis 
support the financing theory over the fire sale theory. 
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strategies can be particularly resourceful and timely with the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic and uncertain periods of recession ahead.      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is literature review. 
Section 4.3 deliberates hypotheses based on the relevant literature. Section 4.4 
depicts data and methodology. Section 4.5 presents empirical results, and Section 
4.6 concludes.  
 
 
4.2 Literature review  
 
Among diverse perspectives, divestitures have principally been studied in the 
context of bankruptcy resolution for financially distressed firms. Gilson, John, and 
Lang (1990) indicate that firms are pressured to divest assets by banks or creditors 
as part of debt restructuring plans or Chapter 1194 to repay debts and avoid defaults. 
Whilst the literature document that asset liquidations are the main mechanism 
through which firms foil defaults and massive scale of debt overhang (Maksimovic 
and Phillips, 2002; Gilson, 2012), the liquidation value of the divested unit remains 
largely undetermined to date. The unresolved paradox primarily aligns with the 
indirect costs of asset sales at prices below going-concern value when sellers are 
under financial distress (Kalay, Singhal, and Tashjian, 2007). Verdicts suggest that 
Chapter 11 can be very costly for firms with relatively high going-concern value, 
especially with greater proportion of intangible or firm-specific assets (Gilson et al., 
1990)95. Divesting firms with firm-specific assets are forced to offer hefty discounts 
as specialist buyers are harder to find, making those assets less liquid. A series of 
studies substantiate the discounts in sellers’ liquidation value. Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998) find that firms acquiring assets through Chapter 11 exhibit 
significantly positive announcement returns and improvement in operating 
 
94 Chapter 11 is a form of bankruptcy through which companies reorganize debts and assets to avoid 
default and recoup the business.  
95 Thus, firms with high going-concern value and fewer lenders are more likely to succeed in debt 
restructuring through private renegotiation outside of Chapter 11. 
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performance because they purchase quality assets from bankrupt targets at 
substantial discounts relative to those of nonbankrupt targets96. Similarly, Pulvino 
(1998) reports that liquid assets of distressed airline companies are sold at up to 46% 
discount to the average market value.  
The secondary issue with empirical inconsistency in asset liquidation value lies 
with the managerial use of the sales proceeds. Whether to retain the proceeds or to 
distribute to creditors apparently determines the liquidated asset value as well as 
the performance of the seller’s remaining business. Some scholars find negative 
implications on debt repayments. Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994) find that 
distribution of asset sales proceeds to creditors has disproportionate impact on 
announcement returns between bondholders and equityholders. Since debt 
repayments terminate equityholders’ call option on the divested asset, shareholders 
experience lower returns during the divestiture announcement and transfer wealth 
gains to bondholders. Part of the discounts in announcement returns with debt 
repayments are attributable to opportunity costs associated with potential 
investments when the sales proceeds are retained alternatively.   
Yet, the idea of retaining proceeds encounters likely challenges by 
contradictory findings. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) report that the value of the 
divesting firm is discounted when the sales proceeds are retained due to the agency 
costs of managerial discretion. The trade-offs of retaining proceeds are in between 
growth opportunities with increased investments and the agency costs of 
overinvestments. Proponents of this idea congruently argue that the additional cash 
obtained from divestitures leads to managerial entrenchment and empire building 
(Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995: Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 1996; Bates, 2005). 
Therefore, they believe that the asset liquidation value increases with debt 
repayments which eliminate the potential misuse of extra cash based on managerial 
discretion.   
The final element that triggers discounts in asset liquidation value is market 
illiquidity, examined within a separate chapter of divestiture literature. This is more 
 
96 In comparison with the prices paid to matched-nonbankrupt targets, the estimated discount is 45% 
on average. 
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relevant to my research as I am trying to measure the relation between economic 
instability and divestiture performance. Irrespective of divesting firms’ financial 
status or the use of proceeds, studies investigating dilution of asset value in 
corporate divestitures collectively illustrate that assets are priced according to the 
market condition (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; 
Schlingemanna, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002). Shleifer and Vishny (1992) inform that 
the illiquid market values assets at a lower price than their best use. To elaborate, 
when industry buyers, who suffer from the same financial constraints as divesting 
firms, cannot afford to acquire the divested assets, the purchase opportunities are 
shifted to non-industry buyers. Closest examples are provided by Pulvino (1998) 
who demonstrates that constrained airlines are more likely to sell assets to industry 
outsiders during the market downturn. However, non-industry buyers may face 
expensive costs for acquiring and managing the assets because they are more 
inclined to overpay for difficult-to-value assets and hire specialists to run an 
unrelated business at additional expenses. This discrepancy in acquisition costs 
between a non-industry buyer and the highest value user drives the asset prices 
below their fundamental valuation. Firms with alternative ways to deal with 
financial distress, therefore, are less likely to divest in illiquid market condition. 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) denote that asset sales are integral means 
of avoiding Chapter 11 but are shunned in distressed and highly leveraged 
industries. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) also mention that industry conditions 
are much more influential in determining an asset price than the efficiency of 
Chapter 11.  
The importance of market liquidity in asset transactions is detailed by 
Schlingemanna, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) who theorize how assets are valued 
depending on asset liquidity. A liquid market characterized by larger volume of 
transactions offers more buyers, in which competitions by several buyers help 
assets valued at prices close to their present value of cash flows. Meanwhile, less 
buyers are available in an illiquid market where sellers are forced to offer discounts 
to attract a buyer. Hence, asset liquidity explains firms’ decision to divest or retain 
and internally restructure a segment. One of their findings show that firms rather 
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divest a business unit which operates in a more liquid market than divesting their 
worst performing unit in an illiquid market.  
So, what happens if firms still divest assets in an illiquid market? Shleifer and 
Vishny (2011) respond to this question in their subsequent paper by linking market 
illiquidity to fire sales that supposedly impose further systematic risks on the 
financial market. It begins with a distressed firm selling an asset at a fire sale price 
because not enough industry buyers are available in the market. This fire sale can 
lower the value of similar assets possessed by other firms as well. As the market 
price of those assets falls, firms have to provide some cash back or more collateral 
to their lenders to maintain loans and avoid liquidation of their collateral. This may 
prompt cascades of financial distress on these firms and deteriorate the overall firm 
values in the market. They describe that the recent financial crisis is a classic 
example of market illiquidity led to fire sales and further destabilization of the 
financial market. Since fire sales deepen mispricing during the crisis97, banks are 
discouraged to lend, reduce their balance sheets, and start hoarding cash. The 
decline of external financing as a result of cash hoarding by banks reduces corporate 
investment and resulting output, thereby expediting depression. There is evidence 
that real investment suffered during the financial crisis because extra cash banks 
have were invested in securities rather than in lending (He, Kang, and 
Krishnamurthy, 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010)98. 
Previous literature leading up to the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis 
in general perceives asset liquidations as a value destructive strategy to implement 
under fire sale conditions, explaining why there are less divestitures during the 
market downturn. However, a recent study by Finlay et al. (2018) discovers adverse 
outcomes on corporate divestitures during overlapping periods of firm and 
 
97 Mitchell and Pulvino (2010) observe extreme mispricing during the pick of the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
98  Similar examples are provided by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) who use the limited 
arbitrage theory applicable to financial assets to explain how fire sales lead to collapse of the 
financial system; The fall of security prices increases margins and haircuts on collateral, so firms’ 
ability to arrange collateral and borrow diminishes, and lenders liquidate collateral at fire sale prices. 
As this condition continues, arbitrageurs start selling underpriced securities and increase mispricing, 
resulting in collapse of both prices and market liquidity.  
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economic distress. In spite of fire sale conditions during the financial crisis based 
on the increase in distressed firms, external market instability, and shortage of 
natural buyers, they find that divesting firms’ shareholders experience remarkable 
financial benefits with positive announcement returns. Supported by the financing 
hypothesis, these gains are enabled by non-industry buyers who are financially 
unconstrained. Two possibilities are suggested for their findings: i) economic 
distress is imperfectly correlated with some industries and the availability of 
unconstrained non-specialist buyers, ii) prior studies may have understated the 
financing benefits and overstated the fire sale costs of divestitures for overlapping 
distress conditions. The second point directly contradicts the fire sale hypothesis 
where non-specialist acquirers demand major discounts on divested assets in an 
illiquid market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 2011) and implies that they offer better 
price for distressed assets during the economic crisis. Finlay et al. (2018) provide 
competitive argument here. Firstly, the value of divested assets can increase if 
bidding competition by non-industry buyers increases the price. Secondly, unlike 
industry-wide distress which construes fire sales as specific and negative 
information about sellers’ asset value, economic distress is not firm-specific. Thus, 
valuations upon divestiture announcements are considered new information on the 
financing benefits that overtake the costs of distress triggered by the bad economy 
(Borisova, John, and Salotti, 2013). These findings turn my next focus onto the 
advantages of divestitures for distressed firms as a means of turnaround.    
Despite the noticeable discounts, studies measuring the subsequent 
performance of the divesting firms discover that the net financing benefits on 
continued operation offset the bankruptcy costs of discounted asset value. The 
benefits associated with divestitures are not limited to immediate cash flow which 
allows financial flexibility to repay debts and lower risk of default. Divestment is 
also a significant source of funding for investments (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jarrell, Brackley, and Netter, 1988; Hovakimian and Titman, 2006; Arnold, 
Hackbarth, and Puhan, 2018) and a tool to increase investment efficiency in the 
remaining divisions (Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004). 
Operational gains and successful turnaround are reported for firms that improve 
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investments using liquidated assets. Kalay, Singhal, and Tashjian (2007) observe 
increase in operating performance following Chapter 11 filings through asset 
disposal. Lasfer, Sudarsanam, and Taff (1996) find that asset sell-offs by financially 
distressed firms are associated with much higher returns than those by healthy firms, 
owing to the efficient lender monitoring and resolution of distress. While reduction 
in bank lending channel reduced investment during the crisis (Stein, 2010), firms 
reinforcing investments rather than retrenchment have brought successful 
turnaround and better performance after recession (Srinivasan, Rangaswamy, 
Lilien, 2005; Gulati, Nohria, Wohlgezogen, 2010; Mann and Byun, 2017).  
The financing benefits of divestitures are also pronounced for highly levered 
firms within illiquid market. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) pinpoints that regardless 
of the discounts in asset value, liquidation can be less costly than alternative 
methods of financing such as debt rescheduling or new equity issue. Firms resort to 
divestitures over alternative financing options 99  particularly when there are 
frictions in external financing and when leverage is relatively high (Denis and 
Shome, 2005; Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan, 2018). These empirical findings are 
anticipated by Jensen (1989) and Ofek (1993) who uncover positive correlation 
between highly levered firms and their propensity to liquidate assets to repay debt. 
Studies further demonstrate that firms with a higher leverage ratio achieve greater 
improvements in operating performance after liquidation (Kalay, Singhal, and 
Tashjian, 2007) as debt is an instrument to disciplining management and averting 
entrenchment (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Patel, 1999). Thus, firms with higher lender monitoring are more likely to increase 
transaction value (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2003).  
Given the financial and operational benefits divestitures bring to firms, it is 
rather unclear why most firms wait to divest until they face some form of internal 
or external financing trouble? To answer this question, next set of literature cope 
with managerial dysfunction and conflict of interest surrounding divestiture 
decision. Wruck (1990) argues that financial distress provides managers an 
 
99 Alternative financings could be extending line of credit from banks or issuing corporate debts.  
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opportunity to free resources and transfer those to higher-valued users. Resultant 
outcomes indicate that strategic and structural changes motivated by distress 
conditions create economic value for firms involved in the transaction, but such an 
organizational transformation is less likely to occur in non-distressed firms. 
Corroborating this theory, divestures are normally followed by significant 
performance declines and financial distress (Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer, 
1984; Jain, 1985; Montgomery and Thomas, 1988; John and Ofek, 1995). 
Montgomery and Thomas (1988) add that relatively poor performance to the 
industry counterparts is the key determinant of divestiture and that firms are 
unlikely to implement divestiture while they are competitive or excelling in their 
primary business. They conclude that managers reserve divestment until they 
exhaust options. Boot (1992) blames the delays in divestiture decision on unfit 
managers who are less willing to correct their mistakes on underperformance until 
the sign of distress is publicly flaunted. He contends that skilled managers make 
more timely divestitures that are value-maximizing. Regrettably, there are 
insufficient divestitures on average relative to the shareholders’ optimum due to 
conflict of interest and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders.   
In this section, I have uncovered the elements involving corporate divestiture 
decisions and the sensitivity of liquidation value to the ongoing performance of a 
firm, use of proceeds, and market liquidity. I take those insights from the prior 






In deriving the hypothesis on long-term performance of divestitures during periods 
of economic crisis, I have to gauge the dependability of the mainstream fire sale 
theory. The fire sale theory envisages that economic instability dissuades firms 
from divesting as divestors may encounter massive discounts in their asset value 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 2011). Contrary to this earlier theory though, a recent 
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empirical study by Finlay et al. (2018) finds positive deal outcomes on divestiture 
announcements over two distinctive periods of economic crisis. Finlay et al. unravel 
why the fire sale theory on asset valuation is not applicable to divestitures 
implemented during economy-wide distress. Assets sold in an illiquid industry 
reveal specific and negative information about the divestor’s financial situation as 
well as the price of similar assets. The investor perception on the riskiness of those 
assets widens mispricing of overall assets in the distressed industry. Conversely, 
economic crisis affects virtually all firms with known difficulties in accessing 
external capital. Hence, assets are valued irrelevantly to a certain industry condition. 
Such a distinction makes asset liquidation during economic crisis less costly than 
that during industry-wide distress. 
 They also examine the financing hypothesis and suggest that prior studies 
might have underestimated the financing benefits that non-industry buyers can 
provide. Divesting firms may have to offer some liquidity discounts on their assets, 
but the financing benefits offset any loss from the discounts by reducing expected 
costs of financial distress. Relatedly, Ang and Mauck (2011) find that merger 
premium paid to distressed targets during the financial crisis is not very different 
from that paid during non-crisis periods. They quote that discounts are not as much 
since the benchmark for the purchase price is based on the 52-week high that is 
believed to be the divested asset’s fundamental value once the market recovers. 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) obtain a similar outcome as Finlay et al., 
but they further observe that firms announcing divestments during recession gain 
higher abnormal returns than those divesting in the growing economy. They argue 
that the recessionary condition pressures firms to undertake a long-overdue 
restructuring that they have been adjourning. Their argument corresponds to the 
agency theory of managerial discretion; external financing frictions triggered by the 
economic crisis pressure financially constrained firms to dispose unfit assets to their 
strategy and reconfigure their portfolio. The agency costs of managerial discretion 
has been an intuitive theory promoted by studies on corporate divestiture decision, 
as significant proportion of divestitures are carried out only after discernible 
performance decline and financial distress. Wruck (1990) and Boot (1992) 
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emphasize that in general, there is not enough corporate divestitures relative to the 
shareholders’ optimum because managers do not deal with the underperforming 
unit as long as it is overshadowed by other profitable businesses. Alexandrou and 
Sudarsanam (2001) believe that economic instability forces those managers to 
finally take action.  
Since several empirical findings renounce the applicability of fire sale theory 
on divestitures during crisis periods, let me assume that firms actually pursue 
divestiture strategically to reconfigure their portfolio and resolve financial distress. 
Let me also assume that there are unconstrained buyers who acquire assets at fair 
price. Would this strategic divestiture help declining firms achieve successful 
turnaround during economic downturn? The turnaround literature offers assuring 
possibility for long-term improvement in operating performance. 
Divestiture along with other asset restructurings are often studied in corporate 
turnaround literature as a dynamic value-maximizing strategy and is known to aid 
strategic reorientation of firms with declining performance. Declining firms are 
required to regain competitive advantage corresponding to an evolving 
environment (Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976; Starbuck, Greve, and 
Hedberg, 1978). Gaining competitive advantage takes idiosyncratic attributes such 
as assets, capabilities, and value creating strategies (Barney, 1991). Consistent with 
this turnaround theory, divestitures allow managerial attention and capital to be 
invested in a firm’s competent assets and increase divisional investment efficiency 
(Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004; Vidal and Mitchell, 2015).  
For example, divestitures that increase focus on their profitable core-assets 
improve long-term operating performance (John and Ofek, 1995; Desai and Jain, 
1999). Undervalued multi-divisional firms with higher information asymmetry on 
their divisional cash flows use divestitures to unlock the value of those assets and 
raise capital, which leads to positive stock market reaction (Nanda and Narayanan, 
1998). Divesting firms receive positive revaluation when they reorient strategy to 
correct their underperformance relative to their competitors (Montgomery and 
Thomas, 1988; Barker and Duhaime, 1997). Firms also sell-off assets when they 
underperform relative to their potential and when the market sentiments are 
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pessimistic (Prezas and Simonyan, 2015); after divestiture, sellers improve both 
their long-term operating performance and stock returns.  
For additional assurance, I investigate how divestitures benefit financially 
constrained firms with external financing frictions given that economic crisis 
suspends the external credit market. Studies show that divestitures are particularly 
preferred by highly levered firms experiencing difficulty in accessing external 
capital (Denis and Shome, 2005; Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan, 2018). Asset sales 
implemented to repay debt and lower leverage significantly increase announcement 
returns (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2003) and operating performance (Kalay, 
Singhal, and Tashjian, 2007). This value creation in asset sales is attributable to 
resolution of financial distress and efficient lender monitoring on discrete managers. 
Thus, divestitures by highly levered firms accrue wealth gains to both equityholders 
and bondholders (Clayton and Reisel, 2013). 
Moreover, divestiture enables financial flexibility to invest in valuable projects 
when external financing is unavailable (Ahn and Denis, 2004; Hovakimian and 
Titman, 2006; Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan, 2018). Empirical evidence shows 
that, during the financial crisis, most banks halted lending which led to a massive 
decline in corporate investment. Yet, firms which continued to invest in their 
operations outperformed those hoarded cash and focused on cost-cutting tactics 
after recession (Gulati, Nohria, Wohlgezogen, 2010; Mann and Byun, 2017). Since 
cash obtained from asset liquidation relaxes financial constraints and do not require 
the remaining units to sacrifice investment, divesting firms are more likely to 
strengthen their strategic positioning over the long run as compared to other 
constrained firms having to reduce investment.  
Overall, studies document that divested assets are fairly valued during the 
economic crisis and divestitures provide constrained firms with financial 
flexibilities that can be used to lower leverage and support the continued operation 
and growth of the remaining assets. Accordingly, I propose the following 
hypothesis consistent with the financing theory from the prior studies (Dittmar and 
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Shivdasani, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004; Denis and Shome, 2005; Kalay, Singhal, 
and Tashjian, 2007; Finlay et al., 2018):   
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms undertaking divestiture during the financial crisis experience 
increase in long-term operating performance. 
 
Similar to asset restructuring, managerial restructuring involves altering 
strategies from the previous management to revitalize the organization. Wiersema 
and Bantel (1992) document that in general, replacement of top managers is 
significantly linked to the change in corporate strategy. Wruck (1990) reports that 
52% of distressed firms replace incumbent managers which implies that significant 
proportion of distress is ascribed to managerial mismanagement. Management 
turnover is known to be effective in overcoming corporate inertia when it entails 
amendment of debilitating strategy which causes performance downturn. However, 
studies under the contingency theory stress that turnaround strategies need to be 
tailored to match the cause of distress, otherwise, they can have an adverse impact 
on firm performance (Schendel, Patton, and Riggs, 1976; Hofer, 1980; Maheshwari, 
2000). For example, Whitaker (1999) emphasizes that managerial restructuring is 
an effective strategy for firms suffering distress because of incompetent 
management, but not for those entering distress as a result of economic crisis. My 
conjecture is that firm-level distress caused by mismanagement can be assuaged by 
replacing incumbent managers, but managerial restructuring alone cannot resolve 
economy-related distress such as constraints in external financing. However, if 
managerial restructuring is accompanied by transformation of prior strategies 
which led to underperformance and a means of raising capital, it could accomplish 
meaningful changes in operating performance. Hence, I expect that managerial 
restructuring alone cannot improve long-term performance, but it can if conjoined 
by divestiture strategy.  
As opposed to divestiture which involves strategic reorientation, retrenchment 
strategies concern short-term cash flows. Thus, operational and financial 
restructuring relying on cost reduction and cash preservation are considered 
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retrenchment measures. Some studies suggest that retrenchment is used in 
extremely distressed conditions (Schendel, Patton, and Riggs 1976; Bibeault 1998; 
Robbins and Pearce, 1992) while others suggest that it is implemented to gain 
efficiency and stabilize the firm prior to enacting strategic reorientation (Bibeault, 
1998; Slatter, 1984). Regardless, the prior literature is sceptical about its long-term 
viability as a turnaround strategy and concurs that retrenchment is a provisional 
resolution (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Denis and Kruse, 2000; Koh et al., 2015). 
Therefore, for firms resorting to retrenchment strategies without an additional asset 
restructuring, the implication on their long-term performance is nebulous.  
For one, the nature of this strategy is short-term and is not designed to boost 
growth. For another, economic crisis is an exogenous shock often linked with 
changes in overall business and corporate dynamics in the economy. Under such 
unpredictable circumstances, firms are often obligated to reconsider their approach 
and quickly adjust their resources and strategies according to the changing 
environment. Retrenched firms may end up with stagnant performance at best or 
even experience performance decline if used excessively (Barker and Duhaime, 
1997). As an evidence, Boyne and Meier (2009) find that over-pursuing cost 
efficiencies results in unsuccessful turnaround and aggravate performance decline. 
Furthermore, Koh et al. (2015) argue that distressed firms without alternative ways 
to raise capital issue equity at severe discounts, leading to insufficient cash flow to 
reverse the distress. Considering the influence of economic distress on corporate 
strategy and the nature of what the managerial restructuring and retrenchment 
strategies are designed for, I propose the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2. Firms undertaking other restructuring strategies – managerial, 
operational, and financial restructuring – without accompanying divestiture during 
the financial crisis do not improve their long-term operating performance.  
 
There are two reasons why I have to consider the possibility of fire sale 
discounts on divestiture announcements. First, during recession, the market is 
illiquid, making it difficult to find a buyer. Thus, the price has to be low enough to 
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attract a buyer (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Schlingemanna, Stulz, and Walkling, 
2002; Wang et al., 2009). Second, distressed firms have lower bargaining power, 
because of their inefficiency and potential risk of default, which causes discounts 
in asset value (Ang and Mauck, 2011). However, in order for a fire sale to occur, 
the following conditions have to be also satisfied: divested assets are highly 
idiosyncratic, industry specialists are also constrained, and non-industry buyers 
demand heavy discounts in asset value (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011).  
Literature is consensus about who provides liquidity for asset transactions 
during periods of market frictions. Assets are often sold to industry outsiders when 
the seller’s industry is constrained (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Pulvino, 1998; 
Schlingemanna et al., 2002; Finlay et al., 2018). Debatable is the fire sale 
hypothesis from earlier studies whereby industry outsiders require heavy 
liquidation discounts in asset price (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Pulvino, 1998; 
Schlingemanna et al., 2002). Unlike the fire sale hypothesis, Finlay et al. (2018) 
observe no sign of fire sale discounts based on divested assets. Rather, consistent 
with the financing hypothesis, liquidity provided by non-industry specialists help 
divesting firms resolve financial distress and obtain positive market valuation 
during asset sales announcements. They argue that the financing benefits from 
divestiture overwrite any liquidity discounts that may have been applied to asset 
valuation. Similarly, Ang and Mauck (2011) report that discounts are perceived 
only when the offer price is compared to the the 52-week high and targets are still 
sold at premium to their current market value.  
The existing evidence suggests no significant discount for divested assets and 
implies that divestiture provides financing benefits to constrained firms during 
periods of economic downturn. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:    
 
Hypothesis 3. Divestiture announcements by distressed firms do not incur fire sale 
discounts during the financial crisis.  
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4.4 Data and methodology 
 
4.4.1 Sample collection 
 
My study involves the financial crisis period beginning in the third quarter of 2007 
and ending in the first quarter of 2009 (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2012). 
This period is within the fiscal year of 2007 and 2008 in the Compustat annual data, 
which is equivalent to June 2007 through May 2009 in calendar time. Therefore, I 
obtain accounting data of U.S. public firms from the Compustat annual database 
over this period. I restrict the sample to industrial firms traded in NYSE, AMEX, 
and Nasdaq. I also require that firms included in my sample have financial 
information available to generate Z-score, a measure of financial distress, beginning 
from two years before the crisis to three years after a divestiture for divesting firms 
or three years after the crisis for non-divesting firms. Upon imposing those 
conditions, the sample has 6,822 firm-year observations for the fiscal year of 2007 
and 2008. Companies meeting these criteria have non-missing financial information 
over fiscal years between 2005 and 2012, which I use to generate pre-crisis distress 
condition and post-divestiture long-term operating performance. Data on 
divestitures is collected from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. I only 
include completed deals and public firms with available accounting data. These 
criteria leave me with 800 divestiture transactions over the period of financial crisis. 
The sample of managerial restructurings is obtained from the S&P Executive 
Compensation database, and the data on equity prices is collected from CRSP.   
 
4.4.2 Financial distress and restructuring strategies  
 
In defining financial distress, I distinguish firms between those experience distress 
during the crisis as well as the pre-crisis period and those enter distress only after 
the crisis begins. The reason why I distinguish the two is because the prior study 
(O’Neill, 1986b) suggests that firms with strong strategic positioning without an 
exogenous shock may opt for retrenchment strategies rather than strategic 
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reorientation while waiting for cyclical upturns. However, economic distress has 
long-lasting impacts on firms’ recovery even after the crisis is over due to 
subsequent recessions, making it arduous to identify which strategies are effective 
for recovery. Accordingly, I generate the distress 1 variable with all distressed firms 
during the crisis regardless of their pre-crisis status and the distress 2 variable with 
firms entering a distress condition only after the crisis begins, but not within two 
years prior to the crisis.   
There are several ways to measure financial distress, but I use Altman’s Z-
score Bankruptcy Model (Altman, 1968) to determine whether a firm is distressed, 
as it is a widely adopted methodology in empirical research with high precision of 
predicting defaults (Graham, 2000; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). Among variations of Z-score 
formulae based on the industry and a firm’s public status, I use the formula which 
can also be applied to non-manufacturer industrial firms as follows: 
 
Z = 6.56T1 + 3.26T2 + 6.72T3 + 1.05T4 
 
where T1 = (Current Assets-Current Liabilities) / Total Assets 
T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
T4 = Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities. 
 
Based on the Z-scores computed using the formula, a firm with Z-score less 
than 1.1 is considered financially distressed. I present how many firms in my sample 
were distressed during the financial crisis in Table 4. 1. The table shows that 
approximately 30% (2,010 firm-year observations) of the firms in the sample were 
distressed during FY 2007/08. Moreover, 9% (615 firm-year observations) of the 
sample and about a third of distressed firms fell into distress only subsequent to the 
beginning of the financial crisis.  
Using the sample and distress 1 and distress 2 subsamples, I examine the 
frequency of restructuring strategies performed by firms during the crisis period. 
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Restructuring strategies, often referred to as turnaround strategies for financially 
distress firms, fall largely into four categories: asset, managerial, operational, and 
financial restructuring (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997; Zhou, Li, and Svejnar, 2011; 
Koh et al., 2015; Finlay et al., 2018). Asset restructuring involves divestments of a 
partial or full business unit, spin-offs, leveraged/management/institutional buyouts, 
and sale and leaseback. Managerial restructuring retains replacement of top-tier 
managements such as the CEO and managing director. Following Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) and Atanassov and Kim (2009), I define management turnover if the 
CEO or manager leaves the firm in year t or year t+1 for reasons besides death or 
retirement. Both asset and managerial restructuring strategies are known to have 
long-term effects on firm performance and are used to engineer portfolio 
reconfiguration and strategic reorientation under a new management, respectively.  
Conversely, operational restructuring is a short-term measure designed to 
tackle an imminent threat to default (Slatter 1984; Gowen and Leonard 1986) and 
regain efficiency, sometimes as prerequisites to strategic reorientation (Pearce, 
1982; Bibeault, 1998; Robins and Pearce II, 1993). Operational restructuring in this 
study comprises of investment reduction, COGS reduction, fixed asset reduction, 
and layoffs. Financial restructuring in periods of economic distress is executed to 
prevent defaults and reserve cash, similar to operational restructuring. Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010) report that banks significantly contracted corporate lending 
during the financial crisis. Firms with limited credit-line should have naturally 
resorted to dividend cut or omission and debt or equity issue. Definition of those 
restructuring strategies are available in Panel A of Appendix C.  
Table 4. 2 exhibits the number of firm-year observations as well as the 
percentage of each restructuring strategy to the total number of observations in the 
sample during the financial crisis. Panel A includes all firms in the sample and 
shows that 8.8% of them took divestitures (asset restructuring strategy). 
Management turnover was implemented by 9.9% of the firms and of those firms, 
16.6% contemporaneously undertook divestitures. Operational restructuring was on 
average more frequently utilized than divestiture or managerial restructuring. 
Investment reduction (57.6%) was the most frequently implemented followed by 
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fixed asset reduction (24.7%) and layoffs (17.65%). COGS reduction (4.8%) was 
the least popular strategy. Approximately 9 to 13.5% of the firms with operational 
restructuring also announced divestiture. Among financial restructuring strategies, 
debt issue (28.9%) was the most widely implemented followed by equity issue 
(15.27%) and dividend cut or omission (10.0%). Between 7.4 and 10.2% of the 
firms with financial restructuring undertook divestments. Those statistics indicate 
that retrenchment strategies and investment cuts are primary responses to the 
economic crisis and divestitures and managerial restructurings are comparably less.   
Panel B and Panel C of Table 4. 2 include distressed firms only. Overall 
frequency of each strategy is similar to the all-firms sample, but distressed firms 
engaged in slightly more divestitures with firms in distress 2 subsample (11.5%) 
having higher frequency than firms in distress 1 subsample (9.6%). Moreover, 
distressed firms displayed greater propensity to layoff (28.5% - 32.0%) and raise 
capital through debt (30.3% - 39.3%) or equity issue (24.0% - 29.2%). Distressed 
firms also undertook divestiture more commonly along with management turnover 
(21.6% - 30%) than non-distressed firms.  
Overall, consistent with Finlay et al. (2018), divestments were employed 
relatively less than other restructuring strategies during the financial crisis. They 
reckon that asset sales are negatively affected by economic downturn due to lack of 
buyers and market illiquidity and more firms espouse retrenchment strategies.  
 
4.4.3 Summary statistics 
 
I present summary statistics of distressed firms (1) and non-distressed firms (2) in 
Table 4. 3. Panel A exhibits firm characteristics of all listed firms in COMPUSTAT 
(panel data with firm-year observations) with available financial information 
between two years prior to the crisis and three years after a divestiture (after the 
crisis) for divesting firms (for non-divesting firms). Definition of control variables 
is available in Panel B of Appendix C. The level of significance in mean and median 
difference is estimated using parametric t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) 
test, respectively.  
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Consistent with the prior literature, the probability of divestiture is slightly 
higher for distressed firms than non-distressed firms but is statistically indifferent 
during the crisis. In comparison of firm characteristics, the financial crisis seems to 
have affected smaller firms more severely than larger firms as the sample of 
distressed firms are significantly smaller in size than that of non-distressed firms. 
Distressed firms are also more levered and less profitable than non-distressed firms 
based on the higher leverage ratio and negative cash flows. Ironically, distressed 
firms are more liquid than non-distressed firms. According to Tobin’s Q, distressed 
firms have on average higher market value relative to their intrinsic value than non-
distressed firms do, but the median value is statistically indifferent. The book-to-
market ratio implies that value firms with higher book value are less likely to be 
distressed given those with higher market value will be more negatively affected 
by the collapse of market price. Those variables will be used as control variables 
later in the analysis of long-term operating performance.   
Panel B displays firm and deal characteristics of listed companies announced 
divestiture during the financial crisis with available accounting data. Similar to the 
sample statistics in Panel A which include non-divesting firms, this cross-sectional 
sample shows that asset size of distressed firms is significantly smaller than that of 
non-distressed firms. Following Pulvino (1998) and Finlay et al. (2018), I create 
the low debt capacity (LDC) variable which identifies firms with higher leverage 
and lower liquidity within their industry. LDC is a dummy equal to one if a firm 
has book leverage higher than the industry median while its current ratio is lower 
than the industry median. Industry median is generated using CRSP US common 
stocks classified based on Fama-French’s 48 industries100. The mean difference test 
indicates that distressed firms have significantly lower debt capacity than non-
distressed firms. This variable is used in the selection stage of the two-step bias 
correction model later.  
As compared to non-distressed divestors, distressed divestors are less 
profitable with lower cash flows, and their market value is higher relative to their 
 
100 Each firm in the sample is assigned with a corresponding industry median on the matching date 
based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. 
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intrinsic value based on Tobin’s Q. The median value for liquidity, book-to-market, 
and run-up are not significantly different between distressed and non-distressed 
divestors.  
I also compare cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) measured by 3-day (-1, 
+1) event window surrounding the divestiture announcement date. Abnormal 
returns are computed by deducting benchmark portfolio returns 101  from the 
divesting firm’s stock returns. Based on the mean and median difference measures, 
CAR is indifferent between distressed and non-distressed firms. I estimate 
divestiture announcement returns using CAR later in the cross-sectional regression 
model.  
Finlay et al. (2018) argue that firms are more likely to sell core assets due to 
financing difficulty during periods of economic crisis. Likewise, my sample shows 
that divestitures during the crisis frequently involve sales of core assets; distressed 
firms divest higher proportion of core assets while non-distressed firms divest more 
non-core assets. In terms of industry relatedness of buyers, both distressed and non-
distressed firms are more likely to sell their assets to unrelated buyers, but 
interestingly non-distressed firms have higher propensity to do so. This has a crucial 
implication regarding the validity of the fire sale theory because if it were true, 
unconstrained firms have less incentive to sell assets to non-industry buyers at 
critical discounts which can deteriorate their firm value. They would rather choose 
alternative financing methods. However, the fact that unconstrained firms are 
actually more willing to divest to industry outsiders indicate that the financing 
benefits of divestiture during recession are greater than the liquidity discounts. I 
will re-examine the fire sale theory as well as the financing hypothesis later in the 
empirical results section using the divestiture announcement return analysis.    
 
 
4.5 Empirical results 
 
 
101 Benchmark returns are estimated using market model over 250 days beginning -295 days prior 
to the announcement. 
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4.5.1 Long-term operating performance of firms with divestiture 
 
In this section, I estimate long-term operating performance of firms undertaken 
divestitures during the crisis period. For the measure of operating performance, I 
use OIBD, operating income before depreciation plus interest income divided by 
the book value of total assets, and ROA, net income (loss) divided by the book 
value of total assets, following Prezas and Simonyan (2015). I adopt the 
methodology used in the event study by Loughran and Ritter (1997) and adjust each 
divesting firm’s performance with that of a matched firm. The matching procedure 
is as follows: i) each divesting firm is matched with a firm which has not divested 
for the 6 years surrounding the year of divestiture (-3, +3), ii) the matching firm is 
from the same industry as the divesting firm based on the first 2-digit SIC code, iii) 
the size of the matching firm based on the book value of total assets at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to the divestiture announcement is between 25 and 200% of the 
divesting firm’s size, and iv) the matching firm has the closest OIBD to that of the 
divesting firm. If no matching firm is found with these criteria, I withdraw the 
industry requirement and apply size criterion between 90 and 110% of the divesting 
firm and closest but higher OIBD ratio.  
Table 4. 4 presents the changes in median operating performance of divesting 
firms and of matched firms. The change in operating performance was measured 
from the fiscal year prior to divestiture to the year of divestiture (year -1 to 0), one 
year after divestiture (year -1 to 1), two years after divestiture (year -1 to 2), three 
years after divestiture (-1 to 3), and average of year 1, 2, and 3 after divestiture 
(year -1 to average 1, 2, 3). Panel A of Table 4. 4 shows that firms undertaken 
divestitures during the crisis outperform their non-divestor benchmark post-
divestiture in years 1 and 2 as compared to year -1. More importantly, divesting 
firms’ ROA is considerably higher than that of their benchmarks in all post-
divestiture years.   
For the distressed sample in Panel B of Table 4. 4, divesting firms not only 
elevate operating performance over the years, but also significantly outperform 
matched firms by 1.3% in OIBD and 5.8% in ROA for the average 3-year period 
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post-divestiture. Firms entering distress only after the crisis (distress 2 subsample) 
in Panel C of Table 4. 4 also experience substantial increase in post-divestiture 
performance with an average matched-firm adjusted ROA of 6.0% over the 3 years. 
The results reveal that asset restructuring in general is more effective for distressed 
firms than for non-distressed firms on improving operating performance. 
Furthermore, firms experiencing distress due to the economic crisis can notably 
improve future performance through divestitures. Overall, the results are consistent 
with the Hypothesis 1.  
Next, I measure operating performance of companies which implement a 
divestiture along with other restructuring strategies. Earlier in Table 2, I observed 
the frequency of complementary strategies and discovered that managerial 
restructuring is more frequently accompanied by divestiture than other restructuring 
strategies. In Table 4. 5, I combine individual strategies presented in Table 2 under 
a bigger restructuring category and evaluate corresponding operating performance 
based on those complimentary strategies.  
Panel A of Table 4. 5 displays the performance of divesting firms which also 
undertake managerial restructuring. This combined strategy involves dynamic 
strategic reorientation as the new management is more likely to change strategic 
direction and contemporaneously reconfigure their business portfolio through asset 
restructuring. The results show that such an intrepid strategic change during the 
crisis has a positive impact on the restructuring firm’s long-term operating 
performance. Firms with this strategy experience 0.8% increase in matched firm-
adjusted OIBD in year 2 and 3.7% increase in ROA over the 3-year period (those 
returns are significant at the 1% level).  
Divesting firms with retrenchment strategies such as operational restructuring 
and financial restructuring in Panel B and Panel C of Table 4. 5, respectively, also 
significantly improve operating performance, but the improvement is not as large 
as when incorporating managerial restructuring.  
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4.5.2 Multivariate quantile regression analysis of post-divestiture operating 
performance  
 
In this section, I estimate the post-divestiture operating performance in multivariate 
quantile (median) regression model using the control variables in Table 4. 3. I use 
median comparison in my regression analysis instead of mean value due to the 
strong presence of outliers in operating performance. Quantile regression is more 
robust to extreme values and is more efficient than OLS for non-normal errors 
(Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Barber and Lyon, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 
1997; Lee and Li, 2012; Prezas and Simonyan, 2015).   
Table 4. 6 exhibits the results. The dependent variable is the change in ROA 
and OIBD from year -1 to year 1, 2, and 3. The variable of interest in this table is 
divest which is a dummy equal to one if a firm makes a divestiture announcement 
in the fiscal year of 2007/08. The sample in Panel A includes all firms. Consistent 
with the matched firm-adjusted performance estimations in Table 4. 4, divesting 
firms realize significantly greater improvements in operating performance for 
subsequent periods than firms which do not divest. The coefficient estimates of the 
divest dummy are all significantly positive, excluding the change in OIBD one-year 
post-divestiture. The median ROA of divesting firms in excess of non-divestors’ 
ranges from 1.4 to 1.9% over the 3 years after divestiture. Panel B only includes the 
distress 1 sample. The regression results indicate that distressed firms perform 
significantly better after divestiture as compared to those which do not divest. 
Divestors are associated with a median ROA of 3.6 to 5.0%. Further, firms entering 
distress with the beginning of the financial crisis (distress 2 sample) in panel C 
realize even higher improvements in their post-divestiture operating performance, 
implying firms affected by the economy-wide distress can significantly benefit 
from the divestiture strategy.  
Control variables also exhibit significant correlations with the change in 
operating performance. Firm size in general has significantly negative impact on 
performance, particularly in the distress 1 sample. The leverage ratio is positively 
associated with operating performance in the all-firms sample. This finding is 
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consistent with the theory on levered firms which have more incentives to improve 
their output as creditors strictly monitor their activities and performance 
(Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 1990; Gompers, 
1995). However, it has negative effects on distressed firms’ performance. Jensen 
(1989) and Ofek (1993) further explain that highly levered firms react to 
performance decline more promptly than do those with lower leverage and actively 
engage in asset, operational, and financial restructurings to avoid default (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991).  
The liquidity and cash flow ratios, on the other hand, are negatively associated 
with performance as cash holdings tend to invoke agency problem (Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling, 1991; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2002; Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes, 2003). However, the agency effect of cash flows dissipates in 
regressions of distressed samples. Tobin’s Q has a positive correlation with 
operating performance indicating that the market value of assets is an integral part 
of firms’ ongoing operating performance. Similarly, Book-to-market value 
indicates that a firm’s equity performance affects its operating performance.  
I further compare the performance of divesting firms which use complimentary 
restructuring strategies in Table 4. 7. Overall, combinations of other restructuring 
strategies with divestiture magnify positive impact on operating performance. As 
shown in Panel A, the largest synergy comes from the combination of divestiture 
with managerial restructuring (MR) resulting in a medium excess ROA of 3.3 to 
4.1%. Operational restructuring (OR) in Panel B and financial restructuring (FR) in 
Panel C also compliment post-divestiture performance and significantly enhance 
operating performance in all 3-year periods. 
Additionally, I investigate whether other restructuring strategies without 
divestiture increase operating performance. Table 4. 8 presents the results. 
Managerial restructuring has no significant impact on the firm performance, except 
in year 3 with 0.6% increase in ROA. Contrarily, firms implementing operational 
or financial restructuring without divestiture experience significantly negative 
performance in all 3 years following the restructuring. Consistent with the 
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Hypothesis 2, these findings confirm that retrenchment strategies are not adequate 
for facilitating long-term performance recovery.  
 
4.5.3 Effectiveness of divestiture in recovering from financial distress 
 
In the previous section, I learned that firms undertaking divestiture in conjunction 
with other restructuring strategies during the crisis improve long-term operating 
performance, but managerial restructuring alone is not as effective and 
retrenchment strategies without divestiture causes performance decline. However, 
I do not know for certain whether the performance decline in firms with 
retrenchment strategies can be explained by their focus on preserving business and 
resolving financial distress, rather than taking strategic reorientation which may 
look risky with economic uncertainty for risk-averse managers. This is especially 
the case with firms fearing to divest their assets at severe discounts in an illiquid 
market. If their objectives were only to improve distress condition and immediate 
cash flows, firms implementing retrenchment strategies should effectively diminish 
financial distress in following periods subsequent to the restructuring.   
To find out if those alternative objectives can explain the use of retrenchment 
strategies, I examine the effectiveness of each category of restructuring strategy in 
recovering from financial distress using the quantile regression analysis. In this 
analysis, I only include distressed firms (distress 1 subsample). The dependent 
variable is the change in Z-score from year -1 to 1, 2, and 3 years after the 
restructuring102. Panel A of Table 4. 9 shows the change in Z-score for divesting 
firms, indicating that divestors significantly improve their financial condition over 
the course of 3 years following divestiture. The improvements are massive at 40.1 
to 59.2%.   
On the contrary, firms with managerial restructurings (MR) 103  in Panel B 
experience increase in distress by 45.0% in year 1 and 50.6% in year 3. Whitaker 
 
102 I refer to Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) in construction of this variable. 
103 I exclude firms which combine managerial restructuring with divestiture from the sample to 
eliminate the influence of divestiture on the recovery.  
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(1999) suggests that turnaround cannot be successfully achieved by replacing top-
tier managers when the cause of a distress is not due to the mismanagement of 
incumbent managers but due to the economic crisis. My finding concurs with his 
argument and alludes that managerial restructuring is ineffective in resolving 
financial distress aggravated by the economic crisis.  
Unlike the alternative objectives of retrenchment strategies I have suggested 
earlier, Panel C shows that the distress condition is exacerbated when firms 
undertake operational restructurings (OR) without divestiture. OR is proven to have 
negative effects on long-term operating performance based on my previous finding. 
This additional finding signifies that retrenchment measures are not useful at 
resolving financial distress, either. Likewise, Panel D indicates that financial 
restructurings (FR) have no significant influence on the distressed firms’ financial 
recovery. The overall findings suggest that divestiture is more effective than other 
restructuring strategies in both improving long-term operating performance and 
alleviating financial distress.  
My findings demand some acknowledgements as to why divestiture is the only 
and most effective long-term turnaround strategy for firms experiencing 
overlapping conditions of firm-level and economy-wide distress. I draw answers to 
this query from multiple theories related to divestitures based on the prior literature. 
Divestiture is part of asset restructuring designed to foster a firm’s strategic 
reorientation. It is particularly useful when firms aim to reverse their declining 
performance compared to their industry counterparts. Periods of financial crisis 
with fast-changing economic environment and declining market productivity are 
when firms need to refine their corporate strategies and increase efficiency in the 
use of their assets and resources. The utmost priority is to liquidate any inefficient 
assets and use it toward financing more valuable assets and maintain investment 
equivalent to the pre-crisis level. This is also when managerial discretion in firms 
with the agency problem will not deter firms from pursuing a long-overdue asset 
restructuring.  
Most importantly, given the overwhelming market frictions in crisis periods, 
funds raised from divestitures can be used to finance projects, control leverage, and 
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maintain investment for the remaining divisions. Thus, the financing theory is 
absolutely pertinent to this study. To substantiate the financing benefits of 
divestiture, I estimate how the leverage and segment investment ratio change 
between a fiscal year before and after the divestiture. I also perform the same 
analysis for non-divesting firms for comparison. The leverage ratio for divesting 
firms is computed as total debt divided by the book value of total assets. The 
segment investment ratio is estimated by capital expenditures as a proportion of 
sales using the data obtained from the Compustat Historical Segments file. 
Following Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003), divesting firms’ segment investment 
ratio was generated using retained segments only to eliminate the influence of 
divested unit on the firm’s overall investment policy in case it was capital-intensive.  
The results are reported in Table 4. 10. Panel A of Table 4. 10 shows that 
leverage of non-divesting firms significantly increases during the crisis while that 
of divesting firms does not. Especially, those with financial restructuring increase 
leverage by 5.6%, which is a stark contrast to 0.6% decrease in leverage for 
divesting firms104. Divesting firms are more levered one year prior to divestiture 
though, which indicates that highly levered firms are more likely to divest.  
As for the investment policy in Panel B of Table 4. 10, divesting firms maintain 
similar level of investment in their remaining divisions as the segment investment 
ratio is indifferent before and after divestiture. However, non-divesting firms, 
especially firms with operational restructuring, significantly decrease investment. 
Being able to maintain investment is the key to long-term performance recovery. 
My findings on these additional tests demonstrate why firms with divestiture 
strategy effectively resolve financial distress and improve long-term operating 
performance.   
 
4.5.4 Cross-sectional analysis of divestiture announcement returns  
 
 
104 The mean difference tests show qualitatively indifferent results from the median difference tests.  
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Under normal circumstances, the literature unanimously documents that 
divestitures by healthy firms increase the value of remaining assets, especially when 
the seller disposes an underperforming non-core unit. Further documentations 
specify that the premium valuations around divestiture announcement reflect 
anticipated performance improvements in the long run (John and Ofek, 1995; Daley, 
Mehrotra, Sivakumar, 1997; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Dittmar and 
Shivdasani, 2003). However, theories suggest that in case of distressed firms during 
periods of economic crisis, divestments may be subject to fire sale discounts 
presumably due to insufficient number of buyers and lower expected cash flows 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 2011). Moreover, mixed findings on the divestiture 
performance of financially distressed firms makes it harder to predict how divested 
assets are valued during recession.  
Fire sale literature indicates that the market for corporate asset sales during 
industry and economy-wide distress is illiquid because specialist buyers are as 
constrained as their distressed industry sellers. Thus, assets are often sold to 
unrelated buyers from the seller’s industry (Pulvino, 1998; Acharya, Bharath, and 
Srinivasan, 2007). In general, unrelated buyers are more likely to use divested 
assets suboptimally than do related buyers and incur extra costs to value and 
manage an unfamiliar asset. To compensate for these additional expenses, the fire 
sale theory indicates that non-industry acquirers are likely to demand a huge 
discount on the asset value. Recent studies, however, show benefits of selling assets 
to unrelated buyers during the economic crisis (Borisova, John, and Salotti, 2013; 
Finaly et al., 2018). They describe non-industry buyers that are financially 
unconstrained can pay higher price that can outweigh the costs of distress and help 
divesting firms avoid fire sale discounts. Indeed, I observe in my sample statistics 
that more assets are acquired by unrelated buyers than by industry buyers.  
Ang and Mauck (2011) denote that if fire sale discounts are present, distressed 
assets would be sold at greater discounts than non-distressed assets. In order to 
investigate whether asset liquidation by distressed firms lead to fire sale discounts 
and negatively affect shareholder value during the crisis, I compare cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) of distressed and non-distressed firms surrounding 
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divestiture announcements105. I use the cross-sectional divestiture transaction data 
obtained from SDC for this experimentation. Table 4. 11 shows the results of 
univariate analyses of CARs as well as the mean difference tests between distressed 
and non-distressed firms. I first measure the returns for all firms in my sample and 
then partition the sample based on the relatedness of the divested unit to the parent’s 
and buyer’s industry.  
The results indicate that distressed firms experience significantly positive 
announcement effects. The average excess returns are 1.7% for all divestitures, 1.8% 
for divestitures of non-core unit, and 2.7% for divestitures to a related buyer. 
Announcement returns are also positive for the sale of core assets (1.7%) and sale 
to an unrelated buyer (0.9%) but are statistically insignificant. This finding suggests 
a contrasting implication to the fire sale theory in which announcements of asset 
sales during economic downturn led to negative shareholder returns because of a 
large discount in the divested asset value. Positive stock returns around divestiture 
announcements rather imply that the financing benefits are perceived to be greater 
than any liquidity discounts that are applied to the divested asset because of the 
divesting firm’s weaker bargaining position. Non-distressed firms also realize 
significantly positive announcement returns, but their returns are statistically 
indifferent from those of distressed firms.  
I further explore the fire sale theory in multivariate OLS regression model 
using the control variables from Panel B of Table 4. 3. Again, the dependent 
variable is 3-day CAR, and the key independent variables are distress 1 (a dummy 
equal to one if a firm is distressed) and distress 2 (a dummy equal to one if a firm 
enters distress only with the beginning of the financial crisis). In this regression, I 
control for the industry fixed effects using Fama-French’s 48 industry classification 
and use robust standard errors. 
I report the results in Table 4. 12. Consistent with the findings from the 
univariate analysis, divestiture announcements of distressed firms do not reflect fire 
 
105 Over 99% of the divested assets are subsidiaries, and information on stock price or premium of 
these units is unavailable in the SDC database. Therefore, I cannot estimate deal premium for 
divestitures. Instead, I measure announcement returns to indirectly see whether divested assets are 
traded at discounts. If so, announcement returns will be negative.  
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sale discounts as coefficients of the distress 1 dummy are not significantly negative 
throughout all regression analyses. Moreover, there is a weak evidence that 
divestiture announcements by firms in the distress 2 sample result in significantly 
positive abnormal returns at 2.7% for all divestitures and 5.1% for divestitures to 
related buyers. My findings indicate that distressed firms do not underperform non-
distressed firms and hence, consistent with the Hypothesis 3, the fire sale theory is 
inapplicable to divestitures implemented during the crisis period.    
Divestiture decisions are not randomly made but rather are forced by creditors 
in distressed firms or are voluntarily undertaken corresponding to the characteristics 
of firms or their strategies. For example, distressed firms with higher leverage and 
lack of external sources of financing are more likely to be forced to divest their 
assets. However, many firms, especially those that are not in highly regulated 
industries, also choose to divest voluntarily to reorganize their assets and boost 
efficiency and profitability. These non-random choices of divestiture cause 
selection bias which cannot be addressed in OLS model. In this study, I use 
Heckman (1979)’s two-step model to control for the selection bias as in Table 4. 
13.  
For each sample106, in the selection stage, I perform probit regression analysis 
with the divest dummy as dependent variable. I then measure whether distressed 
firms are more likely to divest during the financial crisis using the distress dummy 
(equal to one if a firm is distressed). In this stage, I also include the low debt 
capacity (LCD) variable which identifies firms with higher leverage and lower 
liquidity than the industry median. The inverse mills ratio (LAMBDA)107 generated 
in this stage is applied to the second stage regression.  
The first stage regression results show that financially distressed firms and 
firms with low debt capacity are more likely to divest their assets. Further, size and 
market value of assets or equity are significant factors that influence divestiture 
decision. Larger firms are more likely to divest, while firms with higher market 
 
106 Same as in Table 11, I estimate the correction model using a sample of all divestitures, divestiture 
of core unit, divestiture of non-core unit, related buyer, and unrelated buyer.  
107 LAMBDA is unobservable bias which is not captured by the rest of the control variables in the 
selection model. I control selection bias by including this variable in the second stage regression.  
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value of assets or equity as compared to their fundamental value are less likely to 
divest as the market value of their assets is diluted. Firms with more cash flows are 
also less likely to engage in divestiture as they might be less constrained. Overall, 
financial constraint is the primary motive to divest during the financial crisis.   
The dependent variable in the second stage regression model is cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) around the divestiture announcement date. The coefficients 
for LAMBDA are insignificant throughout all regression models, indicating that 
my initial results from the OLS estimations are not biased by the unobservable 
factors which affect divestiture decisions.  
Collectively, consistent with Finlay et al. (2018), the measure of CARs around 
divestiture announcements during the financial crisis suggests no sign of discount 





While divestiture has taken an extensive chapter of the corporate finance literature, 
its importance during the economic crisis has been understated. I postulate that it is 
because of the fire sale theory that extends the notion of liquidity discounts on assets 
divested by distressed firms. The lack of other theoretical considerations in 
empirical studies on the role of divestiture is another reason why divestiture has not 
been studied as an important restructuring measure that involves long-term strategic 
reorientation. Particularly, crisis-related studies focus more on retrenchment 
strategies which in reality are more effective at improving short-term efficiency and 
cash flows. My study fills this research gap and articulate the effectiveness of 
divestiture on the long-term performance of firms experiencing financial distress 
during the economic crisis.   
Using the sample of firms which announce divestiture during the financial 
crisis, I find that divesting firms significantly improve their long-term operating 
performance compared to non-divesting firms and lessen financial distress over the 
3-year periods post-divestiture. Other restructuring strategies such as managerial, 
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operational, and financial restructuring are also effective when implemented along 
with a divestiture but are not when they are taken alone. Further, I find that 
retrenchment strategies which limit investments are associated with performance 
decline.  
During this period, I observe that more assets are sold to non-industry buyers 
as industry buyers might also be financially constrained as the fire sale theory 
suggests. The fire sale theory states that buyers from a similar industry to the 
distressed sellers are more likely to be constrained as well, hence, more asset sales 
are liquidated to non-industry buyers at greater discounts. However, I discover that 
non-distressed firms have higher propensity to sell their assets to non-industry 
acquirers than distressed firms do. Considering unconstrained buyers have less 
incentive to liquidate their assets at huge discounts by involving non-specialist 
buyers, I additionally examine the validity of the fire sale theory using divestiture 
announcement returns. My results imply that divestiture announcements by 
distressed firms have positive effects on the divesting firms’ shareholder returns, 
rendering no evidence of fire sale discounts. The returns are also indifferent 
between distressed and non-distressed firms.    
In a departure from mainstream crisis-related studies which focus on the fire 
sale theory or most frequently implemented corporate strategies (retrenchment 
measures), I revisit the role of divestiture based on the strategic reorientation theory 
and the financing theory. The evidence I provide in this paper enlighten that 
divestiture is an integral source of financing and an effective long-term turnaround 
strategy that can be integrated into corporate strategies in periods of economic 
turmoil. 












5.1.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This thesis investigates topics related to mergers and acquisitions and divestitures. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the quality of boutique financial advisors in M&A. Boutique 
investment banks started as intermediaries serving small to middle market clients 
have grown to advise larger share of M&A transactions over the past decade. Their 
growing reputation and market share have intrigued research firms and corporate 
financiers tracking M&A activities, yet they have received less empirical attention. 
This chapter reveals which factors have contributed to their growing reputation. 
According to the analysis of announcement returns, boutique advisors generate 
higher wealth gains for shareholders of acquiring firms than do full-service banks, 
particularly in deals with higher information asymmetry. These deals include 
private target deals, cross-industry acquisitions, and deals involving bidders 
without prior acquisition experience in the target industry. Significant 
outperformance in such deals indicates that boutique advisors can identify better 
targets and provide the acquiring firm with greater bargaining power. This also 
implies that their dedication on designated industries allows them to accumulate 
experiences and expertise that could supersede those of full-service banks operating 
in broader industries. These findings explain the increasing demand for boutique 
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advisors in large-scale cross-industry mergers as well as their concentration on 
sectors with large volume of M&As such as the technology, energy, healthcare, and 
financial industry. 
Chapter 3 studies divestiture of banks based on theories previously 
underexplored in divestiture studies. Banks have been excluded from the sample of 
divestiture studies for the industry is highly regulated, thus, less is known about 
how banks use divestiture to reconfigure their asset portfolio and its subsequent 
impact on performance. Separately examining bank holding companies yields 
empirical benefits. These benefits include a control for unobservable industry-
specific factors such as regulations and unique risks associated with banks as well 
as the estimation of the sector previously left out. This chapter begins with 
discovering previously unannounced motives of bank divestitures. In their study, 
Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1991) argue that bank divestitures are mostly 
required by regulatory capital requirement. This argument defines divestiture as an 
involuntary restructuring forced by regulation rather than a strategic decision 
coordinated by banks to enhance productivity and performance. However, this 
study finds alternative motives for divestiture of banks such as operating 
inefficiency, financial distress, and change in performance. Further investigation on 
banks’ use of divestiture in dynamic asset restructuring shows that banks use both 
acquisitions and divestitures to change their business scope between focusing and 
diversification: banks use focusing strategy when they experience increasing 
performance and loan growth but use diversifying strategy when they experience 
performance decline and financial distress. These findings imply that divestiture is 
not always involuntarily forced by the regulatory capital requirement or antitrust 
policy with a merger plan but is a prudently planned part of dynamic asset 
restructuring in many cases.  
Chapter 4 is inspired by the current economic environment with the ongoing 
Coronavirus pandemic. Many firms are struggling with the unprecedented 
economic distress and ensuing external financing frictions resulting in a series of 
defaults. In the process of coping with turnaround mechanisms for financially 
distressed firms, I decided to measure which corporate turnaround strategies are 
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effective for firms entering distress as a result of the economic crisis. The closest 
economic condition is represented by the 2007/08 global financial crisis. Based on 
financially distressed firms during this period, I compare long-term operating 
performance of firms employing different turnaround strategies including 
operational, financial, managerial, and asset restructuring. The results show that 
asset restructuring through divestiture is the most effective strategy to improve 
long-term operating performance. This is because the proceeds from divestiture can 
be used to finance valuable projects, maintain pre-crisis level of investment in the 
remaining divisions, and repay debt to lower leverage. Further, contrasting to the 
fire sale theory, this study shows that asset liquidation provides financing benefits 
which outweigh any potential liquidity discounts inflicted by the market condition. 
Combining divestitures with other strategies, especially management restructuring, 
also improves performance. However, managerial restructuring or retrenchment 
strategies alone cannot turnaround declining performance and even exacerbate 
financial distress. This is because these strategies are designed to cut costs to 
increase short-term cash flow but deter investment and growth. The insights 
provided in this study are timely and practical as the knowledge can be applied to 
corporate strategy for firms currently experiencing financial difficulty due to the 
economic condition.  
 
 
5.2. Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Each chapter inspires further research questions that could lead to different research 
topics. 
 
Boutique Financial Intermediaries in Public Acquisitions 
 
In Chapter 2, I have highlighted that boutique financial advisors are essential in 
M&As involving high level of information asymmetry that require specific sector 
knowledge and due diligence skills. While this has been supported by superior 
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 132 
performance of acquiring firms that are advised by boutique investment banks 
compared to those involving full-service advisors in such transactions, their role in 
public deals is less clear. This makes me wonder how boutique advisors 
differentiate their expertise from full-service firms in acquisitions of public targets. 
The known factor is that most large-scale public deals require a fairness opinion 
and boutique advisors are often hired to evaluate the fairness of the offer price for 
shareholders of the acquiring firm.  
The fairness opinion is one of the most important part of a merger process, for 
which investment banks in charge receive premium fee. However, producing a 
fairness opinion entails complexity and risk. First, it requires high level of valuation 
skill as the acquiring firm and its shareholders base their decision to proceed with 
the deal upon the fairness opinion. It can also be used as a defence if shareholders 
unsatisfied with the acquisition file a lawsuit against the managers later. Hence, it 
has to be exclusive and identify any issues in the agreement that needs to be 
addressed to the shareholders. Further, it involves high level of time pressure as it 
happens in the middle of the negotiation process between the buyer and the seller. 
Thus, investigating what proportion of public deals in the takeover market involve 
boutique advisors to provide a fairness opinion and how it affects acquisition 
performance could yield interesting discoveries.  
 
Divestiture in dynamic asset restructuring of non-financial industry 
 
In Chapter 3, divestiture was evaluated as part of dynamic asset restructuring in 
banks. In departure from the agency theory, this study adopts alternative theories 
such as the neoclassical theory and the resource-based view. These theories 
perceive focusing and diversifying strategy as inevitable choices firms sequentially 
make depending on their business cycle. While the focus of this study remained in 
the banking sector, it could be also extended to a larger sample study which include 
all industries with the available mergers and divestitures transaction data.  
Prior studies in divestiture literature are limited to estimating the effectiveness 
of focusing strategy on alleviating diversification discount and justifying the agency 
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theory. However, this theory has been defeated by several studies which find that 
diversifying decisions are made not by managerial entrenchment motive, but by 
declining performance and productivity. Even so, divestiture-related studies are still 
recycling the agency theory to date and have not included profit maximization as 
an alternative motive for diversification. Therefore, examining this alternative 
hypothesis could provide important implications on what exactly motivates firms 
to change their business scope between focusing and diversification using 
divestiture as a reconfiguring mechanism. 
 
Comparison of turnaround strategies during periods of growth vs. recession 
 
Chapter 4 examines long-term effectiveness of turnaround strategies with a focus 
on divestiture during the economic crisis. While divestiture alone or along with 
other restructuring strategies appears to improve long-term operating performance 
of financially distressed firms during recession, managerial restructuring and other 
retrenchment strategies are proven not. However, considering economy-wide 
distress may have a strong and unique impact on corporate turnaround strategy and 
ensuing performance, the results may be different during periods of economic 
growth.  
This is primarily because obtaining capital is less difficult in a liquid market 
than in an illiquid market, which gives firms with more flexible alternatives for 
funding than liquidating assets that may still be useful once the firm recovers from 
distress. For example, restructuring debt or extending a line of credit can be easier 
in the growing economy. Further, retrenchments may be a better alternative to 
managerial or asset restructuring if distressed firms are simply dealing with 
operational inefficiency. In this case, reducing costs and expenses and increasing 
short-term cash flows may be enough to overcome financial distress and improve 
operating performance. Comparing which strategy is suitable for a given market 
condition can be informative in determining which turnaround strategy financially 
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Table 2. 2  Cross-sectional OLS Regression Analysis: Bidder CARs  
This table presents OLS regression analysis for a sample of U.S. M&A transactions performed by 
public bidders acquiring public and private targets over the announcement period 2000 to 2016. The 
dependent variable is bidder CAR (-1, +1) surrounding the announcement date, and control variables 
are selected based on the firm and deal characteristics. The definition of control variables is available 
in Appendix A. Specification (1), (2), and (3) denote all, public, and private acquisitions, 
respectively. Regressions are controlled for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. P-values 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
  All Public Private 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Boutique 0.008** -0.005 0.014*** 
  (0.048) (0.567) (0.003) 
Bidder size -0.003* -0.005** 0.000 
  (0.073) (0.026) (0.991) 
Book to market -0.017** -0.003 -0.017** 
  (0.020) (0.851) (0.038) 
Run-up 0.020* 0.025 0.021* 
  (0.051) (0.191) (0.084) 
Volatility 0.046 -0.252 0.024 
  (0.833) (0.537) (0.927) 
Public Deals  -0.028*** - - 
  (0.000)   
All stock deals -0.016** -0.024*** 0.003 
  (0.027) (0.008) (0.790) 
Relative size 0.003* -0.012*** 0.011*** 
  (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversifying deals -0.007** -0.005 -0.011** 
  (0.044) (0.422) (0.016) 
Tender offers 0.010* 0.002  
  (0.085) (0.672)  
Hostile deals 0.011 0.017  
  (0.238) (0.112)  
Leverage 0.028*** 0.030 0.022* 
  (0.007) (0.146) (0.059) 
Liquidity -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.467) (0.319) (0.375) 
Premium  -0.000***  
  (0.001)  
Constant 0.046** 0.023 0.057** 
  (0.016) (0.500) (0.018) 
Observations 2,938 933 1,940 
Adjusted R-squared 0.054 0.115 0.037 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Table 2. 3  Heckman’s Two-Step (IMR) Analysis 
This table presents Heckman’s two-step analysis for a sample of M&A transactions performed by 
public bidders acquiring public and private targets over the announcement period 2000 to 2016. The 
sample is separated into all, public, and private acquisitions. For each type of deals, the table 
includes two regression models: (1) probit regression for the advisor selection, where the dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if the advisor is boutique and zero if the advisor is full-service, 
and (2) OLS regression for deal outcome, where the dependent variable is 3-day bidder CARs. In 
the selection stage, I include an instrumental variable, prior advisor, which equals to one if the bank 
and the acquirer have prior relationship and zero otherwise. Inverse mills ratio (IMR) is added in the 
outcome stage regression to determine whether there is selection bias in the model. The definition 
of other control variables is available in Appendix A. Regressions are controlled for year fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, 
**, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
  All   Public   Private 
  Selection Outcome   Selection Outcome   Selection Outcome 
Prior advisor 0.226***     0.296*     0.195*   
  (0.008)     (0.066)     (0.058)   
Bidder size -0.456*** -0.001   -0.405*** -0.012   -0.493*** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.866)   (0.000) (0.208)   (0.000) (0.885) 
Book to market -0.270*** -0.016**   -0.426** -0.019   -0.215** -0.017** 
  (0.003) (0.018)   (0.020) (0.171)   (0.048) (0.026) 
Run-up 0.005 0.020***   -0.515** 0.016   0.182 0.021** 
  (0.962) (0.003)   (0.025) (0.347)   (0.172) (0.016) 
Volatility -1.113 0.050   2.268 0.044   -2.764 0.010 
  (0.657) (0.746)   (0.621) (0.866)   (0.365) (0.958) 
Public Deals  0.010 -0.028***             
  (0.877) (0.000)             
All stock deals 0.104 -0.017***   0.285** -0.022**   0.010 0.003 
  (0.252) (0.003)   (0.035) (0.030)   (0.940) (0.697) 
Relative size -0.372*** 0.004   -0.368*** -0.016*   -0.386*** 0.010 
  (0.000) (0.473)   (0.000) (0.085)   (0.000) (0.162) 
Diversifying deals 0.101* -0.008**   0.213* -0.003   0.069 -0.010** 
  (0.085) (0.046)   (0.062) (0.717)   (0.324) (0.023) 
Tender offers   0.010     -0.002     -0.157* 
    (0.169)     (0.767)     (0.074) 
Hostile deals 0.216 0.011   0.385 0.026       
  (0.389) (0.386)   (0.134) (0.100)       
Leverage -0.637*** 0.030**   -0.506 0.029   -0.680*** 0.020 
  (0.000) (0.022)   (0.121) (0.173)   (0.001) (0.225) 
Liquidity 0.015 -0.001   0.041 -0.003   0.018 -0.002 
  (0.464) (0.342)   (0.339) (0.283)   (0.452) (0.271) 
Inverse Mills Ratio   -0.007     0.020     -0.002 
    (0.710)     (0.514)     (0.926) 
Constant 2.310*** 0.049**   2.118*** 0.030   2.528*** 0.073** 
  (0.000) (0.036)   (0.000) (0.433)   (0.000) (0.016) 
Observations 2,938 2,938   998 998   1,939 1,939 
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2) 0.201 0.053   0.198 0.089   0.200 0.034 
Industry FE YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Year FE YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
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Table 2. 4  Propensity Score Matching (PSM): Boutique vs. Full-service 
This table exhibits the results from the Propensity Score Matching for a sample of U.S. domestic 
M&As over the period 2000 to 2016. The bidder is public while the target includes both public and 
private firms. Panel A reports logit regression results in which the dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating the choice of boutique over full-service bank. The definition of control variables is 
available in Appendix A. Propensity scores are computed based on the set of covariates presented in 
this table. Panel B displays difference in mean bidder CARs between treated (boutique) and control 
(full-service) group measured by the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). Selected deals 
for the treated and control group are matched based on different matching methods: one-to-one 
Nearest Neighbour matching, five Nearest Neighbour matching, and Gaussian Kernel matching. P-
values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Logit regression: Choice of boutique advisor       
    All Public Private 
Bidder size   -0.450*** -0.395*** -0.489*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book to market   -0.253*** -0.405** -0.201* 
    (0.006) (0.026) (0.064) 
Run-up   0.010 -0.512** 0.187 
    (0.931) (0.025) (0.161) 
Volatility   -1.019 2.257 -2.661 
    (0.684) (0.622) (0.383) 
Public Deals    0.010     
    (0.883)     
All stock deals   0.102 0.286** 0.008 
    (0.260) (0.034) (0.953) 
Relative size   -0.376*** -0.371*** -0.390*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversifying deals   0.098* 0.200* 0.069 
    (0.094) (0.078) (0.322) 
Hostile deals   0.219 0.390   
    (0.381) (0.127)   
Leverage   -0.611*** -0.503 -0.651*** 
    (0.000) (0.123) (0.001) 
Liquidity   0.013 0.040 0.016 
    (0.516) (0.357) (0.496) 
Constant   2.240*** 2.020*** 2.470*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations   2,938 998 1,939 
Pseudo R2   0.199 0.194 0.198 
Industry FE   YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES YES 
Panel B. Boutique client CARs based on PSM       
    
One-to-one 5 Nearest 
Gaussian 
Kernel 
All   0.020*** 0.013*** 0.014** 
    (0.003) (0.008) (0.029) 
Public   0.005 -0.006 -0.003 
    (0.734) (0.610) (0.742) 
Private   0.014** 0.017** 0.013** 
    (0.046) (0.019) (0.029) 
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Table 2. 5  Long-term Abnormal Returns: Bidder BHARs  
This table presents OLS regression analysis for a sample of U.S. M&A transactions performed by 
public bidders acquiring public and private targets over the announcement period 2000 to 2016. The 
dependent variable is bidder BHAR over the 12-and 24-month period starting from the 
announcement date. BHARs are compounded returns of an acquiring firm over the estimation period 
adjusted by a matching benchmark portfolio from Fama-French’s 25 equally-weighted size and 
book-to-market portfolios:  
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏[1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1





where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is compounded returns of a sample firm I, and 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡 is returns of a corresponding 
benchmark portfolio which falls into the same size/book-to-market decile as the sample firm. 
Control variables are selected based on the firm and deal characteristics. The definition of control 
variables is available in Appendix A. Regressions are controlled for year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
  All Deals Public Deals Private Deals 
  12 Month 24 Month 12 Month 24 Month 12 Month 24 Month 
Boutique 0.040* 0.078** -0.047 -0.098 0.074*** 0.161*** 
  (0.081) (0.038) (0.266) (0.140) (0.007) (0.000) 
Run-up 0.053 0.097 -0.029 0.108 0.087 0.089 
  (0.279) (0.243) (0.740) (0.497) (0.142) (0.358) 
Public Deals  -0.012 0.013         
  (0.600) (0.720)         
All stock deals -0.075** -0.116** -0.092** -0.130* -0.051 -0.101 
  (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.070) (0.306) (0.215) 
Relative size 0.024*** 0.029** 0.001 0.016 0.037*** 0.039** 
  (0.002) (0.020) (0.905) (0.376) (0.000) (0.021) 
Diversifying deals -0.035* -0.040 -0.016 -0.026 -0.040 -0.050 
  (0.084) (0.210) (0.614) (0.615) (0.123) (0.224) 
Tender offers 0.007 -0.033 -0.031 -0.084     
  (0.849) (0.578) (0.405) (0.175)     
Hostile deals 0.027 -0.066 0.069 -0.025 -0.014 -0.160 
  (0.718) (0.533) (0.380) (0.838) (0.808) (0.157) 
Leverage 0.176*** 0.254** 0.025 0.055 0.277*** 0.425*** 
  (0.005) (0.021) (0.794) (0.762) (0.001) (0.002) 
Liquidity -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.027* -0.034 -0.039*** -0.040*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.065) (0.190) (0.000) (0.003) 
Constant 0.002 0.098 0.085 0.279** -0.047 0.014 
  (0.966) (0.254) (0.326) (0.036) (0.503) (0.907) 
Observations 2,157 1,608 765 588 1,392 1,020 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 0.034 0.007 0.003 0.058 0.057 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 158 
Table 2. 6  Long-term Abnormal Returns: Bidder CTPRs  
This table presents time-series regression analysis of calendar time portfolio returns formed on a sample of U.S. 
firms which announced M&A during the period 2000 to 2016. Portfolios are rebalanced each month with 
additional firms which participate in the event in that month and firms which exit the portfolio at the end of the 
12- or 24-month period. The monthly portfolio returns are regressed against Fama-French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997) factors as in the equation below: 
 
𝑅𝑝(𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒),𝑡 −  𝑅𝑝(𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒),𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝,𝑡.  
 
,where 𝑅𝑝(𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒),𝑡 −  𝑅𝑝(𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒),𝑡  is a zero-investment portfolio estimated by the monthly boutique 
portfolio returns in excess of the full-service portfolio returns, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the market excess return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is 
the difference between small and large stock portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the difference between high and low book-to-
market equity stock portfolios, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷 is the difference between winners and losers stock portfolios.  The 
intercept, 𝛼𝑝  estimates boutique portfolio’s monthly abnormal return. Panel A exhibits all deals, panel B 
exhibits public deals, and panel C exhibits private deals. I include both equal-weighted (EW) and value-
weighted (EW) portfolio returns. P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
  12 Months 24 Months 
Panel A. All Deals EW VW EW VW 
Alpha 0.003 0.006** 0.003* 0.006** 
  (0.130) (0.048) (0.064) (0.042) 
RMRF -0.183*** -0.232*** -0.119*** -0.159** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.004) (0.043) 
SMB 0.075 0.059 -0.022 -0.228* 
  (0.537) (0.695) (0.844) (0.056) 
HML 0.037 -0.056 0.098 -0.094 
  (0.570) (0.676) (0.144) (0.438) 
UMD 0.067 -0.315*** 0.003 -0.187** 
  (0.182) (0.000) (0.956) (0.044) 
Calendar Month 215 215 226 226 
Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.104 0.059 0.087 
Panel B. Public Deals    
Alpha -0.005** -0.002 -0.003 0.004 
  (0.019) (0.630) (0.231) (0.250) 
RMRF -0.301*** -0.057 -0.301*** -0.173* 
  (0.000) (0.591) (0.000) (0.092) 
SMB 0.048 0.187 0.004 -0.188 
  (0.705) (0.257) (0.975) (0.203) 
HML 0.400*** 0.393** 0.231** 0.019 
  (0.000) (0.041) (0.029) (0.911) 
UMD -0.061 -0.389*** -0.126 -0.242** 
  (0.453) (0.000) (0.185) (0.038) 
Calendar Month 214 214 225 225 
Adjusted R-squared 0.207 0.174 0.157 0.067 
Panel C. Private Deals    
Alpha 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.005 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.178) 
RMRF -0.089 -0.199 -0.014 0.007 
  (0.213) (0.106) (0.843) (0.946) 
SMB -0.011 0.407* -0.135 0.187 
  (0.949) (0.086) (0.465) (0.340) 
HML -0.134 -0.483** 0.073 -0.349** 
  (0.151) (0.011) (0.487) (0.020) 
UMD 0.127* -0.057 0.093 0.000 
  (0.050) (0.616) (0.294) (0.998) 
Calendar Month 214 214 226 226 
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.138 0.025 0.059 
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Table 2. 7  Propensity Score Matching (PSM): Cross-industry M&As 
This table exhibits the results from the Propensity Score Matching performed on cross- and same-
industry deals for a sample of U.S. domestic M&As over the period 2000 to 2016. The bidder is 
public while the target includes both public and private firms. Panel A reports logit regression results 
in which the dependent variable is a dummy indicating the choice of boutique over full-service bank. 
Cross-industry is defined as deals in which a bidder operates in a different industry from its target 
based on the first 3-digit SIC code. Industry peers is average use of boutique advisors by industry 
peers computed as the number of boutiques hired by a bidder's industry peers (based on the same 3-
digit SIC code) during the last one year prior to the announcement date over the total number of 
advisors employed by the same group of peers during the same period. The definition of other 
control variables is available in Appendix A. Propensity scores are computed based on the set of 
covariates presented in this table. Panel B displays difference in mean bidder CARs between treated 
(boutique) and control (full-service) group measured by the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATT). Selected deals for the treated and control group are matched based on different 
matching methods: one-to-one Nearest Neighbour matching, five Nearest Neighbour matching, and 
Gaussian Kernel matching. P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and 
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Logit estimation results: Choice of boutique advisor       






Bidder size   -0.472***  -0.451*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book to market   -0.402***  -0.211 
    (0.003)  (0.127) 
Run-up   0.111  -0.076 
    (0.558)  (0.621) 
Volatility   -1.086  -1.632 
    (0.787)  (0.663) 
Public Deals    0.013  0.009 
    (0.893)  (0.932) 
All stock deals   0.095  0.124 
    (0.494)  (0.335) 
Relative size   -0.361***  -0.410*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hostile deals   -0.184  0.370 
    (0.625)  (0.149) 
Leverage   -0.528**  -0.412 
    (0.044)  (0.138) 
Liquidity   0.005  0.029 
    (0.891)  (0.337) 
Industry peers   0.517***  0.094 
    (0.001)  (0.641) 
Constant   2.602***  2.089*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations   1,366  1,508 
Pseudo R2   0.207  0.216 
Industry FE   YES  YES 
Year FE   YES  YES 
Panel B. Boutique client CARs based on PSM       
    
One-to-one 5 Nearest 
Gaussian 
Kernel 
Cross-industry   0.010 0.015* 0.016** 
    (0.347) (0.078) (0.039) 
Same industry   0.014 0.012 0.013 
    (0.181) (0.198) (0.137) 
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Table 2. 8  Propensity Score Matching (PSM): Without Prior Experience 
This table exhibits the results from the Propensity Score Matching performed on acquisitions with and without 
prior experience for a sample of U.S. domestic M&As over the period 2000 to 2016. The bidder is public while 
the target includes both public and private firms. Panel A reports logit regression results in which the dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating the choice of boutique over full-service bank. Without prior experience is 
defined as the number of acquisitions that a bidder has undertaken in the same 3-digit SIC industry as the 
current target during the last 3 years prior to the announcement date. If this is zero, it is considered without 
prior experience whereas greater than zero is classified as with prior experience. Industry peers is average use 
of boutique advisors by industry peers computed as the number of boutiques hired by a bidder's industry peers 
(based on the same 3-digit SIC code) during the last one year prior to the announcement date over the total 
number of advisors employed by the same group of peers during the same period. The definition of other control 
variables is available in Appendix A. Propensity scores are computed based on the set of covariates presented 
in this table. Panel B displays difference in mean bidder CARs between treated (boutique) and control (full-
service) group measured by the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). Selected deals for the treated 
and control group are matched based on different matching methods: one-to-one Nearest Neighbour matching, 
five Nearest Neighbour matching, and Gaussian Kernel matching. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Logit estimation results: Choice of boutique advisor       






Bidder size   -0.437***   -0.553*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Book to market   -0.255**   -0.460 
    (0.014)   (0.121) 
Run-up   0.006   -0.021 
    (0.960)   (0.956) 
Volatility   -0.894   7.455 
    (0.753)   (0.505) 
Public Deals    -0.045   0.246 
    (0.540)   (0.296) 
All stock deals   0.075   0.243 
    (0.437)   (0.421) 
Relative size   -0.366***   -0.475*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Diversifying deals   0.152**   -0.570** 
    (0.018)   (0.013) 
Hostile deals   0.142   0.378 
    (0.550)   (0.427) 
Leverage   -0.597***   -0.141 
    (0.003)   (0.811) 
Liquidity   0.027   -0.237** 
    (0.249)   (0.033) 
Industry peers   0.347**   -0.122 
    (0.011)   (0.788) 
Constant   2.205***   2.473** 
    (0.000)   (0.026) 
Observations   2,406   455 
Pseudo R2   0.197   0.300 
Industry FE   YES   YES 
Year FE   YES   YES 
Panel B. Boutique client CARs based on PSM       
    
One-to-one 5 Nearest 
Gaussian 
Kernel 
Without Prior Experience   0.012 0.013** 0.016*** 
    (0.162) (0.037) (0.006) 
With Prior Experience   0.007 -0.003 0.003 
    (0.691) (0.869) (0.844) 
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Bank Divestiture as 
a Percentage of All 
Industries 
Bank Divestiture as 
a Percentage of 
Financial Services 
Industry 
1980 5 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
1981 110 17 2 1.82% 11.76% 
1982 329 52 16 4.86% 30.77% 
1983 719 98 33 4.59% 33.67% 
1984 782 139 55 7.03% 39.57% 
1985 634 98 42 6.62% 42.86% 
1986 897 141 49 5.46% 34.75% 
1987 764 140 38 4.97% 27.14% 
1988 973 205 77 7.91% 37.56% 
1989 1,279 264 130 10.16% 49.24% 
1990 1,414 398 257 18.18% 64.57% 
1991 1,436 431 267 18.59% 61.95% 
1992 1,488 396 219 14.72% 55.30% 
1993 1,733 398 189 10.91% 47.49% 
1994 1,832 421 238 12.99% 56.53% 
1995 2,085 537 281 13.48% 52.33% 
1996 2,265 446 184 8.12% 41.26% 
1997 2,277 496 140 6.15% 28.23% 
1998 2,303 526 124 5.38% 23.57% 
1999 2,008 436 104 5.18% 23.85% 
2000 1,910 386 96 5.03% 24.87% 
2001 1,788 378 114 6.38% 30.16% 
2002 1,840 376 94 5.11% 25.00% 
2003 2,047 484 102 4.98% 21.07% 
2004 2,011 516 112 5.57% 21.71% 
2005 2,149 611 103 4.79% 16.86% 
2006 2,233 659 101 4.52% 15.33% 
2007 2,210 692 101 4.57% 14.60% 
2008 1,863 544 94 5.05% 17.28% 
2009 1,711 510 139 8.12% 27.25% 
2010 1,718 641 154 8.96% 24.02% 
2011 1,786 679 131 7.33% 19.29% 
2012 1,954 819 117 5.99% 14.29% 
2013 1,940 751 108 5.57% 14.38% 
2014 2,005 846 121 6.03% 14.30% 
2015 1,867 772 88 4.71% 11.40% 
2016 2,004 915 80 3.99% 8.74% 
2017 2,205 1,096 107 4.85% 9.76% 
2018 1,809 895 65 3.59% 7.26% 
2019 1,262 721 52 4.12% 7.21% 
Total 63,645 18,930 4,524 7.11% 23.90% 
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Table 3. 2  Summary Statistics 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the unbalanced panel data (number of banks included in the sample 
fluctuate each year) used to analyse divestiture decision of banks. This sample includes all banks which has or 
has not divested over the period 1980 and 2019. Each bank has only one firm-year observation whether it has 
divested more than once or whether it has not divested. Divestors are the public U.S. domestic banks. N 
represents the total number of observations for each variable. Panel B displays the summary statistics of (1) 
divestor and (2) non-divestor sample. Non-divestors are defined as those which have not divested in a given 
year. For divestors, all accounting variables excluding the loan growth and acquisition variable are generated 
at the end of the fiscal year prior to the divestiture announcement. The difference in means and medians between 
the two samples are measured using t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, respectively. P-values 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel C reports the summary statistics of the cross-sectional data with all 
divestiture transactions with available accounting data for the event study analyses, which means a bank can 
have several firm-year observations within a year unlike the panel data in Panel A. This sample includes only 
firms with divestiture transaction events. The definition of all variables is available in Appendix B. Market 
value is adjusted for inflation. Values are in US $ million. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% level. 
 
Panel A Summary Statistics for the Divestiture Decision 
Model  
            
Variable  N Mean Std 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
Size 23819 25098.4 112279.3 138.1 438.2 1125.6 4167.6 84785.6 
Inefficiency 19034 0.421 0.099 0.267 0.358 0.414 0.475 0.593 
Operating inefficiency 19530 0.029 0.012 0.015 0.022 0.027 0.033 0.050 
Liquidity 23202 0.266 0.123 0.090 0.176 0.252 0.337 0.493 
Leverage 23763 0.092 0.038 0.043 0.068 0.087 0.107 0.163 
Capital 18911 11.901 3.841 6.620 9.380 11.430 13.700 18.900 
Default risk 19324 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.043 
Market-to-book 19571 1.326 0.688 0.364 0.878 1.218 1.660 2.634 
Loan growth 17383 0.454 0.563 -0.187 0.120 0.325 0.639 1.542 
ROA 23805 0.007 0.008 -0.006 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.016 
ROE 23789 0.079 0.112 -0.066 0.056 0.096 0.132 0.185 
Net interest margin 19296 3.798 0.948 2.300 3.220 3.720 4.310 5.460 
Acquisition 27179 0.326 0.469 - - - - - 
       
 
Panel B Summary Statistics of Divestor vs. Non-divestor 





  N Mean 50th N Mean 50th (1) - (2) (1) - (2) 
Size 1099 71937 7711 22720 22832 1052 49104.313*** 6658.757*** 
Inefficiency 771 0.419 0.406 18263 0.421 0.415 -0.002 -0.009* 
Operating inefficiency 773 0.034 0.031 18757 0.029 0.027 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Liquidity 1066 0.254 0.245 22136 0.266 0.253 -0.012** -0.008** 
Leverage 1098 0.080 0.079 22665 0.092 0.087 -0.012*** -0.008*** 
Capital 863 10.494 10.390 18048 11.969 11.500 -1.475*** -1.110*** 
Default risk 884 0.013 0.006 18440 0.012 0.006 0.002*** 0.000*** 
Market-to-book 1047 1.419 1.287 18524 1.321 1.213 0.098*** 0.074*** 
Loan growth 960 0.435 0.303 16423 0.455 0.326 -0.020 -0.023*** 
ROA 1099 0.005 0.008 22706 0.007 0.008 -0.003*** 0.000 
ROE 1098 0.054 0.100 22691 0.080 0.096 -0.026*** 0.004* 
Net interest margin 886 3.710 3.680 18410 3.803 3.720 -0.093** -0.040* 
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Panel C Summary Statistics of Divestiture Transactions for the Event Study Analyses         
  N Mean Std 50th         
Market value 1599 35710.134 70710.377 3358.630         
Tobin's Q 1543 1.052 0.071 1.035         
Total assets 1545 282277.589 617232.642 24698.952         
Deal value 426 261.41 571.697 56.255         
Relative size 425 0.147 0.356 0.027         
Public target 1603 0.011 0.105 -         
Private target 1603 0.003 0.056 -         
Subsidiary target 1603 0.979 0.142 -         
Non-core unit 1603 0.699 0.459 -         
Core unit 1603 0.301 0.459 -         
Related merger 520 0.598 0.491 -         
Unrelated merger 520 0.402 0.491 -         
State 1603 0.455 0.498 -         
Divestiture experience 1603 0.889 1.004 0.693         
% Cash payment 228 93.567 19.433 100.000         














TABLES AND FIGURES 
 164 
Table 3. 3  Fixed-effect Probability Model: Determinants of Divestiture  
This table measures the relation between firm characteristics and banks’ decision to divest based on 
equation (1). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a bank divests in a given year, and 
zero otherwise. Positive performance gap is the value of the Historical aspiration gap if the gap is 
positive, and zero otherwise. Negative performance gap is the absolute value of the Historical 
aspiration gap if the gap is negative, and zero otherwise. Historical aspiration gap is calculated as 
the difference between a bank’s 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1  and the average of 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑡−2, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−3, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−4  as in 
equation (2). Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Operating inefficiency is the 
total noninterest expense over the book value of total assets. Liquidity is sum of cash and due from 
banks total and investment securities over the book value of total assets. Leverage is the book value 
of total common equity over the book value of total assets. Capital is a risk-adjusted tier 1 capital 
ratio. Default risk is nonperforming assets over the book value of total assets. Market-to-book is the 
market value of equity over the book value of equity. Loan growth is an average percentage growth 
in bank loans over the past three years. ROA is net income over the book value of total assets. 
Acquisition is equal to one if a bank has acquired another firm between 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−3 and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+1. All 
the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level excluding the Size variable. The control 
variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions are controlled for year fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. P-values are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: Divest vs. Non-divest       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Positive performance gap     1.4708**   
      (0.0283)   
Negative performance gap       -0.0006 
        (0.9992) 
Size 0.0517*** 0.0392*** 0.0560*** 0.0517*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Operating inefficiency   1.6401***     
    (0.0027)     
Liquidity -0.0279 -0.0069 -0.0180 -0.0279 
  (0.4433) (0.8571) (0.6446) (0.4433) 
Leverage 0.0143 -0.2035 -0.0191 0.0143 
  (0.9127) (0.1956) (0.8942) (0.9137) 
Capital   0.0002     
    (0.8532)     
Default risk   0.4694*     
    (0.0715)     
Market-to-book -0.0107 -0.0165** -0.0071 -0.0107 
  (0.1398) (0.0211) (0.3640) (0.1407) 
Loan growth -0.0116** 0.0001 -0.0127** -0.0116** 
  (0.0309) (0.9895) (0.0457) (0.0331) 
ROA -2.5574*** -1.3953** -2.8647*** -2.5575*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0109) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Acquisition 0.0372*** 0.0154* 0.0410*** 0.0372*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0551) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -0.4646*** -0.1895** -0.4627*** -0.4646*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0457) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Observations 15,252 11,410 13,347 15,252 
Number of firms 1,582 1,376 1,432 1,582 
Within Adj.R-squared 0.0708 0.0194 0.0590 0.0707 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3. 4  Fixed-effect Probability Model: Change in Corporate Scope through 
Mergers & Divestitures 
This table shows the relation between firm characteristics and banks’ decision to change their 
corporate scope. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating banks’ choice between focusing and 
diversifying strategy. Specifically, focusing strategy is equal to one if a bank increases its focus by 
divesting an unrelated asset in a given year and acquiring a related business over the five-year period 
(-3, +1) surrounding the year of divestiture. Diversifying strategy is equal to one if a bank either 
acquires an unrelated business over the five years or concurrently divests assets in a given year. 
Positive performance gap is the value of the Historical aspiration gap if the gap is positive, and zero 
otherwise. Negative performance gap is the absolute value of the Historical aspiration gap if the gap 
is negative, and zero otherwise. Historical aspiration gap is calculated as the difference between a 
bank’s 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 and the average of 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑡−2, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−3, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−4 as in equation (2). Size is the natural 
log of the book value of total assets. Liquidity is sum of cash and due from banks total and investment 
securities over the book value of total assets. Leverage is the book value of total common equity 
over the book value of total assets. Market-to-book is the market value of equity over the book value 
of equity. Loan growth is an average percentage growth in bank loans over the past three years. ROA 
is net income over the book value of total assets. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% level excluding the Size variable. The control variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions 
are controlled for year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 











  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Positive performance gap 6.1859* -6.1056**     
  (0.0536) (0.0444)     
Negative performance gap     -1.9888 0.0409 
      (0.1744) (0.9797) 
Size 0.0366 -0.0069 0.0298 -0.0034 
  (0.4514) (0.8862) (0.5097) (0.9406) 
Liquidity -0.0543 -0.1681 -0.0175 -0.1903 
  (0.7800) (0.3431) (0.9266) (0.2826) 
Leverage -0.0939 -0.2830 -0.0047 -0.3484 
  (0.9171) (0.7529) (0.9957) (0.6911) 
Market-to-book 0.0485* -0.0558** 0.0462* -0.0542** 
  (0.0848) (0.0224) (0.0789) (0.0188) 
Loan growth 0.0398** -0.0517** 0.0314* -0.0413** 
  (0.0405) (0.0111) (0.0846) (0.0322) 
ROA -3.2619* 2.5185* -3.2434* 2.2567 
  (0.0649) (0.0858) (0.0635) (0.1081) 
Constant -0.4380 1.3339*** -0.3998 1.2962*** 
  (0.2074) (0.0001) (0.1880) (0.0000) 
Observations 1,934 1,934 2,091 2,091 
Number of firms 376 376 386 386 
Within Adj.R-squared 0.0933 0.1420 0.0930 0.1352 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3. 5  Logistics Regression: Cross-sectional Analysis of Bank Mergers & 
Divestitures    
This table estimates correlation between banks’ characteristics and the choice of restructuring 
strategy using the cross-sectional transaction-level data. The dependent variable for each model is 
as follows: (1) Non-core unit is a dummy equal to one if a bank divests non-core unit, (2) Focusing 
strategy is a dummy equal to one if a bank implements a divestiture of non-core unit & acquisition 
of related business, (3) Diversifying strategy 1 is a dummy equal to one if a bank implements a 
divestiture of non-core unit & acquisition of unrelated business, and (4) Diversifying strategy 2 is a 
dummy equal to one if a bank implements a divestiture of core unit & acquisition of unrelated 
business. Diversification level is the number of sectors in which a bank operates in measured using 
the first 2-digit SIC codes. Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Operating 
inefficiency is the total noninterest expense over the book value of total assets. Liquidity is sum of 
cash and due from banks total and investment securities over the book value of total assets. Leverage 
is the book value of total common equity over the book value of total assets. Capital is a risk-
adjusted tier 1 capital ratio. Default risk is nonperforming assets over the book value of total assets. 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of total assets (book value of total assets minus book value of total 
common equity plus market value of equity) over the book value of total assets. Loan growth is an 
average percentage growth in bank loans over the past three years. ROA is net income over the book 
value of total assets. Acquisition is equal to one if a bank has acquired another firm between 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−3 
and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+1. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level excluding the Size variable. 
The control variables are defined in Appendix B. Regressions are controlled for year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are adjusted for divesting bank clustering. P-values are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.   
 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Diversification level 0.217 0.920*** -0.831*** -0.768 
  (0.180) (0.003) (0.000) (0.197) 
Size -0.021 -1.018*** 1.224*** 0.248 
  (0.876) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642) 
Operating inefficiency 18.400 -14.293 68.046*** 162.924** 
  (0.444) (0.727) (0.006) (0.042) 
Liquidity 3.105 -2.621 0.073 -14.377 
  (0.294) (0.589) (0.986) (0.191) 
Leverage -16.078 -10.479 -26.870* 55.000* 
  (0.131) (0.678) (0.081) (0.092) 
Capital -0.060 -0.409 0.439** -3.715*** 
  (0.618) (0.177) (0.024) (0.000) 
Default risk 5.318 79.680 103.044 -1,541.323** 
  (0.874) (0.406) (0.123) (0.015) 
Tobin's Q 1.307 8.315 9.687** -10.359 
  (0.646) (0.158) (0.046) (0.322) 
Loan growth -0.055 0.718*** -0.036 -4.219*** 
  (0.750) (0.006) (0.909) (0.009) 
ROA 1.770 -48.015 17.791 186.156 
  (0.956) (0.705) (0.710) (0.104) 
Acquisition 0.610       
  (0.177)       
Constant -1.950 4.341 -29.140*** 51.619*** 
  (0.550) (0.497) (0.000) (0.006) 
Observations 576 344 295 158 
Pseudo R-squared  0.192 0.394 0.304 0.309 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3. 6  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) on the Divestiture 
Announcements 
This table exhibits abnormal returns during the divestiture announcements for 3-day, 5-day, and 11-
day event windows using the sample of bank divestitures that are completed between 1981 and 2019. 
CAR is the divestor’s stock return minus the benchmark portfolio return over the event window. 
The benchmark is estimated using market model over the period beginning -295 days and ending -
45 days before the announcement. Abnormal returns are measured for (1) all divestitures, (2) 
divestitures of non-core unit, (3) divestitures of non-core unit & acquisitions of related business 
(focusing strategy), (4) divestitures of non-core unit & acquisitions of unrelated business 
(diversifying strategy 1), and (5) divestitures of core unit & acquisitions of unrelated business 
(diversifying strategy 2). Panel A includes all banks and Panel B only includes diversified banks 
(banks with more than one operating sector) in the sample. CARs are winsorized at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are adjusted for divesting bank clustering. P-values are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficients. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.   
 
Panel A: All Banks  
  







Window (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
[-1, 1] 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.001 -0.012*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.592) (0.482) (0.007) 
[-2, 2] 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.008* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.784) (0.934) (0.081) 
[-5, 5] 0.006*** 0.004* -0.007* -0.005** -0.011 
  (0.006) (0.082) (0.098) (0.035) (0.252) 
Observations 1,594 1,115 200 159 67 
Panel B: Diversified Banks 
[-1, 1] 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 -0.012** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.594) (0.418) (0.014) 
[-2, 2] 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.000 -0.008 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.792) (0.925) (0.111) 
[-5, 5] 0.005** 0.003 -0.007* -0.005** -0.009 
  (0.023) (0.177) (0.082) (0.042) (0.370) 
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Table 3. 7  OLS Regression: The Effect of Restructuring Strategies on 
Announcement Returns 
This table displays the perception of investors on the (1) divestiture of core unit, (2) focusing 
strategy, (3) diversifying strategy 1, and (4) diversifying strategy 2 measured by the 3-way 
interaction variables. The dependent variable is CAR [-1, +1]. Core unit is a dummy equal to one if 
a divesting bank’s primary 4-digit SIC code is the same as that of its divested unit. Diversified bank 
is a dummy equal to one if a divesting bank operates in more than one industry defined by the 
number of different first 2-digit SIC codes. Non-core unit is a dummy equal to one if a divesting 
bank's primary 4-digit SIC code is different from that of its divested unit. Related merger is a dummy 
equal to one if a divesting bank has acquired a firm with the same first 2-digit SIC code during the 
period 3 years prior to and 1 year after divestiture announcement. Unrelated merger is a dummy 
equal to one if a divesting bank has acquired a firm from an industry with a different first 2-digit 
SIC code during the period 3 years prior to and 1 year after divestiture announcement. Divestiture 
experience is the natural log of one plus divesting bank's number of divestiture experience over the 
last 3 years before the divestiture announcement. Size is the natural log of the book value of total 
assets. Operating inefficiency is the total noninterest expense over the book value of total assets. 
State is a dummy equal to one if a buyer is located in the same state as its seller’s divested unit. 
Liquidity is sum of cash and due from banks total and investment securities over the book value of 
total assets. Capital is a risk-adjusted tier 1 capital ratio. Tobin’s Q is the market value of total assets 
(book value of total assets minus book value of total common equity plus market value of equity) 
over the book value of total assets. Runup is value-weighted excess returns adjusted for market 
returns during the 200-day period (-205, -6) prior to divestiture announcement. All the continuous 
variables and CARs are winsorized at the 1% level excluding the Size variable. The control variables 
are defined in Appendix B. Regressions are controlled for year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for divesting bank clustering. P-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent Variable: CAR [-1, 1]         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Core unit -0.0047**       
  (0.0458)       
Diversified bank*Non-core unit*Related merger   0.0219***     
    (0.0000)     
Diversified bank*Non-core unit*Unrelated merger     0.0087   
      (0.5906)   
Diversified bank*Core unit*Unrelated merger       -0.0143** 
        (0.0474) 
Divestiture experience 0.0034** 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 
  (0.0263) (0.6089) (0.6089) (0.6089) 
Size -0.0033*** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0001) (0.8223) (0.8223) (0.8223) 
State -0.0003 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 
  (0.9024) (0.2440) (0.2440) (0.2440) 
Liquidity -0.0041 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0128 
  (0.6942) (0.3338) (0.3338) (0.3338) 
Leverage -0.0677 -0.0443 -0.0443 -0.0443 
  (0.2807) (0.6973) (0.6973) (0.6973) 
Tobin's Q 0.0044 0.0368 0.0368 0.0368 
  (0.8255) (0.1313) (0.1313) (0.1313) 
Runup 0.0181** 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 
  (0.0179) (0.6116) (0.6116) (0.6116) 
Constant 0.0316 -0.0849*** -0.0705** -0.0625*** 
  (0.1098) (0.0007) (0.0102) (0.0084) 
Observations 1,515 610 610 610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0449 0.0351 0.0351 0.0351 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3. 8  Long-term Stock Performance based on Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARs) 
This table presents average BHARs for banks which performed divestitures. Returns of divesting 
banks are compounded for 12, 24, and 36 months the month after the completion of divestments. To 
get BHARs, I compute the average of the banks’ compound returns and subtract the average 
compound returns of their benchmarks as follows: 
 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏[1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡]
𝑇
𝑡=1





where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is compounded returns of a sample firm i, and 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡  is Fama-French’s 25 
benchmark portfolio returns. Benchmarks are generated by matching size/book-to-market 
breakpoints (BM) of all the NYSE listed banks. The size variable is the price on the last trading date 
of the month multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the divestiture completion 
month. The BM variable is computed as the book value of equity from Compustat bank 
fundamentals annual at the fiscal year ending prior to the divestiture effective date over the market 
value of equity. Both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) returns are reported. The 
weights in VW returns are computed using the market value of equity at the divestiture completion 
month, scaled by the level of the CRSP VW market index in the same month. I calculate both 
standard two-sided p-values and bootstrapped p-values following Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
Bootstrapped p-values are calculated by generating BHARs for 1,000 pseudo-samples which contain 
random banks with the same size/BM category as the sample firms. The p-value is the proportion of 
BHARs from 1,000 pseudo-samples that are greater than the BHAR of the event sample. All returns 
are expressed as percentages.  
 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 











Panel A: All Divestitures 
12 -1.262 0.304 0.007   -2.748 0.000 1.000 
24 1.672 0.396 0.736   -0.134 0.906 0.989 
36 6.698 0.007 0.031   3.412 0.019 0.586 
Panel B: Focusing Strategy 
12 2.094 0.360 0.847   -1.119 0.548 0.003 
24 11.664 0.010 0.293   1.205 0.705 0.966 
36 21.099 0.000 0.193   11.531 0.009 0.805 
Panel C: Diversifying Strategy 1 
12 -2.664 0.275 1.000   -4.709 0.037 0.001 
24 -1.828 0.596 1.000   -1.690 0.545 0.004 
36 1.547 0.783 1.000   -1.328 0.720 0.003 
Panel D: Diversifying Strategy 2 
12 -2.475 0.561 0.562   -0.445 0.899 0.145 
24 -5.299 0.563 0.524   3.935 0.625 0.422 
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Table 3. 9  Long-term Stock Performance based on Calendar-Time Portfolio 
Regressions  
This table presents calendar-time regressions of portfolios formed on banks with divestitures. Panel 
A, Panel B, and Panel C report time-series regressions of 12, 24, and 36 month returns, respectively. 
Each month over the sample period, I form monthly portfolios with banks which enters the event 
within the previous 12, 24, and 36 months. Portfolios are rebalanced every month by including banks 
which enter the event in that month and excluding banks which reach the end of their holding period. 
I compute both EW and VW portfolio returns in which the value weights are the sample firm’s 
market value of equity at the divestiture completion month, scaled by the level of the CRSP VW 
market index in the same month. The portfolio excess returns are calculated by deducting risk-free 
rate within the same month and then regressed against Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
factors as in the following equation:  
 
 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝,𝑡 .  
 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the market excess return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the difference between small and large stock 
portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the difference between high and low book-to-market equity stock portfolios, and 
𝑈𝑀𝐷 is the difference between winners and losers stock portfolios. The intercept, 𝛼𝑝  estimates 
average monthly abnormal returns of the event portfolios. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. All returns are expressed as percentages. 
 
  Equal-Weighted   Value-Weighted 
  Estimate p-Value   Estimate p-Value 
Panel A: 12 Month           
Alpha 0.021 0.925   -0.130 0.570 
Mktret 1.012 0.000   1.263 0.000 
Smb 0.334 0.000   -0.187 0.014 
Hml 1.062 0.000   1.015 0.000 
Umd -0.146 0.003   -0.210 0.000 
Adj. R-squared 0.595     0.647   
Panel B: 24 Month           
Alpha -0.060 0.770   -0.147 0.491 
Mktret 1.035 0.000   1.275 0.000 
Smb 0.311 0.000   -0.164 0.022 
Hml 1.061 0.000   1.032 0.000 
Umd -0.103 0.028   -0.181 0.000 
Adj. R-squared 0.613     0.666   
Panel C: 36 Month           
Alpha -0.055 0.774   -0.175 0.407 
Mktret 1.043 0.000   1.295 0.000 
Smb 0.277 0.000   -0.167 0.019 
Hml 1.028 0.000   1.049 0.000 
Umd -0.109 0.013   -0.193 0.000 











TABLES AND FIGURES 
 171 
Table 4. 1  Distressed firms based on the Z-score during the financial crisis (FY 
2007/08) 
Distress 1 is a dummy equal to one if a firm is distressed based on its Z-score during the financial 
crisis. Distress 2 is a dummy equal to one if a firm enters a distress condition during the financial 
crisis, but not within two years prior to the crisis. No distress is a dummy equal to one if a firm is 
not distressed during the financial crisis based on its Z-score. 
 
  Firm-year observation % of total  
Distress 1 2,010 29.46% 
Distress 2 615 9.01% 
No distress 4,812 70.54% 
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Table 4. 2  Frequency of restructuring strategies performed during the financial 
crisis (FY 2007/08) 
 
Restructuring strategy N % of total   Restructuring strategy N % of strategy 
Panel A All firms       Panel A All firms     
Divestiture 600 8.80%         
Management turnover 676 9.91%   Divestiture/Management turnover 112 16.57% 
Investment reduction 3,927 57.56%   Divestiture/Investment reduction 344 8.76% 
COGS reduction 324 4.75%   Divestiture/COGS reduction 29 8.95% 
Fixed asset reduction 1,687 24.73%   Divestiture/Fixed asset reduction 167 9.90% 
Layoffs 1,204 17.65%   Divestiture/Layoffs 163 13.54% 
Dividend cut/omission 683 10.01%   Divestiture/Dividend cut or omission 56 8.20% 
Debt issue 1,895 28.93%   Divestiture/Debt issue 193 10.18% 
Equity issue 950 15.27%   Divestiture/Equity issue 70 7.37% 
Panel B Distress 1 subsample       Panel B Distress 1 subsample     
Divestiture 192 9.55%         
Management turnover 148 7.36%   Divestiture/Management turnover 32 21.62% 
Investment reduction 1,109 55.17%   Divestiture/Investment reduction 108 9.74% 
COGS reduction 93 4.63%   Divestiture/COGS reduction 8 8.60% 
Fixed asset reduction 829 41.24%   Divestiture/Fixed asset reduction 80 9.65% 
Layoffs 572 28.46%   Divestiture/Layoffs 78 13.64% 
Dividend cut/omission 219 10.90%   Divestiture/Dividend cut or omission 18 8.22% 
Debt issue 592 30.34%   Divestiture/Debt issue 67 11.32% 
Equity issue 499 29.23%   Divestiture/Equity issue 38 7.62% 
Panel C Distress 2 subsample       Panel C Distress 2 subsample     
Divestiture 48 11.46%         
Management turnover 40 9.55%   Divestiture/Management turnover 12 30.00% 
Investment reduction 219 52.27%   Divestiture/Investment reduction 23 10.50% 
COGS reduction 18 4.30%   Divestiture/COGS reduction 1 5.56% 
Fixed asset reduction 180 42.96%   Divestiture/Fixed asset reduction 24 13.33% 
Layoffs 134 31.98%   Divestiture/Layoffs 21 15.67% 
Dividend cut/omission 73 17.42%   Divestiture/Dividend cut or omission 7 9.59% 
Debt issue 158 39.30%   Divestiture/Debt issue 18 11.39% 
Equity issue 91 24.01%   Divestiture/Equity issue 8 8.79% 
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Table 4. 3  Summary statistics (FY 2007/08) 
This table presents summary statistics of distressed (1) and non-distressed firms (2) during the financial crisis. 
Panel A is panel data obtained from COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year of 2007/08. The sample includes all 
public firms with available financial information to generate Z-score and define the distress condition. Divest 
is a dummy equal to one if a firm makes a divestiture announcement during the crisis period and zero, otherwise. 
Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus short-term 
debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short-term investments divided 
by the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating income before depreciation, interest, and 
taxes over the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets. 
Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus 
preferred stock divided by the market value of equity. Panel B is cross-sectional data obtained from SDC with 
all divestitures announced during the fiscal year of 2007/08. The sample only includes public firms with 
available financial information to generate the control variables. LDC is a dummy equal to one if a firm has a 
leverage ratio108 higher than the industry median and a current ratio109 lower than the industry median. Industry 
medians are computed based on CRSP US Common Stocks with Fama-French 48 industry classification. Run-
up is a divesting firm’s market-adjusted value-weighted excess returns measured over the 200-day period (-
205, -6) prior to the divestiture announcement. CAR is measured by 3-day (-1, +1) event window surrounding 
the divestiture announcement date. Core unit is a dummy equal to one if a divesting firm’s primary 4-digit SIC 
code is the same as that of its divested unit. Non-core unit is a dummy equal to one if a divesting firm’s primary 
4-digit SIC code is different from that of its divested unit. Related buyer is a dummy equal to one if the primary 
4-digit SIC code of the buyer is identical with that of the seller’s divested unit. Unrelated buyer is a dummy 
equal to one if the primary 4-digit SIC code of the buyer is different from that of the seller’s divested unit. All 
accounting ratios are generated at the end of the fiscal year prior to a divestiture announcement and winsorized 
at the 1%. All variables are defined in Panel B of Appendix C. The level of significance in mean and median 
difference is based on parametric t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) test, respectively. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.       
 
 Distress firms (1)   Non-distress firms (2) Mean difference Median difference 
  N Mean 50th   N Mean 50th (1) - (2) (1) - (2) 
Panel A: Firm-year data of all listed firms with available financial information for the fiscal year between 2005 and 2012 (COMPUSTAT) 
Divest    2,010  0.096 -      4,812  0.085 - 0.011 0.000 
Size    2,010  5.329 4.909      4,812  6.603 6.538 -1.274*** -1.629*** 
Leverage    2,010  0.305 0.276      4,804  0.173 0.142 0.132*** 0.134*** 
Liquidity    2,010  0.264 0.141      4,812  0.188 0.111 0.076*** 0.030*** 
Cash Flow    1,867  -0.165 -0.016      4,452  0.089 0.091 -0.254*** -0.107*** 
Tobin's Q    2,008  1.986 1.328      4,807  1.758 1.411 0.228*** -0.083 
Book-to-market    1,729  1.491 0.567      4,780  1.497 0.599 -0.005 -0.032*** 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional firm and deal characteristics for firms announced divestiture during the crisis period (SDC) 
Size 252 6.464 6.397   548 8.101 8.092 -1.636*** -1.695*** 
LDC 252 0.786 -   548 0.630 - 0.156*** - 
Liquidity 252 0.166 0.069   548 0.118 0.062 0.048*** 0.007 
Cash Flow 239 -0.080 0.027   519 0.089 0.091 -0.169*** -0.064*** 
Tobin's Q 252 1.593 1.217   547 1.554 1.378 0.039 -0.161** 
Book-to-market 219 1.052 0.601   545 0.744 0.545 0.308*** 0.056 
Run-up 249 0.062 0.020   531 0.030 0.009 0.031 0.011 
CAR (-1, +1) 249 0.017 0.011   531 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.007 
Core unit 251 0.518 -   548 0.400 - 0.118** - 
Non-core unit 251 0.482 -   548 0.600 - -0.118** - 
Related buyer 251 0.466 -   543 0.326 - 0.140*** - 
Unrelated buyer 251 0.534 -   543 0.674 - -0.140*** - 
 
 
108 Leverage ratio is measured by long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by the book value of 
total assets. 
109 Current ratio is measured by current assets divided by current liabilities. 
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Table 4. 4  Change in post-divestiture operating performance 
Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C exhibit performance of divesting firms in the all-firms sample and 
distress 1 and distress 2 subsamples, respectively. I present two operating performance measures: OIBD/Assets 
(operating income before depreciation plus interest income over the book value of total assets) and ROA (net 
income over the book value of total assets). N is the number of divesting and matched firm observations. 
Column 3 and 4 are median changes in operating performance for divesting firms and matched firms, 
respectively. The matching firm is assigned to each divesting firm based on the following algorithm: i) each 
divesting firm is matched with a firm which has not divested for the 6 years surrounding the year of divestiture 
(-3, +3), ii) the matching firm is from the same industry as the divesting firm based on the first 2-digit SIC 
code, iii) the size of the matching firm based on the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to the divestiture announcement is between 25 and 200% of the divesting firm’s size, and iv) the matching firm 
has the closest OIBD to that of the divesting firm. If no matching firm is found with these criteria, I withdraw 
the industry requirement and apply size criterion between 90 and 110% of the divesting firm and closest but 
higher OIBD ratio. Median difference is calculated by deducting matched firms’ performance from that of 
divesting firms to generate matched firm-adjusted performance. Significance levels are computed using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) test for the median performance. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Performance measures N Divesting firms Matched firms Median difference p-value 
Panel A All firms           
OIBD/Assets           
Year -1 to 0 451 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.684 
Year -1 to 1 453 -0.007 -0.010 0.003** 0.028 
Year -1 to 2 447 -0.002 -0.011 0.009*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 431 0.003 -0.005 0.008 0.114 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 431 -0.002 -0.009 0.007*** 0.001 
ROA           
Year -1 to 0 451 -0.005 -0.009 0.004*** 0.007 
Year -1 to 1 453 -0.001 -0.022 0.021*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 2 447 0.007 -0.019 0.026*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 431 0.007 -0.004 0.011*** 0.000 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 431 0.000 -0.017 0.017*** 0.000 
Panel B Distress 1 subsample           
OIBD/Assets           
Year -1 to 0 120 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.183 
Year -1 to 1 121 0.012 -0.005 0.017** 0.012 
Year -1 to 2 118 0.020 -0.002 0.022*** 0.002 
Year -1 to 3 113 0.019 0.007 0.012 0.232 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 113 0.013 0.000 0.013*** 0.009 
ROA           
Year -1 to 0 120 0.011 -0.013 0.024*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 1 121 0.029 -0.015 0.044*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 2 118 0.069 -0.006 0.075*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 113 0.045 0.008 0.037*** 0.000 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 113 0.049 -0.009 0.058*** 0.000 
Panel C Distress 2 subsample           
OIBD/Assets           
Year -1 to 0 44 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009 0.762 
Year -1 to 1 44 0.024 0.011 0.013* 0.082 
Year -1 to 2 44 0.051 0.002 0.049*** 0.004 
Year -1 to 3 43 0.029 0.007 0.022 0.134 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 43 0.020 0.008 0.012** 0.034 
ROA           
Year -1 to 0 44 0.004 -0.019 0.023 0.123 
Year -1 to 1 44 0.091 -0.022 0.113*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 2 44 0.065 -0.023 0.088*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 43 0.071 -0.003 0.074*** 0.000 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 43 0.039 -0.021 0.060*** 0.000 
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Table 4. 5  Change in operating performance for divesting firms with other 
restructurings 
Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C exhibit performance of divesting firms which accompany managerial 
restructuring, operational restructuring, and financial restructuring, respectively. The definition of each 
restructuring strategy is available in Panel A of Appendix A. I present two operating performance measures: 
OIBD/Assets (operating income before depreciation plus interest income over the book value of total assets) 
and ROA (net income over the book value of total assets). N is the number of divesting and matched firm 
observations. Column 3 and 4 are median changes in operating performance for divesting firms and matched 
firms, respectively. The matching firm is assigned to each divesting firm based on the following algorithm: i) 
each divesting firm is matched with a firm which has not divested for the 6 years surrounding the year of 
divestiture (-3, +3), ii) the matching firm is from the same industry as the divesting firm based on the first 2-
digit SIC code, iii) the size of the matching firm based on the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to the divestiture announcement is between 25 and 200% of the divesting firm’s size, and iv) the 
matching firm has the closest OIBD to that of the divesting firm. If no matching firm is found with these criteria, 
I withdraw the industry requirement and apply size criterion between 90 and 110% of the divesting firm and 
closest but higher OIBD ratio. Median difference is calculated by deducting matched firms’ performance from 
that of divesting firms to generate matched firm-adjusted performance. Significance levels are computed using 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) test for the median performance. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Performance measures N Divesting firms Matched firms Median difference p-value 
Panel A Managerial restructuring         
OIBD/Assets           
Year -1 to 0 93 0.005 -0.008 0.013** 0.040 
Year -1 to 1 94 -0.001 -0.014 0.013* 0.052 
Year -1 to 2 94 0.000 -0.008 0.008*** 0.001 
Year -1 to 3 91 0.008 -0.002 0.010 0.375 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 91 0.002 -0.008 0.010** 0.038 
ROA           
Year -1 to 0 93 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.402 
Year -1 to 1 94 0.021 -0.031 0.052*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 2 94 0.040 -0.020 0.060*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 91 0.029 0.003 0.026*** 0.001 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 91 0.013 -0.024 0.037*** 0.000 
Panel B Operational restructuring         
OIBD/Assets           
Year -1 to 0 344 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.530 
Year -1 to 1 345 -0.006 -0.007 0.001** 0.049 
Year -1 to 2 341 -0.001 -0.009 0.008*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 327 0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.327 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 327 -0.001 -0.007 0.006*** 0.008 
ROA           
Year -1 to 0 344 -0.004 -0.009 0.005** 0.032 
Year -1 to 1 345 0.001 -0.024 0.025*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 2 341 0.010 -0.018 0.028*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 327 0.010 -0.003 0.013*** 0.000 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 327 0.002 -0.015 0.017*** 0.000 
Panel C Financial restructuring         
OIBD/Assets           
Year -1 to 0 197 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 0.765 
Year -1 to 1 197 -0.004 -0.017 0.013*** 0.001 
Year -1 to 2 194 0.004 -0.011 0.015*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 185 0.007 -0.005 0.012** 0.031 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 185 0.001 -0.009 0.010*** 0.000 
ROA           
Year -1 to 0 197 -0.011 -0.013 0.002 0.419 
Year -1 to 1 197 0.000 -0.031 0.031*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 2 194 0.003 -0.022 0.025*** 0.000 
Year -1 to 3 185 0.006 -0.006 0.012*** 0.000 
Year -1 to average 1, 2, 3 185 -0.002 -0.017 0.015*** 0.000 
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Table 4. 6  Quantile (median) regressions of post-divestiture operating performance 
Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C compare the operating performance of divesting firms vs. non-
divesting firms using the all-firms sample and distress 1 and distress 2 subsamples, respectively. 
Dependent variables include the change in ROA and OIBD from year -1 to year 1, 2, and 3. Year -
1 is the fiscal year prior to the divestiture announcement for divesting firms. The key independent 
variable is divest which is a dummy equal to one if a firm makes a divestiture announcement during 
the crisis period and zero, otherwise. Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity 
is the ratio of cash and short-term investments divided by the book value of total assets. Cash flow 
is the ratio of operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes over the book value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity 
plus the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets. Book-to-market 
is the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus preferred 
stock divided by the market value of equity. All accounting ratios are generated at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to a divestiture announcement and winsorized at the 1%. All variables are defined 
in Panel B of Appendix C. p-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.     
  
Panel A: All firms              
Dependent variable: ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+2 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+3 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+1 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+2 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Divest 0.0193*** 0.0171*** 0.0138*** 0.0013 0.0085*** 0.0063*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6250) (0.0000) (0.0037) 
Size 0.0010** -0.0002 -0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006* 
  (0.0250) (0.5718) (0.0318) (0.5013) (0.3383) (0.0905) 
Leverage 0.0220*** 0.0266*** 0.0149*** 0.0323*** 0.0367*** 0.0274*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0401*** -0.0371*** -0.0332*** -0.0363*** -0.0257*** -0.0119 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.2142) 
Cash Flow 0.0618*** -0.0537*** -0.1271*** 0.0347*** -0.1157*** -0.1401*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0053) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0108*** 0.0050*** 0.0055*** 0.0087*** 0.0071*** 0.0041*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) 
Book-to-market -0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0002* -0.0005*** 
  (0.2581) (0.9224) (0.1605) (0.0305) (0.0502) (0.0000) 
Constant -0.0520*** -0.0192*** -0.0008 -0.0317*** -0.0177*** -0.0023 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8267) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5464) 
Observations 5,512 5,159 4,829 5,508 5,158 4,827 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0160 0.00735 0.0108 0.0154 0.0136 0.0199 
Panel B: Distress 1             
Divest 0.0498*** 0.0453** 0.0361*** 0.0031 0.0096** 0.0004 
  (0.0067) (0.0384) (0.0002) (0.5237) (0.0485) (0.9177) 
Size -0.0011 -0.0033*** -0.0047*** -0.0042*** -0.0057*** -0.0046*** 
  (0.3097) (0.0087) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Leverage -0.0297** -0.0136 -0.0395*** -0.0085 -0.0123 0.0130 
  (0.0170) (0.2440) (0.0020) (0.4018) (0.2780) (0.1950) 
Liquidity -0.0599 0.0221 0.0007 -0.0308 -0.0290 -0.0029 
  (0.1073) (0.6156) (0.9867) (0.2704) (0.3634) (0.9417) 
Cash Flow 0.1644*** 0.0316 0.0132 0.1607*** 0.0084 -0.0326 
  (0.0000) (0.4626) (0.7699) (0.0000) (0.8109) (0.3381) 
Tobin's Q 0.0168*** 0.0113 0.0160* 0.0141*** 0.0157** 0.0117 
  (0.0013) (0.1606) (0.0889) (0.0000) (0.0117) (0.1415) 
Book-to-market -0.0006*** 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0007*** 
  (0.0003) (0.9770) (0.2260) (0.2294) (0.6677) (0.0002) 
Constant -0.0168 0.0139 0.0401** 0.0172* 0.0382*** 0.0309** 
  (0.2282) (0.4156) (0.0304) (0.0924) (0.0048) (0.0334) 
Observations 1,346 1,177 1,064 1,344 1,177 1,064 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0234 0.00676 0.0127 0.0307 0.0157 0.0161 
Panel C: Distress 2             
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Divest 0.1237** 0.0787*** 0.0711** 0.0276** 0.0554*** 0.0183 
  (0.0132) (0.0047) (0.0401) (0.0188) (0.0018) (0.2578) 
Size 0.0041 0.0003 -0.0031 0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0053** 
  (0.4614) (0.8702) (0.1574) (0.9516) (0.1329) (0.0174) 
Leverage 0.1071** 0.0285 -0.0097 0.0161 -0.0152 0.0196 
  (0.0120) (0.2209) (0.6602) (0.4399) (0.4714) (0.3967) 
Liquidity -0.2121** -0.0851 0.0002 -0.1699*** -0.1579** 0.0087 
  (0.0335) (0.2164) (0.9985) (0.0020) (0.0137) (0.8978) 
Cash Flow -0.0058 -0.0538 0.0646 0.0330 -0.0709 0.0157 
  (0.9380) (0.2344) (0.2228) (0.4956) (0.1513) (0.6964) 
Tobin's Q 0.0104* 0.0021 -0.0057 -0.0024 0.0089 -0.0026 
  (0.0968) (0.7772) (0.2539) (0.7499) (0.2730) (0.6739) 
Book-to-market 0.0016 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0001 
  (0.3149) (0.2442) (0.7985) (0.9169) (0.6045) (0.7249) 
Constant -0.1322*** -0.0284 0.0234 -0.0089 0.0236 0.0366 
  (0.0074) (0.2945) (0.3563) (0.7014) (0.3335) (0.1386) 
Observations 505 454 416 505 454 416 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0572 0.0215 0.0189 0.0424 0.0172 0.00843 
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Table 4. 7  Quantile (median) regressions on operating performance of divesting 
firms with other restructurings 
This table presents regression results on the effectiveness of combined strategies between divestiture 
and other restructurings. Dependent variables include the change in ROA and OIBD from year -1 to 
year 1, 2, and 3. Year -1 is the fiscal year prior to the divestiture announcement for divesting firms. 
Divest * MR is a dummy equal to one if a firm undertakes both divestiture and managerial 
restructuring. Divest * OR is a dummy equal to one if a firm undertakes both divestiture and 
operational restructuring. Divest * FR is a dummy equal to one if a firm undertakes both divestiture 
and financial restructuring. Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity is 
the ratio of cash and short-term investments divided by the book value of total assets. Cash flow is 
the ratio of operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes over the book value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity 
plus the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets. Book-to-market 
is the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus preferred 
stock divided by the market value of equity. All accounting ratios are generated at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to a divestiture announcement and winsorized at the 1%. All variables are defined 
in Panel B of Appendix C. p-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      
 
Panel A: Firms with divestitures & managerial restructurings (MR)         
Dependent variable: ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+2 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+3 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+1 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+2 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Divest * MR 0.0295 0.0410*** 0.0331*** 0.0114*** 0.0153** 0.0150*** 
  (0.1996) (0.0086) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0257) (0.0000) 
Size 0.0013*** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.0086) (0.6929) (0.4464) (0.3116) (0.5590) (0.4279) 
Leverage 0.0224*** 0.0274*** 0.0118*** 0.0323*** 0.0350*** 0.0274*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0393*** -0.0398*** -0.0339*** -0.0360*** -0.0289*** -0.0129 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.1951) 
Cash Flow 0.0662*** -0.0472*** -0.1310*** 0.0398*** -0.1084*** -0.1523*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0051) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0112*** 0.0063*** 0.0064*** 0.0091*** 0.0076*** 0.0055*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Book-to-market -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0002** -0.0005*** 
  (0.1365) (0.9243) (0.3000) (0.0333) (0.0119) (0.0001) 
Constant -0.0553*** -0.0239*** -0.0049** -0.0337*** -0.0188*** -0.0050 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0473) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2562) 
Observations 5,154 4,831 4,520 5,150 4,830 4,518 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0172 0.00705 0.0109 0.0178 0.0124 0.0205 
Panel B: Firms with divestitures & operational restructurings (OR)         
Divest * OR 0.0219*** 0.0174*** 0.0177*** 0.0017 0.0096*** 0.0077** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4189) (0.0002) (0.0147) 
Size 0.0011** -0.0000 -0.0006** 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0006 
  (0.0172) (0.8959) (0.0410) (0.3097) (0.4328) (0.1211) 
Leverage 0.0222*** 0.0264*** 0.0133*** 0.0322*** 0.0372*** 0.0278*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0394*** -0.0368*** -0.0344*** -0.0357*** -0.0258*** -0.0111 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0025) (0.2594) 
Cash Flow 0.0635*** -0.0551*** -0.1277*** 0.0373*** -0.1156*** -0.1375*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0107*** 0.0053*** 0.0055*** 0.0088*** 0.0071*** 0.0040*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009) 
Book-to-market -0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0002** -0.0005*** 
  (0.2553) (0.8219) (0.3118) (0.0238) (0.0458) (0.0002) 
Constant -0.0525*** -0.0206*** -0.0007 -0.0328*** -0.0181*** -0.0024 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8512) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5629) 
Observations 5,403 5,057 4,731 5,399 5,056 4,729 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.0161 0.00673 0.0108 0.0157 0.0133 0.0194 
Panel C: Firms with divestitures & financial restructurings (FR)         
Divest * FR 0.0170*** 0.0138*** 0.0107*** 0.0018 0.0125*** 0.0123*** 
  (0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0051) (0.2774) (0.0001) (0.0021) 
Size 0.0013*** 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006* 
  (0.0047) (0.6541) (0.3982) (0.4844) (0.4068) (0.0903) 
Leverage 0.0201*** 0.0254*** 0.0123*** 0.0322*** 0.0338*** 0.0279*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0426*** -0.0413*** -0.0349*** -0.0388*** -0.0301*** -0.0118 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.2285) 
Cash Flow 0.0608*** -0.0482*** -0.1238*** 0.0366*** -0.1136*** -0.1358*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0113*** 0.0056*** 0.0056*** 0.0091*** 0.0077*** 0.0048*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) 
Book-to-market -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0002*** -0.0005*** 
  (0.1265) (0.8879) (0.4118) (0.0797) (0.0003) (0.0022) 
Constant -0.0541*** -0.0219*** -0.0035 -0.0322*** -0.0174*** -0.0033 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3036) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4417) 
Observations 5,262 4,926 4,608 5,258 4,925 4,606 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0168 0.00640 0.00979 0.0168 0.0132 0.0193 
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Table 4. 8  Quantile (median) regressions of post-restructuring operating 
performance 
This table presents regression results on the effectiveness of other restructuring strategies without 
divestiture. Dependent variables include the change in ROA and OIBD from year -1 to year 1, 2, 
and 3. MR is a dummy equal to one if a firm undertakes managerial restructuring (management 
turnover). OR is a dummy equal to one if a firm undertakes operational restructuring (investment 
reduction, COGS reduction, fixed asset reduction, and layoffs). FR is a dummy equal to one if a 
firm undertakes financial restructuring (dividend cut/omission, debt issue, and equity issue). Size is 
the natural log of the book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus short-
term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments divided by the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation, interest, and taxes over the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus the market value of common 
equity divided by the book value of total assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of 
equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus preferred stock divided by the market 
value of equity. All accounting ratios are generated at the end of the fiscal year prior to a divestiture 
announcement and winsorized at the 1%. All variables are defined in Panel B of Appendix C. p-
values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.      
 
Panel A: Firms with managerial restructurings (MR)   
Dependent variable: ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+2 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+3 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+1 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+2 ∆𝑂𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑡+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR -0.0042 -0.0015 0.0052*** -0.0002 -0.0023 0.0019 
  (0.3054) (0.4139) (0.0002) (0.9473) (0.4252) (0.3886) 
Size 0.0015*** 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  (0.0008) (0.2258) (0.2161) (0.6840) (0.3557) (0.4733) 
Leverage 0.0200*** 0.0255*** 0.0119*** 0.0320*** 0.0355*** 0.0276*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0429*** -0.0408*** -0.0343*** -0.0393*** -0.0287*** -0.0096 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.3314) 
Cash Flow 0.0606*** -0.0455*** -0.1248*** 0.0354*** -0.1127*** -0.1382*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0051) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0107*** 0.0051*** 0.0053*** 0.0088*** 0.0073*** 0.0040*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0023) 
Book-to-market -0.0003 -0.0001*** 0.0001 -0.0005* -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
  (0.1577) (0.0069) (0.3783) (0.0924) (0.0016) (0.0000) 
Constant -0.0528*** -0.0219*** -0.0028 -0.0308*** -0.0170*** -0.0044 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3854) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2915) 
Observations 5,423 5,072 4,746 5,419 5,071 4,744 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0155 0.00540 0.00931 0.0161 0.0124 0.0188 
Panel B: Firms with operational restructurings (OR)         
OR -0.0070*** -0.0049*** -0.0036*** -0.0052*** -0.0066*** -0.0047*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0025) 
Size 0.0014*** 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0005 
  (0.0000) (0.2189) (0.6961) (0.9275) (0.5219) (0.2361) 
Leverage 0.0198*** 0.0237*** 0.0109*** 0.0306*** 0.0338*** 0.0276*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0048) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0446*** -0.0399*** -0.0349*** -0.0388*** -0.0280*** -0.0129 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.1978) 
Cash Flow 0.0606*** -0.0427*** -0.1277*** 0.0372*** -0.1071*** -0.1487*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0049) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0117*** 0.0056*** 0.0063*** 0.0093*** 0.0072*** 0.0057*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Book-to-market -0.0003* -0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0003*** -0.0004** 
  (0.0539) (0.0198) (0.7589) (0.0404) (0.0024) (0.0217) 
Constant -0.0495*** -0.0204*** -0.0022 -0.0270*** -0.0136*** -0.0014 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5201) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.7572) 
Observations 5,174 4,846 4,535 5,170 4,845 4,533 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.0178 0.00599 0.00989 0.0185 0.0125 0.0199 
Panel C: Firms with financial restructurings (FR)           
FR -0.0207*** -0.0170*** -0.0146*** -0.0176*** -0.0145*** -0.0113*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Size 0.0009* 0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 
  (0.0515) (0.6676) (0.0871) (0.6342) (0.9357) (0.3854) 
Leverage 0.0368*** 0.0335*** 0.0181*** 0.0397*** 0.0414*** 0.0320*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -0.0458*** -0.0381*** -0.0350*** -0.0393*** -0.0275*** -0.0151 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.1375) 
Cash Flow 0.0529*** -0.0506*** -0.1250*** 0.0320** -0.1058*** -0.1542*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0183) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.0115*** 0.0062*** 0.0066*** 0.0097*** 0.0075*** 0.0055*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Book-to-market -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** 
  (0.1776) (0.8233) (0.6592) (0.0001) (0.0057) (0.0000) 
Constant -0.0447*** -0.0181*** 0.0015 -0.0249*** -0.0163*** -0.0008 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6700) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8669) 
Observations 5,315 4,977 4,658 5,311 4,976 4,656 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0210 0.00987 0.0140 0.0233 0.0162 0.0228 
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Table 4. 9  Effectiveness of divestiture in long-term recovery from financial distress 
based on the change in Z-score 
This table estimates the change in Z-score from year -1 to year 1, 2, and 3 after each restructuring 
strategy using a sample of distressed firms. Divest is a dummy equal to one if a firm makes a 
divestiture announcement during the crisis period and zero, otherwise. MR is a dummy equal to one 
if a firm undertakes managerial restructuring (management turnover). OR is a dummy equal to one 
if a firm undertakes operational restructuring (investment reduction, COGS reduction, fixed asset 
reduction, and layoffs). FR is a dummy equal to one if a firm undertakes financial restructuring 
(dividend cut/omission, debt issue, and equity issue). Size is the natural log of the book value of total 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by the book value of total 
assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short-term investments divided by the book value of total 
assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes over the 
book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus book value 
of common equity plus the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets. 
Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
minus preferred stock divided by the market value of equity. All accounting ratios are generated at 
the end of the fiscal year prior to a divestiture announcement and winsorized at the 1%. All variables 
are defined in Panel B of Appendix C. p-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      
 
Panel A: Firms with divestitures (AR)     
Dependent variable: ∆𝑍𝑡+1 ∆𝑍𝑡+2 ∆𝑍𝑡+3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Divest 0.5214*** 0.4012*** 0.5923** 
  (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0335) 
Size 0.0488* 0.0402 -0.0150 
  (0.0600) (0.2706) (0.6387) 
Leverage -0.0068 -0.3519 -1.3404*** 
  (0.9817) (0.3654) (0.0014) 
Liquidity -2.6605*** -3.1928** -2.6477* 
  (0.0076) (0.0322) (0.0766) 
Cash Flow 16.8441*** 14.4459*** 14.8861*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.8912*** 0.8584*** 0.7073*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Book-to-market -0.0453*** -0.0302* -0.0320*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0983) (0.0000) 
Constant -2.6753*** -2.1699*** -1.0001* 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0598) 
Observations 1,341 1,169 1,057 
Pseudo R-squared 0.167 0.101 0.0806 
Panel B: Firms with managerial restructurings (MR)   
MR -0.4496*** -0.2313 -0.5056** 
  (0.0096) (0.5847) (0.0246) 
Size 0.0522* 0.0504 0.0080 
  (0.0665) (0.1376) (0.8335) 
Leverage 0.1765 -0.1808 -1.2528*** 
  (0.5639) (0.6160) (0.0033) 
Liquidity -2.7982*** -3.0909** -2.3559 
  (0.0062) (0.0378) (0.1002) 
Cash Flow 16.9254*** 14.4490*** 14.6931*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.9849*** 0.8557*** 0.7701*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Book-to-market -0.0489*** -0.0331*** -0.0367** 
  (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0120) 
Constant -2.8136*** -2.2791*** -1.2376** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0162) 
Observations 1,317 1,146 1,034 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.168 0.101 0.0804 
Panel C: Firms with operational restructurings (OR)   
OR -0.4999*** -0.4048*** 0.1031 
  (0.0001) (0.0051) (0.4698) 
Size 0.0542 0.0501 -0.0074 
  (0.1643) (0.2787) (0.8694) 
Leverage -0.2312 -0.5840 -1.4895*** 
  (0.5232) (0.1476) (0.0012) 
Liquidity -2.6878** -3.1080* -2.3252 
  (0.0167) (0.0510) (0.1356) 
Cash Flow 16.9366*** 15.6108*** 15.7427*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.9064*** 0.9229*** 0.7751*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Book-to-market -0.0458*** -0.0465*** -0.0285 
  (0.0096) (0.0013) (0.2242) 
Constant -2.2634*** -1.9410*** -1.2286** 
  (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0381) 
Observations 1,256 1,095 987 
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 0.109 0.0843 
Panel D: Firms with financial restructurings (FR)     
 FR -0.0476 -0.1678 0.1306 
  (0.7009) (0.3203) (0.3651) 
Size 0.0522* 0.0402 -0.0223 
  (0.0806) (0.4145) (0.4135) 
Leverage -0.2654 -0.5016 -1.6900*** 
  (0.4914) (0.2908) (0.0000) 
Liquidity -2.6518** -2.6956* -2.4314 
  (0.0132) (0.0862) (0.1370) 
Cash Flow 17.1958*** 15.9784*** 16.1232*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tobin's Q 0.8754*** 0.8715*** 0.7260*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) 
Book-to-market -0.0489*** -0.0390*** -0.0325** 
  (0.0028) (0.0006) (0.0314) 
Constant -2.5327*** -2.0955*** -0.9566** 
  (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0377) 
Observations 1,284 1,119 1,010 
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.109 0.0852 
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Table 4. 10  Comparison of the leverage and segment investment ratio for divesting 
vs. non-divesting firms during the financial crisis 
This table shows the comparison of mean and median leverage and segment investment ratio. Panel 
A presents the leverage ratio of divesting firms, non-divesting firms, and firms with financial 
restructuring (FR) in year t-1 and year t+1. Leverage is measured by long-term debt plus short-term 
debt over the book value of total assets. Panel B presents the segment investment ratio of divesting 
firms, non-divesting firms, and firms with operational restructuring (OR) in year t-1 and year t+1. 
Segment investment ratio is computed as capital expenditures divided by sales using the data 
obtained from the Compustat Historical Segments file. For divesting firms, I only analyze retained 
segments to show how the investment policy has changed for the remaining divisions pre- and post-
divestiture. The p-values are generated using Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) test.  
 
Panel A. Leverage ratio                   
  Year t - 1   Year t + 1     
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median Median difference p-value 
Divesting firms 574 0.264 0.244   530 0.267 0.238 -0.006 0.756 
Non-divesting firms 5,798 0.187 0.133   5,307 0.204 0.153 0.020 0.000 
Firms with FR 2,874 0.228 0.201   2,708 0.283 0.257 0.056 0.000 
Panel B. Segment investment ratio  
  Year t - 1   Year t + 1     
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median Median difference p-value 
Divesting firms 98 0.081 0.034   98 0.076 0.032 -0.002 0.143 
Non-divesting firms 4,250 0.125 0.039   3,924 0.092 0.031 -0.008 0.000 
Firms with OR 4,989 0.127 0.036   4,621 0.101 0.029 -0.007 0.000 
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Table 4. 11  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding divestiture 
announcements during the financial crisis 
This table presents univariate analyses of average 3-day (-1, +1) announcement returns for distressed 
and non-distressed firms. Model (1) includes all divestitures in my sample and model (2), (3), (4), 
and (5) involve divestitures of core unit, divestitures of non-core unit, related buyer, and unrelated 
buyer subsamples, respectively. CAR is generated using the divestor's stock return minus the 
benchmark portfolio return over the event window. Benchmark returns are estimated using the 
market model over the period beginning -295 days and ending -45 days before the announcement. 
p-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
 CAR [-1, 1] All Core unit Non-core unit Related buyer Unrelated buyer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Distressed firms 0.017** 0.017 0.018* 0.027* 0.009 
  (0.029) (0.166) (0.064) (0.058) (0.234) 
Non-distressed firms 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.009 0.015*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.117) (0.000) 
Difference 0.004 -0.000 0.007 0.018 -0.006 
  (0.621) (0.978) (0.471) (0.233) (0.462) 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 186 
Table 4. 12  Multivariate OLS regressions of divestiture announcement returns 
during the financial crisis 
This table presents multivariate OLS regression analyses of divestiture announcement returns during 
the financial crisis. Each model specification involves different subsamples: (1) – (2) all divestitures, 
(3) – (4) divestiture of core unit, (5) – (6) divestiture of non-core unit, (7) – (8) related buyer 
(industry buyer), and (9) – (10) unrelated buyer (non-industry buyer). The dependent variable is 3-
day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding the divestiture announcement date. Distress 1 
is a dummy equal to one if a firm is distressed based on its Z-score during the financial crisis. 
Distress 2 is a dummy equal to one if a firm enters a distress condition during the financial crisis, 
but not within two years prior to the crisis. Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. 
Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short-term investments divided by the book value of total assets. 
Cash flow is the ratio of operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes over the book 
value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the book value of total assets minus book value of 
common equity plus the market value of common equity divided by the book value of total assets. 
Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
minus preferred stock divided by the market value of equity. Run-up is a divesting firm’s market-
adjusted value-weighted excess returns measured over the 200-day period (-205, -6) prior to the 
divestiture announcement. All accounting ratios are generated at the end of the fiscal year prior to a 
divestiture announcement and winsorized at the 1%. I control for industry fixed effects using Fama-
French’s 48 industry classification and use robust standard errors in all regression analyses. All 
variables are defined in Panel B of Appendix C. p-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      
 
CAR [-1, 1] All Core unit Non-core unit Related buyer Unrelated buyer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Distress 1 0.001  -0.003  -0.002  0.005  -0.002  
  (0.908)  (0.864)  (0.887)  (0.738)  (0.794)  
Distress 2  0.027*  0.030  0.013  0.051*  0.008 
   (0.071)  (0.143)  (0.531)  (0.054)  (0.560) 
Size -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.251) (0.224) (0.819) (0.790) (0.212) (0.193) (0.966) (0.845) (0.175) (0.191) 
Liquidity -0.038 -0.034 -0.062 -0.052 -0.024 -0.022 -0.027 -0.004 -0.038 -0.038 
  (0.195) (0.250) (0.168) (0.247) (0.557) (0.582) (0.583) (0.935) (0.254) (0.256) 
Cash flow -0.027 -0.015 -0.077 -0.062 -0.054 -0.044 -0.069 -0.040 -0.044 -0.036 
  (0.510) (0.694) (0.172) (0.235) (0.168) (0.269) (0.156) (0.396) (0.366) (0.423) 
Tobin's Q -0.011** -0.011** -0.016** -0.017** -0.001 -0.002 -0.013 -0.016** -0.013* -0.013* 
  (0.039) (0.025) (0.041) (0.026) (0.837) (0.797) (0.114) (0.045) (0.056) (0.056) 
Book-to-market 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.012 0.011 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.820) (0.977) (0.933) (0.726) (0.429) (0.476) (0.775) (0.853) (0.323) (0.317) 
Run-up -0.023 -0.022 -0.005 0.000 -0.044** -0.044** -0.028 -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 
  (0.114) (0.137) (0.825) (0.998) (0.046) (0.042) (0.302) (0.443) (0.253) (0.251) 
Constant 0.067** 0.067** 0.062 0.061 0.042 0.041 0.078* 0.092** 0.080*** 0.078** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.261) (0.268) (0.143) (0.145) (0.075) (0.034) (0.010) (0.014) 
Observations 701 701 301 301 399 399 262 262 445 445 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.017 0.027 0.050 0.067 0.044 0.046 0.091 0.124 0.039 0.040 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 4. 13  Heckman’s two-step model: Selection bias and announcement returns 
during the financial crisis 
This table exhibits results based on Heckman’s two-step procedure which involves correction of 
selection bias. The first step estimates divestiture decision model using probit regression analysis. 
The dependent variable in the first stage model is divest, a dummy equal to one if a firm announces 
a divestiture during the crisis period and zero, otherwise. The second step involves OLS regression 
analysis of divestiture performance based on 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding 
the divestiture announcements. Distress is a dummy equal to one if a firm is distressed based on its 
Z-score during the financial crisis. Size is the natural log of the book value of total assets. LDC is a 
dummy equal to one if a firm has a leverage ratio higher than the industry median and a current ratio 
lower than the industry median. Industry medians are computed based on CRSP US Common Stocks 
with Fama-French’s 48 industry classification. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments divided by the book value of total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation, interest, and taxes over the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the book value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus the market value of common 
equity divided by the book value of total assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of 
equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus preferred stock divided by the market 
value of equity. Run-up is a divesting firm’s market-adjusted value-weighted excess returns 
measured over the 200-day period (-205, -6) prior to the divestiture announcement. LAMBDA is 
unobservable bias which is not captured by the rest of the control variables and is estimated in the 
selection model. I control for industry fixed effects using Fama-French’s 48 industry classification 
and use robust standard errors in the second stage regression analyses. All variables are defined in 
Panel B of Appendix C. p-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.      
 
  All Core unit Non-core unit Related buyer Unrelated buyer 
  Divest CAR Divest CAR Divest CAR Divest CAR Divest CAR 
Distress 0.172*** 0.009 0.164** -0.007 0.172** -0.007 0.199** -0.006 0.132* -0.013 
  (0.006) (0.508) (0.039) (0.743) (0.026) (0.769) (0.014) (0.848) (0.079) (0.402) 
Size 0.215*** 0.007 0.173*** 0.004 0.225*** -0.012 0.160*** -0.010 0.231*** -0.010 
  (0.000) (0.620) (0.000) (0.789) (0.000) (0.636) (0.000) (0.608) (0.000) (0.576) 
LDC 0.139***   0.178***   0.081   0.134*   0.119**   
  (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.184)   (0.053)   (0.044)   
Liquidity   -0.043   -0.043   -0.015   -0.004   -0.019 
    (0.139)   (0.315)   (0.715)   (0.914)   (0.572) 
Cash flow -0.781*** -0.080 -0.838*** -0.075 -0.538** -0.037 -0.725*** -0.018 -0.724*** -0.036 
  (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.414) (0.011) (0.634) (0.001) (0.847) (0.000) (0.631) 
Tobin's Q -0.154*** -0.016 -0.170*** -0.020 -0.136*** 0.007 -0.147*** -0.006 -0.151*** -0.006 
  (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000) (0.676) (0.000) (0.767) (0.000) (0.638) 
Book-to-market -0.124*** -0.005 -0.085*** -0.008 -0.159*** 0.018 -0.075*** 0.002 -0.177*** -0.002 
  (0.000) (0.621) (0.000) (0.395) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.862) (0.000) (0.922) 
Run-up   -0.019   -0.003   -0.046**   -0.028   -0.012 
    (0.215)   (0.888)   (0.035)   (0.318)   (0.420) 
LAMBDA   0.052   0.033   -0.052   -0.045   -0.045 
    (0.527)   (0.743)   (0.707)   (0.742)   (0.623) 
Constant -2.395*** -0.025 -2.300*** -0.046 -2.478*** 0.215 -2.362*** 0.263 -2.816*** 0.235 
  (0.000) (0.906) (0.000) (0.869) (0.000) (0.566) (0.000) (0.475) (0.000) (0.393) 
Observations 6,098 700 5,501 301 5,671 398 5,499 255 5,751 439 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.135 0.067 0.129 0.115 0.137 0.093 0.118 0.179 0.142 0.058 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Figure 2. 3  Propensity Score Matching Quality 
The following figures display similarity of matched deals between boutique and full-service based 
on PSM. Both box graph and line chart show that the characteristics of covariates (firm and deal 














Appendix A  Variable Definition 
Variable Name Description 
Bidder size Acquirer market value of equity (US $ million) 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement from CRSP. 
Book-to-market Book value of equity at the fiscal year end prior to the announcement 
(COMPUSTAT) divided by bidder market value of equity 4 weeks prior to 
the announcement (CRSP). 
Run-up Acquirer’s value weighted market-adjusted excess return during the 200-
day period (-205, -6) prior to the acquisition announcement (CRSP).  
Volatility Standard deviation of acquirer daily stock returns (market-adjusted) 
between 205 and 6 days prior to the announcement date from CRSP.  
Leverage Acquirer’s total debt divided by total assets at the fiscal year end prior to 
the announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
Liquidity Acquirer’s cash divided by current liabilities at the fiscal year end prior to 
the announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
Deal value The transaction value in US $ million reported by SDC. 
Relative size Deal value from SDC divided by the bidder’s market value of equity 4 
weeks prior to the announcement from CRSP. 
Tender offers  A dummy which takes the value of one when the acquisition technique 
includes tender offer from SDC. 
Public deals A dummy which takes the value of one when the target firm’s public status 
is public from SDC. 
Private deals A dummy which takes the value of one when the target firm’s public status 
is private from SDC. 
Diversifying deals A dummy which takes the value of one if the first 2-digits of the bidder’s 
SIC code do not match those of the target’s SIC code and zero, otherwise. 
Hostile deals A dummy which takes the value of one when the acquisition method is 
hostile from SDC. 
All cash A dummy which takes the value of one if 100% of the transaction was paid 
by cash from SDC. 
All stock A dummy which takes the value of one if 100% of the transaction was paid 
by stock from SDC. 
Mixed payments A dummy which takes the value of one if the transaction was paid by both 
cash and stock from SDC. 
Premium The SDC percentage deal premium 4 weeks prior to the acquisition 
announcement, which is winsorized between 0 and 2 as in Officer (2003).  
CAR (-1, +1) The bidder’s value-weighted 3-day cumulative abnormal return around the 
announcement date. The CAR is generated using the bidder’s stock return 
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minus the benchmark portfolio return over the event window. The 
benchmark is estimated using market model over the period beginning -
295 days and ending -45 days before the announcement.  
Prior advisor A dummy variable which is equal to one if a bank was the bidder’s previous 
M&A advisor in the past five years.  
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Appendix B  Variable Definition  
Control variables Definition from Compustat Bank Fundamentals Annual 
Size The natural log of the book value of divesting bank's total assets (AT) at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Inefficiency The ratio of divesting bank's sum of staff expense total (XLR) and occupancy 
expense of bank premises net (OEBPN) over sum of net interest income (NIINT) 




The ratio of divesting bank's expense noninterest total (bank) (XNITB) over the book 
value of total assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year prior to divestiture 
announcement. 
Liquidity The ratio of divesting bank's sum of cash and due from banks total (CDBT) and 
investment securities total (IST) over the book value of total assets (AT) at the end 
of the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Leverage Financial leverage measured by divesting bank's proportion of common/ordinary 
equity total (CEQ) to the book value of total assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to divestiture announcement. 
Capital Divesting bank's risk-adjusted capital ratio - tier 1 (CAPR1) at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to divestiture announcement. Tier 1 capital is calculated as equity capital 
plus minority interests less portion of perpetual preferred stock and goodwill as a 
percent of adjusted risk-weighted assets. Regulatory minimum is four percent. 
Default risk Nonperforming assets (NPAT) divided by the book value of total assets (AT).  
Asset growth Divesting bank's change in book value of total assets (AT) from one year before the 
end of the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Market-to-book The risk evaluation of the equity markets measured by the market value of equity 
over the book value of equity. 
Loan growth An average percentage growth in bank loans (LNTAL) over the past 3 years before 
the end of the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Loan losses The ratio of divesting bank's provision credit losses (income account) (PCL) over 
loans net of total allowance for loan losses (LNTAL) at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to divestiture announcement. 
Return on asset 
(ROA) 
The ratio of divesting bank's net income (loss) (NI) over the book value of total assets 
(AT) at the end of the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Return on equity 
(ROE) 
The ratio of divesting bank's net income (loss) (NI) over stockholders equity parent 
(SEQ) at the end of the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Net interest margin 
(NIM) 
Divesting bank's net interest margin (NIM) or the ratio of divesting bank's net 
interest income (NIINT) (computed by total interest income minus total interest 
expense) over the book value of total assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to divestiture announcement. 
Change in ROA Divesting bank's ROA 1, 2, and 3 years after a divestiture minus ROA at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Change in ROE Divesting bank's ROE 1, 2, and 3 years after a divestiture minus ROE at the end of 
the fiscal year prior to divestiture announcement. 
Historical aspiration 
gap 




The value of the Historical aspiration gap if the gap is positive, and zero otherwise. 
Negative 
performance gap 
The absolute value of the Historical aspiration gap if the gap is negative, and zero 
otherwise. 
  Definition from SDC Mergers & Acquisitions Database 
Divest A dummy equal to one if a bank divested.  
Past M&A A dummy equal to one if a bank has performed M&A in the past three years. 
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Future M&A A dummy equal to one if a bank has performed M&A in the next three years after 
divestiture. announcement date 
Diversification 
level 
The degree of divesting bank's diversification based on the number of different first 
2-digit SIC codes in which the bank operates in. 
Diversification A dummy equal to one if a divesting bank operates in more than one industry defined 
by the number of different first 2-digit SIC codes. 
Non-core unit A dummy equal to one if divesting bank's primary 4-digit SIC code is different from 
that of its divested unit.  
Distant unit A dummy equal to one if a divesting bank's headquarter is located in a different state 
from that of its divested unit. 
Related buyer A dummy equal to one if the primary 4-digit SIC code of buyer is identical with that 
of divested unit.  
Related merger A dummy equal to one if divesting bank has acquired a firm with the same first 2-
digit SIC code during the period 3 years prior to and 1 year after divestiture 
announcement. 
All seller A dummy equal to one if a bank divested.  
Focusing seller A dummy equal to one if divesting bank is diversified and acquired related business 
and divested non-core unit. 
Divestiture 
experience 
The natural log of one plus divesting bank's number of divestiture experience over 
the last 3 years before the divestiture announcement. 
State A dummy equal to one if a buyer is located in the same state as its seller's divested 
unit.   
  Definition from CRSP Daily Stock File 
Tobin's Q The ratio of divesting bank's market value of total assets (book value of total assets 
(AT) minus common/ordinary equity total (CEQ) plus market value of equity) over 
the book value of total assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year prior to divestiture 
announcement. 
Runup Divesting bank's value weighted and market-adjusted excess return during the 200-
day period (-205, -6) prior to divestiture announcement. 
CAR Divesting bank's value weighted 3-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return around 
divestiture announcement date. CAR is generated using the divestor's stock return 
minus the benchmark portfolio return over the event window. The benchmark is 
estimated using market model over the period beginning -295 days and ending -45 
days before the announcement. 
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Appendix C  Variable definition 
Panel A Variables for restructuring strategies 
Asset restructuring (AR) Divest A dummy equal to one if a firm divested (SDC divestiture 
announcements) during the crisis period (fiscal year 2007 
and 2008). 
Managerial restructuring (MR) Management turnover  A dummy equal to one if a firm replaced its CEO and/or 
top-tier managers during the crisis period. Management is 
considered replaced when executives leave the firm in year 
t or year t+1 (COMPUSTAT Execucomp item LEFTCO) 
and the reason for a departure (COMPUSTAT Execucomp 
item REASON) is not 'DECEASED' or 'RETIRED'. 
Operational restructuring (OR) Investment reduction A dummy equal to one if the firm experienced more than 
15% reduction in investment activities (COMPUSTAT 
item IVNCF) from year t−1 to year t or t + 1 over the crisis 
period. 
  COGS reduction A dummy equal to one if a firm's COGS (scaled by sales) 
is above the industry median in year t−1 but falls to the 
bottom quartile in year t or year t + 1 (COMPUSTAT item 
COGS/SALE) over the crisis period. 
  Fixed asset reduction A dummy equal to one if fixed assets of a firm 
(COMPUSTAT item PPENT) fall more than 15% between 
year t−1 and year t or year t + 1 over the crisis period. 
  Layoffs A dummy equal to one if more than 20% of employees 
have been reduced (COMPUSTAT item EMP) between 
year t−1 and year t or t+1 over the crisis period.  
Financial restructuring (FR) Dividend cut/omission A dummy equal to one if a firm experienced more than a 
25% decrease in dividends paid between year t−1 and year 
t or t + 1 (COMPUSTAT item DVT) over the crisis period.  
  Debt issue A dummy equal to one if a firm’s net debt (COMPUSTAT 
item DLTIS less DLTR) exceeds 5% of the book value of 
its total assets at year t or t+1 over the crisis period. 
  Equity issue A dummy equal to one if a firm’s net equity 
(COMPUSTAT item SSTK less PRSTKC) exceeds 5% of 
the book value of its total assets at year t or t+1 over the 
crisis period. 
Panel B Control variables  
COMPUSTAT Annual Size The natural log of the book value of total assets (AT). 
  Leverage A financing ratio measured by long-term debt (DLTT) 
plus short-term debt (DLC) over the book value of total 
assets (AT). 
  Liquidity The ratio of cash and short-term investments (CHE) 
divided by the book value of total assets (AT). 
  Cash flow A profitability ratio measured by operating income before 
depreciation (OIBDP) minus interest (XINT) minus taxes 
(TXT) over the book value of total assets (AT).  
  Tobin's Q A measure of firm's market value in comparison with its 
intrinsic value estimated by the book value of total assets 
(AT) minus book value of common equity (CEQ) plus the 
market value of common equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) over 
the book value of total assets (AT). 
  Book-to-market A measure of a firm's value estimated by the book value 
of equity (stockholders' equity (SEQ) plus deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit (TXDITC) minus preferred 
stock (PSTK)) divided by the market value of equity 
(CRSP item PRC*SHROUT). 
  OIBD A measure of a firm's operating performance estimated by 
operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) plus 




  Return on asset (ROA) A measure of a firm's operating performance estimated by 
net income (loss) (NI) over the book value of total assets 
(AT). 
  Change in OIBD A firm's OIBD in t+1, t+2, or t+3 minus OIBD in year t-1. 
  Change in ROA A firm's ROA in t+1, t+2, or t+3 minus ROA in year t-1. 
  LDC (low debt capacity) A dummy equal to one if a firm has a leverage ratio (DLTT 
+ DLC/AT) higher than the industry median and a current 
ratio measured by current assets divided by current 
liabilities (ACT/LCT) lower than the industry median. 
Industry medians are computed based on CRSP US 
Common Stocks with Fama-French 48 industry 
classification. 
SDC Core unit A dummy equal to one if a divesting firm's primary 4-digit 
SIC code is the same as that of its divested unit.  
  Non-core unit A dummy equal to one if a divesting firm's primary 4-digit 
SIC code is different from that of its divested unit.  
  Distant unit A dummy equal to one if a divesting firm's headquarter is 
located in a different state from that of its divested unit. 
  Related buyer A dummy equal to one if the primary 4-digit SIC code of 
the buyer is identical with that of the seller's divested unit.  
  Unrelated buyer A dummy equal to one if the primary 4-digit SIC code of 
the buyer is different from that of the seller's divested unit.  
CRSP Runup A divesting firm's market-adjusted value-weighted excess 
returns during the 200-day period (-205, -6) prior to 
divestiture announcement. 
  CAR A divesting firm's value weighted 3-day (-1, +1) 
cumulative abnormal return around the divestiture 
announcement date. CAR is generated using the divestor's 
stock return minus the benchmark portfolio return over the 
event window. Benchmark returns are estimated using 
market model over the period beginning -295 days and 
ending -45 days before the announcement. 
 
 
 
